Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CCXXI
We’re Saved! A Nuclear Renaissance Is Upon Us, Part 3.
In Part 2 of this multipart Contemplation (see: Part 1 Website Medium, Substack; Part 2 Website Medium Substack) I present a critical perspective on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) that have become the latest and greatest nuclear power-based ‘solution’ to humanity’s energy needs. This technology is not only unproven at the scale proposed by the industry, but is already failing to live up to the promises being made by its advocates.
SMRs are being found to be: more expensive than their large counterparts and alternative energy producers (e.g., hydrocarbons, solar photovoltaic, wind turbines); producing increased amounts of radioactive waste; lacking regulatory oversight leading to increased safety risks; encountering fuel supply challenges, requiring a massive expansion of ecologically-destructive extraction; and, reliant upon a finite resource that is already in a supply deficit with the current fleet of reactors and experiencing diminishing returns on investments. All of this is challenging the assertion of inexpensive and ‘sustainable’ power generation from them that their marketers/advocates are making.
And although these SMRs are not the miracle ‘solution’ they are being marketed as, money (both government and private) continues to flow into them. I conclude with a thought experiment regarding the fuel supply issue and ‘sustainability’.
This Contemplation concentrates on the waste management ‘dilemma’.
If you’re new to my writing, check out this overview.
The Waste ‘Dilemma’
The Hitachi BWRX-300 small modular reactors being proposed for construction in North America and Europe require Uranium Dioxide (U02) fuel. As discussed in Part 2, this is not a novel fuel but is commercially available with an existing supply chain for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Like the BWRs, Hitachi’s SMR generates a variety of radioactive waste products (i.e., gas, liquid, and solid). The basis of nuclear waste safety protocols for BWRs is: to ‘dilute and disperse’ low-level radioactive gases and liquids, after they have reached a radioactivity level a fraction of natural background radiation; and, to ‘concentrate and contain’ intermediate- and high-level radioactive solids.
One of the benefits of SMRs touted by the nuclear industry is their ‘passive safety system’. This simply means that safety protocols can be maintained for about a week without external power or operator intervention. It is believed that this greatly reduces the risk of radioactive waste being released into the local environment. Despite such a safety system, all of the on-site safety protocols depend greatly on perpetual energy and material inputs, as well as human oversight. Any disruption to these places safety at risk.
The possibility of reactors losing those inputs makes my mind jump immediately to the 2003 northeast North America blackout, that was caused by: tree branches touching some power lines, leading to a drop in voltage; a software bug that failed to alert operators of the need to redistribute power in light of this; and then a cascading powering down of the complex and interconnected electrical system of much of northeast North America in response, impacting about 55 million people. This blackout lasted 3 days in some regions, impacting multiple nuclear reactors (particularly Ontario, Canada, where its reactors require multiple days to start back up), and the concern that arose at the time and followed regarding these reactors losing grid-supplied power (see: this, this, this, and/or this).
Gaseous Waste Products
Radioactive gas (primarily airborne particulates and noble gases like Krypton-85) from the turbine system is said to have reduced radioactivity levels via natural decay and constructed filtration systems that allows the gas to be released safely into the atmosphere after further dilution and safety checks. Gases are diverted to delay/holdup tanks where they remain for hours/days to allow short-lived radioactive isotopes to decay naturally and form non-radioactive, stable ones. The gas is then passed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and/or charcoal filters to remove radioactive particulates. It is further monitored for radioactivity and then vented through tall exhaust stacks/chimneys where, hopefully, it is highly diluted, and then gets dispersed into the atmosphere.
Liquid Waste Products
Radioactive liquid waste from reactor equipment, detergents, etc. is reduced in radioactivity via evaporation (the most effective method), ion exchange (liquid passed through ion-exchange resins that trap and hold radioactive ions–e.g. Cesium-137, Cobalt-60), and filtration (similar process to gas as described above), with the water being monitored and reused or released into local water systems (e.g., river, lake, ocean), while the solid waste created is held for different processing.
Despite assurances by the industry and government regulators, concerns have been raised by some regarding the effectiveness of these gas and liquid waste safety protocols, especially as it pertains to those most susceptible to radioactivity (e.g., children, pregnant women), and the apparent correlation between birth defects, miscarriages, and childhood cancers and proximity to reactors–a correlation that the industry and governments dispute.
[Note: Although these plant safety protocols are supposedly strict and carried out by ‘independent’ inspectors on a regular basis, I am reminded of my community’s abandoned gravel pits that are being ‘rehabilitated’ with construction fill that is ‘tested’ for contamination prior to being dumped into a pit sitting above important water aquifers for the province of Ontario. This testing process (that is being carried out by one of the companies profitting from the landfill process) consists of a visual and odour-based inspection of soil that is ‘suspected’ to be ‘contaminated’–it needs to smell and look okay. That’s it. Fill that is not ‘suspected’ of being contaminated does not undergo this ‘rigourous’ testing procedure. There are literally thousands of large dump trucks every day dumping such fill into the pits above these aquifers, and the companies running this seek periodic increases in the quantity of fill it is ‘allowed’ to dump; one of their most recent requests is to open the process up an extra day to run 6 days a week, 7 am to 7 pm. The fox is in charge of the henhouse at these gravel pits and I can’t help but wonder how independent and rigourous inspections are in reality for nuclear power generators since I have come to mistrust greatly (completely?) government and big business–they will often, if not always, say what is ‘needed’ but do what is expedient/inexpensive.]
Solid Waste Products
‘Low-level’ radiated solid waste (primarily concentrated liquid waste, such as spent ion exchange resins and filter sludges) are placed in 200L steel drums with cement/mortar/polymer to solidify the waste and, hopefully, prevent it from leaching into the immediate environment. Contaminated materials such as clothing, tools, and plastics are compacted and then placed in similar disposal containers.
This low-level radioactive solid waste is disposed of in dedicated near-surface repositories. These engineered trenches/vaults are designed to isolate these wastes for hundreds of years after which the radioactivity is supposedly safe–obviously this assumption has not been tested in the real world. Intermediate-level solid waste with slightly higher radioactivity (e.g., some reactor components and resins) may require longer isolation and tend to be stored on site at the reactor with high-level radioactive waste.
On-Site Uranium Waste Storage (sciencephotogallery.com)
High-level radioactive solid waste (e.g., used nuclear fuel, irradiated reactor components) is extremely radioactive and generates enormous heat. It is stored on site at nuclear power plants in spent fuel pools for cooling, requiring at least 5-10 years in such cooling pools. After this initial stage, the waste is placed in dry cask storage on site (large steel and concrete containers). Ideal long-term storage for intermediate- and high-level solid waste is in deep geological repositories as it is believed to be ‘problematic’ for anywhere from 1000 to 100,000+ years–more on this ‘solution’ below.
Waste-Handling Concerns and Critiques
During the January 2025 public hearings carried out by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, a number of experts expressed deep concern over the BWRX-300 waste-handling plans and the SMR design. These included: dismay that the above-ground spent fuel pools being proposed had no protected containment structure making them more vulnerable to disturbance of any kind (e.g., aircraft impact, conflict scenario, extreme weather); dispute of the claims these reactors were ‘inherently safe’ with their safety systems being oversimplified (e.g., the single Isolation Condenser System that replaced multiple and redundant safety systems in the design’s larger predecessor); and, a rush to begin construction prior to finalisation of approval, arguing this hurried regulatory process was politically- and industry-driven as opposed to engineering and technical readiness, thereby increasing the risks substantially.
In addition, the BWRX-300 actually produces solid waste that has a higher radioactivity per volume of solid waste than other reactors, requiring more robust handling, shielding, and storage processes. The heavier spent fuel casks would also require some infrastructure upgrades in order to be handled correctly (e.g., hauling roads, equipment). And, the ‘recycling’ claims to reduce waste toxicity by the industry are questionable, being unproven at scale.
Finally, the need for deep geological repositories to store used fuel safely for anywhere from 1000 to 100,000+ years (whose safety ‘guarantees’ are theoretical for the most part), is where the ‘rubber truly hits the road’.
Deep Geological Repositories: The Magic Bullet For Highly-Radioactive Solid Waste
The answer provided by the industry and governments across the planet for the storage of the high-level radioactive solid waste created by nuclear power plants is always deep geological repositories (DGRs)–and has been for decades.
Onkalo Deep Geological Repository (gettyimages.com)
The idea (because there are currently no functioning, only under construction, repositories; and safety assurances are based on scientifically-supported ‘best guess’) is that extremely long-term storage in a deep, stable and impermeable rock formation with a multi-barrier system will isolate radioactive material from the biosphere for hundreds of thousands of years until its radioactivity dissipates. In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of tonnes of highly-radioactive waste continues to be stored ‘temporarily’ on site at nuclear reactor plants–currently estimated at 390,000 tonnes, everything that has been created since the first reactors went online.
This ‘temporary’, now 75-year long, storage in cooling ponds or dry casks at reactor sites requires constant monitoring, security, and maintenance. As such, they are vulnerable on a number of levels: natural disasters, human error, and societal upheaval/change over hundreds of millennia. Without a permanent ‘solution’, future generations and the local environment are at extreme risk.
The theory behind DGRs is that passive safety features and long-term, geological predictability will ensure radioactivity is contained for the 100,000+ years needed. DGRs do not rely upon energy inputs, human intervention, or societal stability. Once sealed, the waste should be safe from affecting the surface environment. The main goal is to keep the radioactive waste from impacting the biosphere and the hope is that by placing the material deep underground with a multi-barrier system it will be kept protected from any surface threats, natural or human. And the belief is that scientists can predict the behaviour of rock formations much more confidently than that of surface structures or human societies.
Multi-Barrier System
The proposal is that radioactive material will be immobilised within a stable solid (e.g., borosilicate glass, ceramic), then placed in a massive, corrosion-resistant container usually made from copper, steel, or a special alloy that ‘hopefully’ will withstand high pressure and corrosion for hundreds of millennia. These canisters are to be buried within a thick layer of compacted bentonite clay that will swell when wet to create a watertight seal, resist geological shifts, and filter out potential contaminants. The most important aspect will be the rock that the repository is located in and its stability. Of additional importance is a lack of groundwater and isolation from surface events such as earthquakes or climate change.
These repositories are not merely dumps but highly-sophisticated systems designed to address the long-term needs of storing intermediate- and high-level radioactive waste for very long periods of time, as opposed to the ongoing ‘interim’ approach of storing it at nuclear generation sites where it has been accumulating since plants first were opened in the 1950s.
Sweden’s Proposed DGR (powermag.com)
Excellent ‘Solution’, Except…
Perhaps the biggest ‘hiccup’ in this ingenious plan is that there are, as of the current moment, no functioning DGR facilities for intermediate- and high-level radioactive waste, and plans for only a handful of them. This despite ongoing accumulation of waste and plans to triple (or more) the current fleet of reactors.
There exist only five relatively advanced projects as of today, with various operational projected dates: Onkalo, mid-2020s (Finland); Forsmark, 2030s (Sweden); NWMO, 2040ish (Canada); Cigéo, 2050ish (France); Nagra, 2050ish (Switzerland). Such complex repositories are highly regulated given the expectations for containing waste for hundreds of millennia, and take decades to construct after years of siting and licensing.
While high-level radioactive waste is estimated to make up only about 1% of the waste created by nuclear power generation, and intermediate-level about 4%, these products are slated for DGRs given their danger to the biosphere. As of this moment, there are approximately 390,000 tonnes of high-level waste and four times that of intermediate-level waste, resulting in close to 2 million tonnes of waste looking for DGR storage.
It should be noted that reprocessing of spent fuel is possible and helps to reduce the volume of it, with some 30% of this built-up high-level waste inventory having gone through this already–however, this is a very expensive endeavour (both in terms of money and energy/materials) and waste storage (on site and in DGRs) is the preferred method; although this may change depending upon economic circumstances and peak uranium concerns. Currently, only a few countries reprocess spent fuel (e.g., France, Japan, Russia, India). Of additional note is that reprocessing of the spent fuel is geopolitically charged given that it produces weapons-grade isotopes–the supposed main reason the United States halted its reprocessing, although it is reconsidering this position (I tend to believe the US decision was primarily motivated by the economics of the endeavour given the imperial ambitions of the US Empire but, hey, who am I to disbelieve what the US government and its nuclear industry claims as to why they don’t reprocess spent fuel).
The case is also being made by some that next-generation, fast-neutron reactors will run on spent fuel, thereby closing the fuel cycle and eliminating highly-radioactive spent fuel concerns. And if unicorns were real…
Leaving aside the as-yet-to-be-hatched technological chickens that may or may not hatch (most never do, BTW), the proposed DGRs are limited in the amount of high- and intermediate-level radioactive waste that they can host. The five under-construction sites can hold approximately 135,000 of the almost 2 million tonnes currently in storage at nuclear power generating plants–just under 15% of the current total. And these are not slated for sealing of deposited waste for at least another 50 years…so add the growth of waste (estimated at over 11,000 tonnes per year currently) sitting in storage at sites on top of this over the next few decades, along with the proposed growth in nuclear plants, and A LOT of waste will continue to pile up at nuclear reactor sites despite DGRs beginning to take in waste. And with SMRs being rolled out (coming to a community near you?), the number of sites where radioactive waste will be stored will increase dramatically.
All in all, this DGR ‘solution’ to highly-radioactive nuclear waste is helping to manage just a fraction of what exists, and what is planned to accumulate. But this is the ‘answer’ to the waste ‘problem’ being thrown about by the nuclear industry, governments, and pro-nuclear advocates. Like WTAF?
I cannot be the only one who sees that the ‘solution’ to our radioactive waste ‘problem’ is to place a finger-sized bandage on a gaping, arterial wound and then pass this off as saving the patient–all while the wound continues to enlarge. It’s beyond delusional to believe this is addressing the issue. But here we are, looking at tripling (or more) the nuclear reactor fleet and creating narratives that everything is fine, just fine, and continuing to assure everyone that the future can take care of any potential ‘problems’ because…human ingenuity and technology.
(pininterest.com)
In the final part of this multi-part Contemplation on the nuclear renaissance, I will indulge myself with another thought experiment that highlights the lunacy of this endeavour and revisit some aspects of the ‘electrify everything’ narrative that I have discussed previously.
Recent and relevant articles:
Electricity Prices Extend Rise, Regulators Rein In Data Centers | ZeroHedge
What We Burn To Speak To Machines
No, Nuclear Energy Won’t Save Us – The Honest Sorcerer
Nuclear power is not the solution | Peak Everything, Overshoot, & Collapse
Eight Slides on the Future of Electricity Prices
Fatal Delusion and the Curse Of Maximum Power
Is AI a Catalyst for Growth–or For Collapse?
The Long Twilight of Growth | Art Berman
Trump’s Nuclear Revolution: The Policy That Could Redefine U.S. Power
The Prospects for Billion-Dollar-Plus SMR and Fusion Nuclear Projects
What is going to be my standard WARNING/ADVICE going forward and that I have reiterated in various ways before this:
“Only time will tell how this all unfolds but there’s nothing wrong with preparing for the worst by ‘collapsing now to avoid the rush’ and pursuing self-sufficiency. By this I mean removing as many dependencies on the Matrix as is possible and making do, locally. And if one can do this without negative impacts upon our fragile ecosystems or do so while creating more resilient ecosystems, all the better. Building community (maybe even just household) resilience to as high a level as possible seems prudent given the uncertainties of an unpredictable future. There’s no guarantee it will ensure ‘recovery’ after a significant societal stressor/shock but it should increase the probability of it and that, perhaps, is all we can ‘hope’ for from its pursuit.”
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