Anthony Downs called this phenomenon “rational ignorance,” and it is especially significant with government-related decision-making, or “Public Choice.” Economic analysis shows us that the value of the time individuals spend informing themselves must exceed its opportunity cost. Take this into consideration when contemplating the ludicrous probability of a single participant swaying an entire election. There is very little individual upside to justify any significant effort to inform oneself on voting for the “right” solution.
Thus, ignorance is a perfectly reasonable alternative and should be a completely expected outcome of democracy. After all, the individual losses of inadequate voting are just too low to matter much, if at all. Proper examination simply doesn’t make nearly as much economic sense for political agents as it does for market ones.
But if people are choosing ignorantly, wouldn’t the properly-educated minority weigh the scale towards good, effective policies? And if, as I believe, good policy means a less-intrusive government, why does the opposite always seem to happen?
The Head Start of Statism
An important distinction must here be made: the issue at hand is not an admitted lack of knowledge. Otherwise, the very fact that voting is not random at all would completely debunk the theory. In this case, however, ignorance is knowing things wrong.
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