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Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXC–Beyond Collapse: Climate Change and Causality During the Middle Holocene Climatic Transition
Tulum, Mexico. (1986) Photo by author.
This Contemplation comments upon and summarises a paper that considers prehistorical periods of rapid climatic transition and societal-level responses to the resulting environmental changes. I thought it interesting to review this research article given the significant concern many have regarding how humans may respond to current/future climatic shifts and the changes that result from them.
Many variables of significant, possibly existential, importance to human existence will increasingly be impacted by a changing climate, including but not limited to: biodiversity loss, extreme weather events, disease propagation, altered geographies, and resource availability and distribution–especially water and arable land. Whether our species, or any for that matter, will or can adapt to these changes in either the short-term or long-term is unknown–there exist diametrically-opposed views on this, from widespread extinction of all life to a ‘clean’ and ‘sustainable’ techno-utopia in balance with nature.
The research article in question looks at the changes that took place during the Middle Holocene Climatic Transition (MHCT), a glacial-interglacial transition period of rapid climate change, and how human societies of the time responded to the resulting environmental shifts.
As the author makes clear the comparison is not perfect, primarily because of the differences in the nature of the climate shifts and the human population density and distribution dissimilarities. However, he also points out that it is somewhat analogous in that complex societies were in existence during the changes, so we can draw some parallels based upon how past societies responded to unpredictable and chaotic changes in their environment.
What’s interesting to me is that the evidence can be interpreted as hopeful for some form of successful adaptation as our world changes due to a shifting climate. While some groups were forced to disperse and others perished in the face of a rapidly changing climate, the emergence of urbanisation and complex societies as a result of adapting to environmental shifts occurred as well. There are, of course, significant caveats that suggest modern-day complex societies will not be so lucky as to adapt to changes in anything like their present form and/or population densities.
There exist a number of impediments for our present-day societies and their adaptability to environmental shifts in comparison to those of the past. Below are three of these.
First, there is a very large segment of today’s global population that is enormously reliant upon industrial technologies for maintenance of a vast array of complexities, particularly food production and distribution. These technologies, in turn, are dependent upon a finite energy resource (hydrocarbons) up and down their supply chains. Disruptions in the complex array of supports to maintain our energy-intensive technologies put many modern human populations at risk.
Second, there are few resource-rich regions left on the planet for human societies to expand into and exploit relative to the past. The hyper-charged population densities and distribution we currently have (thanks to the significant surplus energy of easy-to-access hydrocarbons) make the successful adaptations that past societies exhibited far less likely–to say little about the increasing loss of fertility of much of our arable land due to excessive use of hydrocarbon-based chemicals upon them. There was much greater capacity for growth during shifts in the past with smaller population densities, more sparsely distributed settlements, minimal complexity, and resource abundance. The latitude available for past societies to adapt to environmental changes is gone for 8+ billion (and growing) of our species. Add to this the reality of having encountered diminishing returns on investments whereby greater and greater resources (especially energy) must be used to meet current needs, let alone growing ones.
Third, there exists for large swaths of our global population a general lack of skills and knowledge to survive without our energy-intensive technologies and various logistical/organisational systems. In the past, the vast majority of people were involved in food production and could support themselves and/or their families without complex societal systems sustaining them. That is certainly not the case today with few within our populations capable of providing anyone with the basic necessities of existence–potable water, food, and/or regional shelter needs.
Overall, things do not bode well for modern-day societies to rely upon the adaptations of the past that proved successful in the face of rapid environmental changes.
I, personally, am as confident as I can be that ‘collapse’ of our global, industrialised complex societies is in our future–many argue that it has already begun. I am unsure, however, of what arises in terms of human existence from this predicament; if anything given the degree to which we appear to be in ecological overshoot.
With our propensity to double down on our pursuit of technological innovation and economic growth in the face of perceived problems (rather than pursuing a simplification and contraction of our lifestyles) we are exacerbating our predicaments and creating a situation whereby the likelihood of adapting to changing conditions is being made significantly more difficult and unlikely by the day.
Only time, of course, will tell what the future holds for humanity…
Below is a summary of the research article. The longer summary notes can be found here.
Beyond Collapse: Climate Change and Causality During the Middle Holocene Climatic Transition, 6400-5000 Years Before Present
Nick Brooks
Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography
2013
Vol. 112, No. 2, 93-104
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00167223.2012.741881
Our changing climate is expected to mirror the shift witnessed during glacial-interglacial transitions, only more quickly and possibly reach global average temperatures not seen for millions of years. While changes to our oceanic and atmospheric currents are not precisely known, previous transitions do suggest that the availability and distribution of key resources (especially water and arable land) will be altered and likely affect human societies.
Analogues exist from the past 10,000 years, when cyclical climate disruptions have occurred every 1000-2000 years lasting 100-300 years. These are characterised by cooling at high and middle latitudes, and increased aridity at lower ones–especially in the northern hemisphere. These changes have been linked to warfare and population collapse, and the collapse of several complex societies (e.g., Arkkadian, Egyptian Old Kingdom, Neolithic cultures, and others).
The Middle Holocene Climatic Transition (MHCT, 6500-5000 BP) witnessed a significant environmental reorganisation due to an acceleration of cooling and increasing aridity trends. Some regions experienced sudden arid conditions, others glacial advance. Monsoons weakened with rains moving southward, and El Niño reappeared after a prolonged absence. The global climate system appears to have been impacted by summer solar radiation weakening outside of the tropics due to a rotational axis shift.
The present day is different from the MHCT in several ways: warming vs. cooling, increasing greenhouse gasses vs. a solar insolation shift, and retreat of ice and snow vs. glacial advance. The distribution of changes will be different as well and the present day may experience greater aridity, especially outside of monsoon regions.
The societal contexts are very different (e.g., population densities and distribution) but also similar (e.g., large urban centres and state-level societies with hierarchical structures and political institutions, as well as some small-scale agriculture and pastoralism).
All regions studied exhibited societal shifts that coincided with rapid climate shifts. In Mesopotamia, egalitarian village-level farming communities coalesced into a hierarchical culture and agricultural settlements were abandoned with the rise of urban centres. In Egypt, many migrated to the Nile River Valley, and in some areas cattle herding increased but in a mobile sense with populations seeking appropriate pastures due to an unpredictable environment. In the Indus Valley, pastoral societies arose with cyclical migration.
Migration patterns, livelihoods, and settlement and occupation patterns all changed in light of increased aridity. In particular, increasing aridity led to movement towards reliable water sources and/or arable lands, the rise of nomadic pastoralism in order to follow grazable pastures, and increasing exploitation of riparian environments (ecosystem along the edge of water bodies).
“Worsening environmental conditions may well have altered patterns of productivity, resulting in the abandonment of some areas, the agglomeration of populations in others, increased competition over resources, and widespread social disruption.” (p. 98)
Near the end of the MHCT (5300-5000 BP) some cultures in Mesopotamia (e.g., Uruk) collapsed with nomadic pastoralism arising, while some areas witnessed dispersed populations coming together to form urban centres (e.g., Uruk-Warka). Resource competition between protostates in Egypt resulted in a larger, complex society centred on the Nile River Valley, while some regions experienced settlement abandonment and populations perishing. A shift towards greater transhumance (seasonal pastoralism) in the Indus Valley led to the emergence of urbanisation. Migration towards the Yellow River in China witnessed a shift from early complex societies to larger and more complex ones. The river valleys of coastal Peru also saw the emergence of urbanisation as people gathered in such resource-rich locations.
Aridification appears to have impacted migrations towards reliable water sources, where many gathered and resulted in urbanisation and complexity, including social stratification, class/caste systems, and formal political power.
The archaeological evidence points to some complex societies collapsing as a result of environmental changes due to a changing climate. On the other hand, there is also evidence that some complex societies appear to have emerged as a consequence of climate change. It would appear that different contexts had different, even the opposite, outcome when climate changes occurred in the past.
During the MHCT some regions experienced sudden arid conditions, others glacial advance. Monsoons weakened with rains moving south, El Niño reappeared after a prolonged absence. Summer solar radiation weakening outside the tropics due to a rotational axis shift that impacted the global climate system. The present day is different. Rather than cooling and glacial advances due to a solar insolation shift we are experiencing warming with snow and ice retreat due to greenhouse gasses.
The societal contexts are different in terms of population densities and distribution but similar in terms of large, urban centres and state-level societies with social hierarchies and political institutions along with some small-scale agriculture and pastoralism).
All regions studied exhibit societal shifts that coincide with rapid climate changes. In Mesopotamia, egalitarian village-level farming communities coalesced into a hierarchical culture. Migrations to the Nile River Valley in Egypt occurred alongside a rise in nomadic pastoralism that required movement to follow suitable pastures during a time of unpredictable environments. Meanwhile, in the Indus Valley, pastoral societies emerged defined by seasonal migrations.
Depending where one looks, there is strong evidence to support the interpretation that rapid environmental change led to societal-level changes. Migration patterns, livelihoods, and settlement and occupation patterns all changed in light of increasing aridity. In particular, increasing aridity led to: movement towards reliable water sources and arable lands; increasing nomadic pastoralism to follow suitable pasturelands; increasing exploitation of riparian environments; and the abandonment of settlements.
“The evidence from the Middle Holocene discussed here suggests that rapid climate change played a role in the emergence of complex societies, as well as their collapse, and that similar climatic stresses might result in very different outcomes in different societal contexts.” (p. 100)
In some instances, climate change overwhelmed other drivers of societal change and adaptation was not possible. Depending upon the circumstances, however, other societies adapted.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
Released September 30, 2024
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVIX–Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability
Tulum, Mexico (1986). Photo by author.
This Contemplation shares my thoughts on and a summary of an article by archaeologist Joseph Tainter that discusses societal problem solving’s complexity, history, and prospects for sustaining a society. It follows nicely from the four-part series I just completed regarding societal ‘collapse’ being primarily the result of stress surges following a prolonged period of diminishing returns in problem solving (See here: Part 1 (Website; Medium; Substack), 2 (Website; Medium; Substack), 3 (Website; Medium; Substack), and 4 (Website; Medium; Substack)).
Tainter’s focus in the paper is to better understand the problem-solving process so that societal ‘collapse’ is avoided. His goal is to identify problem-solving strategies that provide sustainable existence. One of the issues discussed is the human tendency to simplify complex issues and depend upon decision-making processes that minimise or ignore complexities. This results in a ‘solution’ that has only a tenuous connection to the ‘problem’ and eventually leads to system-wide consequences that may appear years/decades after the ‘solution’ is put into place.
While during and after reading the article (summarised below) I had some of the following thoughts.
It’s a common assertion by some that it is our ‘solutions’ to ‘problems’ that invariably lead to further problems that, in turn, require more problem solving.
This is perhaps a consequence of the fact that our solutions are often in terms of furthering societal complexity and as a result of implementing them create secondary and tertiary issues that require their own problem solving.
It is likely also the outcome of the fact that our solutions tend to be focused on short-term/immediate results and we are less worried (if at all) about the longer-term consequences that arise from our problem solving. It doesn’t help this limited thinking that the ‘benefits’ of the solution are highlighted by those with a vested interest in seeing the solution implemented, and the possible negative qualities downplayed or ignored. This leads not only to the acceptance of the proposed solution by most but contributes to the belief that the problem has been solved and our problem-solving approach is always successful. Solutions work!
When later negative consequences arise as a result of the solution put in place, they are not easily attributed to the earlier action/policy. Lag times between solutions and problems contribute to this perception as well, with supposed benefits occurring ‘immediately’ and some consequences not appearing for long periods of time–sometimes years/decades.
As Tainter points out in the article summarised below, it’s also often the case that solutions are only tenuously connected to the perceived problem they are supposedly addressing and thus not only are more problems created but the impacts of the problem persist, requiring further redress via more problem solving.
In addition to the above, it’s my belief that part of this exponential proliferation of societal problems occurs because the solutions used to address them are not only increasing complexity, tenuously connected to the problem, and focused upon short-term results, but often (if not always) a repercussion of the ruling elite taking advantage of the problem-/crisis-at-hand and leveraging it to support other agendas–especially the control/expansion of the wealth-generation/-extraction systems that provide their revenue streams and thus positions of power and prestige. This ultimately ends up in creating more problems as the solutions offered and carried out are only marginally addressing the issue-at-hand, as Tainter asserts.
It is primarily in the marketing/spin of the solution by the mass media, governments, and associated businesses/industries (all the benefactors of the ‘solution’ put in place) that any policies/actions are fully and completely related to the problem. But in reality the solution is fundamentally the creation/expansion of a ‘racket’ that further enriches those who sit atop a society’s power and wealth structures. If the problem were actually solved, the monetary enrichment and the increase in social control often garnered by the elite via their ‘solutions’ would be stymied. And this is not what the ruling caste wishes to see happen.
There are of course a variety of additional reasons why any particular solution to a perceived problem leads to other problems that require other solutions. System complexity. Incomplete data/knowledge. Biased perspective. Blind spots. Groupthink. Etc..
Regardless of why solutions lead to even more problems, the issue for Tainter is that there appear to be three fundamental societal-level consequences/results of human problem solving:
It would appear that the most often pursued problem-solving strategy of furthering complexity to address issues tends to result in new problems that require even more complexity leading to a positive feedback loop:
NEW PROBLEM(S)
↓ ↑
PROBLEM → SOLUTION(S) OF MORE COMPLEXITY
This pursuit of further complexity, however, requires evermore energy-resource subsidies. Of course (at least for those who acknowledge biogeophysical reality), this furtherance of complexity that relies upon continually increasing energy and other resources is a distinct issue on a planet with finite resources.
In the past, solutions of increased complexity had relatively minor impacts upon ecological systems and society–especially when their scale was relatively small. For example, riverine irrigation or the burning of biomass at a small scale did not result in massive ecological systems destruction, the overloading of planetary sinks, or major societal shifts. However, increasing the scale of even these basic ‘solutions’ can become problematic.
From an environmental perspective, sinks may become overloaded resulting in planetary/regional boundaries being overshot–something we are witnessing in modern times as 8+ billion humans (and especially those in so-called ‘advanced’ economic societies) strive to exist and depend upon complex industrial technologies that require finite resources, especially hydrocarbons. From a sociopolitical perspective, large-scale irrigation projects require significant labour organisation, communication, and surplus-distribution institutions that can lead to increases in societal-level bureaucracies and increasing inequality.
Homo sapiens’ original lifestyle of nomadic hunting and gathering consisted of relatively limited complexity requiring minimal energy/resource subsidies to support it. It could be supported quite well with local, natural resources and human labour. It was a successful strategy for the overwhelming majority of our species’ existence. Environmental challenges and/or population pressures were met with minimal increases in technological and/or social complexity, and/or migration to un/underexploited regions–perhaps even the breaking off of small groups.
However, for the past 6000-12000 years, the primary problem-solving strategy of our species has become one of increasing complexity. This strategy unfortunately leads in the long run to negative impacts upon ‘sustainability’. In the moment of addressing immediate problems, long-term consequences tend to be ignored/denied as they are not of relevance in the here-and-now. Our default has become that because of our ingenuity and technological prowess, at some future time some technological ‘breakthrough’ will ‘solve’ any new problems/issues that may arise.
With a population performing at about minimal or close to basic sufficiency needs (e.g., hunting gathering), there existed a massive capacity to increase productivity with just human labour. Innovations (e.g., irrigation, draught animals, organisational institutions) attributed to human ingenuity could push productivity even higher and expansion over a number of years/decades/centuries could create a sense of such increases in complexity and technological ‘improvements’ being forever possible. Infinite growth on a finite planet IS entirely possible and not unreasonable from this perspective due to human ingenuity and technology.
Any ‘problems’ are also completely ‘solvable’ and not anything to be concerned about. We are the ‘wise human’ or ‘thinking man’. We can do any and everything we can imagine. Look at us, we’re great! [NOTE: from a psychological perspective our self-serving bias (part of attribution theory) tends to always attribute success to something internal–in this situation, our uniquely human ingenuity–while failures are the result of external factors.]
An important insight by Tainter that demonstrates a disconnect between our seeming self-congratulatory hubris that we can solve any problem is that: “with every victory over nature, the difficulty of achieving breakthroughs which lie ahead is increased”–classic diminishing returns on investments in complexity. I was reminded here of the ‘faith’ by so many in the energy transition sphere where almost all the success of shifting away from hydrocarbons to ‘renewables’ of some type rests on as-yet-to-be-hatched technological chickens and/or the scaling up of some current technologies that would require energy/resources beyond the capacity of our finite planet to provide.
This faith almost invariably ignores the impacts upon ecological systems of the continued resource extraction and processing needed for our complex, materials-based technologies. Some provide passing acknowledgement with the proviso that they are less problematic than hydrocarbons but this, in turn, ignores the significant hydrocarbon (and other finite resource) inputs required for scaling up the industrial technologies they are advocating and is blind to the multitude of variables (i.e., complexity) of the problem (actually predicament) at hand–this being almost always due to carbon tunnel vision: we just have to address carbon emissions and our complex society is ‘saved’.
The Byzantine ‘simplification’ that Tainter discusses is one of the rare instances of a society ‘voluntarily’ contracting–but its simplification was perhaps not truly voluntary/managed but demonstrated some adaptive responses to general ‘collapse’. An approach that some argue is the typical response of a society to issues rather than actual collapse: complex societies don’t ‘collapse’, they simplify in response to circumstances. This seems to me to be somewhat of a semantic argument and one I discussed in my previous Contemplation series.
As I stated near the end of my last Contemplation: “…I wish to highlight the primary response typically pursued by the elite and that we are already bearing witness to, and will likely see much more of in the years ahead: opting to pursue increased complexity to address perceived problems.”
As Tainter points out in the article summarised below: a society pursuing a problem-solving strategy of increased complexity ends in ‘collapse’ if there is no energy subsidy available to sustain it.
At this point in time, there is not only no scalable and ecologically-neutral energy subsidy waiting in the wings to save us and our complex societies from ourselves, but we have blown past the natural environmental carrying capacity of our planet thanks to the subsidies provided by hydrocarbons and rocketed into ecological overshoot where most of the planetary boundaries for sustainable living have been left far behind in the dust.
This has but one inevitable near-term ending: societal ‘collapse’ (or ‘simplification’, if it makes you feel better to call it that). Only time will tell whether extinction accompanies our plight.
Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability
Joseph A. Tainter
Population and Environment, Sep., 2000, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 3-41
This article by archaeologist Joseph Tainter follows from his general thesis that human societies are at their basic functioning a problem-solving organisation which primarily uses the strategy of increasing complexity to address issues that arise. He argues that while such an approach can be quite successful in the short term, it is cumulatively detrimental to the sustainability of the society resulting eventually in ‘collapse’, simplification, or the pursuit of increasing complexity via increasing energy subsidies.
His goal is to better understand the development of our problem-solving strategies by studying examples through pre/history so that modern society can choose ‘solutions’ to problems that are ‘sustainable’ in nature.
After outlining a variety of constraints to the effectiveness and durability of institutional problem solving (e.g., environmental; structural–including other institutions; internal transaction efficiency; human cognition limits), he suggest that ‘solutions’ may often have only a tenuous connection with the problem and result in system-wide consequences that may appear years/decades after implemented.
Our societies tend to become more complex (more parts, types of parts, and integration of parts), especially so over the past 12,000 years (5000-6000 for state-level societies). There is a cost (in terms of resources, labour, etc.) to this but it has also provided utility in problem solving.
As an adaptive, problem-solving strategy, complexity investments can be effective initially when the easiest/cheapest solutions are used but this approach loses effectiveness over time as more difficult/expensive solutions are necessary–this is diminishing returns. As return on investments decrease, society becomes more vulnerable to collapse.
A great example arises in resource production where the easiest-to-acquire/-process/-distribute/-consume resources are initially used. As consumption increases and/or resource availability decreases, greater costs/effort must be used with non increase in returns.
The same is true for knowledge production where productivity declines over time; i.e., each additional year of education past the first couple results in decreasing increases in productivity. Investments in more complex research, for example, grows exponentially while ‘progress’ rates do not, with each subsequent ‘breakthrough’ taking longer, costing more, and being less likely.
While the ‘solutions’ being pursued appear rational in the moment, mostly because costs and complexity are only slightly incremental, the cumulative and long-term impacts irreparably harm the systems involved.It is the cumulative nature of small increases in complexity and costs that cause negative impacts in the long term. As Tainter stresses, “[t]his is the key to understanding the development of unsupportable complexity: it grows by small steps , each necessary, each a reasonable solution to a problem.” (p. 19)
In using the Western Roman Empire as an example, Tainter points out that the economies of imperialism are such that initial subjugation provides the best returns (appropriated surpluses) but once governing costs are assumed such returns decline. These increased costs lead eventually to the need to devalue the currency to cover the growing shortfalls. This currency debasement led to insolvency and military funding issues, which resulted in military contraction and foreign invasion success. Domestic unrest also rose as living standards fell.
The response from the elites was to increase complexity by growing the governing bureaucracies, doubling the size of the military, increasing taxes, conscripting labour, and dictating occupations. The empire “became a coercive, omnipresent state that tabulated and amassed all resources for its own survival.” (p. 22)
As taxes became more burdensome, lands were abandoned with peasants seeking protection from wealthy landowners. Eventually negative feedback loops arose where lost provinces led to lost revenue that hurt military funding leading to more lost regions. The Roman military eventually disbanded, and the Germanic tribes the emperor was using overthrew him when they were not paid, In 476 A.D. the Western Roman Empire was officially no more.
Tainter also discusses the Early Byzantine Recovery episode where it was able to come back from near total collapse (at least until the Turks took Constantinople in 1453. Where the West’s emperors of the 3rd and 4th centuries responded to the crises via increased complexity, those of the East’s 7th and 8th centuries found a period of ‘simplification’ extended their society’s existence.
Civic and military administrations were merged, cities contracted to fortified hilltops, education and literacy were scaled back to basics, and a class of peasant-soldiers arose–paid with land rather than a debased currency so long as they and their eldest male (and so on) provided military service.
Finally, Tainter holds up the centuries-long military arms race of modern Europe as a classic example of diminishing returns on complexity (focusing upon the 1400-1815 time frame). For example, siege guns laid waste to the advantage of stone castles. This led to the development of defensive canons and fortified walls. These changes were expensive and prevented large militaries from forming but also led to more expensive siege methods. Despite such ongoing changes, the outcome was usually a stalemate.
The most significant constraint was funding as complexity via technological innovations grew faster than revenue and the necessary resources to support it. To sustain this arms race, European states ended up drawing upon ever-larger segments of society, eventually using trade wealth and colonisation (via their resources) to fund their military adventures.
The three examples Tainter draws upon show the basic outcomes to societal problem-solving: collapse (Western Roman Empire); simplification (Early Byzantine Recovery); and, growing complexity alongside energy subsidy growth (modern Europe).
Tainter concludes that for state-level sustainability to be successful, research needs to focus upon complexity and attempts to identify problem-solving strategies that are sustainable. Modern societies have become increasingly complex the past couple of centuries and especially since the discovery of hydrocarbon energy subsidies. But this subsidy is waning and will come to an end in the near future and it is our understanding of problem-solving systems and the three outcomes that might help to inform how we respond.
We can continue to grow complexity while experiencing diminishing returns, and proceed towards collapse. We can simplify our existence and extend our societies. Or, we can grow our complexities while hoping we discover an energy subsidy…
The longer summary notes of the article can be found here.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
Released September 30, 2024
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVIII–Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 4
Knossos, Greece (1988). Photo by author.
This Contemplation follows from Part 1 (Website; Medium; Substack), 2 (Website; Medium; Substack), and 3 (Website; Medium; Substack) that was prompted by the devastation brought to the southeastern United States by way of Hurricane Helene. This recent natural disaster (followed closely by Hurricane Milton) is but one of dozens to hit the globe during the past year.
As I stated in the introductory Contemplation “my own immediate reaction to the significant damage and a few articles/conversations with others has me viewing the tragedy that is unfolding as another step in the path towards ‘collapse’ of the U.S. nation as currently constructed. Another straw, as it were, on the camel’s back that supports societal complexity for this particular nation state/empire–which would have repercussions for most other societies on our planet given U.S. global hegemony (and its faltering nature).”
In Part 1, I describe how complexity and collapse are viewed in archaeologist Joseph Tainter’s thesis (See: The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge University Press, 1988. (ISBN 978-0-521-38673-9)). Part 2 looks at diminishing returns and begins to explore what the ‘collapse’ process entails, i.e., what occurs during and what follows the loss of sociopolitical complexity. Part 3 expands on what the past tells us about what a large, complex society experiences as it is in the process of ‘collapse’, what it looks like post ‘collapse’, and began to touch on what our present-day complex societies may have in store as we continue along the path of increasing complexity while encountering diminishing returns.
In this Contemplation I review the patterns that past complex society collapses exhibit and what this suggests for those of us alive today as our exceedingly complex, globalised industrial society gets rather long in the tooth.
Past Collapse Patterns
Let me begin by summarising the previous three Contemplations that provide an overview of what Dr. Joseph Tainter argues the archaeological evidence shows with respect to the changes that occur over the lifespan of a complex society–particularly its ‘collapse’ phase.
First, society is viewed as a problem-solving organisation that forms to address the stresses that arise from living in an unpredictable and occasionally chaotic environment (both biogeophysically and socioculturally). Problem solving requires resources (especially energy) for its technological innovations and/or organisational growth of problem-solving institutions. A significant consequence of our problem-solving strategies is increasing complexity.
The ‘costs’ of problem solving are met easily during a society’s growth phase when return on investments is high (due to resource surpluses being abundant) and ‘solutions’ are relatively simple in nature. However, complexity and its associated costs are cumulative in nature resulting in ever-increasing costs and ever-decreasing returns on investments. This results in a continuous drawdown of resources (particularly the least costly, easiest-to-access ones) and ever-growing demands upon the populace (especially via labour and/or ‘taxes’). Note that along with growth in complexity comes an increase in social differentiation, inequality, centralisation, and social control mechanisms.
In the face of ever-increasing complexity and costs, the speed of declining returns intensifies until a point is reached where they turn negative and greater and greater inputs/costs are needed just to sustain society. The perceived benefits of evermore societal investments begin to fade as reserves are increasingly drawn upon, leaving less and less for problem solving (which is becoming more difficult), and demands upon the population grow.
Increasingly, problems are poorly addressed or not resolved at all. Subsequently, citizen dissatisfaction grows–especially apathy towards the polity and its elite–with some individuals and/or small social units ‘opting out’ of the larger community. As a result of all these changes, the economic strength of the polity falters creating a positive feedback loop that is increasingly difficult to halt or reverse.
Once diminishing returns are encountered, a society becomes more susceptible to stress surges that may overwhelm its various institutions/systems. The increasing failure of societal problem solving leads greater numbers of people to lose faith in the polity and its elite to meet the challenges that arise. People also begin to lose faith in the problem-solving strategy of ever-increasing complexity.
The collapse process is marked by: falling benefits for society as a whole—mostly impacted are the masses since the elite (those that sit atop a society’s power and wealth structures) tend to be insulated in a number of ways; substantial cost increases and demands on the public; population decline with increasing numbers opting out, typically via migration elsewhere; and, growing negative impacts upon the environment as the drawdown and use of biogeophysical resources increases exponentially in attempts to offset diminishing returns.
One typical elite response is the imposition of strict sociobehavioural controls—usually via legitimisation activities and/or oppressive control mechanisms—to try and decrease inefficiencies and sustain their revenue streams and positions of prestige. Perhaps the primary and overarching response is to increase the pursuit of complexity. This, however, exacerbates resource drawdown and negative impacts upon the environment leading to a quickening of diminishing returns and turning them negative. In turn, more and more of the population opt for simplification and withdraw support for the polity.
“Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold…”
-William Yeats, 1920
The Second Coming
As a result of diminishing returns and faltering support, the polity’s revenues begin to fall with the elite further burdening their citizens to sustain themselves. The standard response to this situation is currency debasement that tends to lead to lower living standards for the masses. As a result of decreasing revenue and increasing costs, especially for the military, foreign challengers meet with greater success. Domestic unrest also rises, with some regions breaking away. With a fall in energy-averaging systems, self-sufficiency grows. Technology simplifies to that which can be developed and maintained locally.
Societal ‘collapse’ is signalled, then, by a simplification (a reversal of fortunes as it were) in all of the aspects that growing complexity brought, including: social stratification/differentiation; economic/occupational specialisation; centralised control/regimentation (especially sociobehavioural); epiphenomena of growth (e.g., monumental architecture, artistic and literary achievements); information flow; energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade); societal organisation/coordination; and territorial expansion.
Collapse In the Present
Our hominin species has been present on Earth for about 300,000 years. Most of that time it has sustained itself via a hunting-gathering lifestyle. These groups were still complex in nature and used technological innovations to meet their basic needs, but their size, sociopolitical complexity, and technology was limited in nature relative to today’s global, industrial societies. Growth of groups that might overshoot the carrying capacity of the surrounding natural environment–placing pressure upon sustainability and requiring sociopolitical complexity–was primarily dealt with by some small group of members breaking off and seeking an unexploited region. Migration was perhaps one of the primary means of dealing with population pressures for millennia.
It is primarily during the past 12,000 years or so (and especially the last 6000) that evidence suggests a different mode of living arose where much larger groups formed and began to solve the stressors of existence via ever-increasing sociopolitical complexity that involved more technological innovations and the development of hierarchical social institutions to organise and distribute surpluses (that has been kicked into hyper-exponential change via hydrocarbon reserves). The differential access and control of these resources eventually morphed into a large, hierarchical society displaying increasing inequality and complexity.
But once diminishing returns on their investments in this approach kicked in time, or a series of unexpected stress surges, caused it all to come crashing down in the form of drastic simplification from a previous peak of complexity. EVERY. TIME. Sometimes this ‘collapse’ was short-lived and the remnants of society began to pursue complexity again, but most of the time this was not the case. The overwhelming majority of the time society dissolved to a point that was no longer recognisable relative to previous times. The society had ‘collapsed’.
As Tainter reiterates in his text: “Collapse is recurrent in human history; it is global in its occurrence; and it affects the spectrum of societies from simple foragers to great empires.” (p. 193)
To close, I wish to highlight the primary response typically pursued by the elite and that we are already bearing witness to, and will likely see much more of in the years ahead: opting to pursue increased complexity to address perceived problems.
Evidence would suggest that this is the exact opposite of what we should likely be attempting but we are pursuing it regardless. Unfortunately, in doing so we are exacerbating all of the negative aspects of growing complexity: inequality; specialisation (and thus interdependency, both nationally and internationally); mechanisms for sociobehavioural control; currency debasement; resource drawdown and concomitant environmental/ecological-systems destruction.
As Tainter suggests, these observations are important to us in the present since they can inform us as to what we are likely to face as our societies attempt to counter the consequences of diminishing returns and its numerous impacts upon us.
Scanning the media regularly over the past couple of decades would suggest that some of these societal collapse consequences have already taken place or begun to for some nation states and for some regions within nation states. This is not necessarily for the reason of diminishing returns in many but for the reason of geopolitics where power struggles have or are occurring, and for some where stronger powers have undercut the ruling elite to sow chaos–usually with the aim to fill the subsequent power vacuum and control the nation’s wealth and resources.
But even if we ignore such cases and focus upon seemingly strong nations, we can begin to see some of the collapse process unfolding. Certainly it would appear that central authority, or at least support for it, is breaking down for a number of nation states. Civic strife between opposing factions can be seen increasing in intensity, if not actual ‘battles’. Government revenues are faltering and the typical response of currency debasement is occurring to counter this. Resources are being redirected from the masses to the privileged few that sit atop the power and wealth structures of society. Supply chains are being disrupted due to trade disputes and other geopolitical maneuvering.
Many of these changes are being hidden or rationalised away as one-offs, or due to some nefarious ‘other’. But they are occurring nonetheless in a number of places, including supposed stable nations. It is only through willful ignorance that they are not perceived for what they are: signals of impending sociopolitical collapse due to an elite class attempting to offset diminishing returns on our investments in complexity.
What exactly will befall our large, sociopolitically complex societies is anyone’s guess. But, throw our predicament of ecological overshoot on top of this cyclical phenomenon and the writing is on the wall: societal simplification is inevitable.
Perhaps one of the more significant impediments for our species in being able to accept that societal collapse is inevitable is that in our human proclivity to deny/avoid/ignore anxiety-provoking thoughts, the vast majority of us disregard the overwhelming evidence…so we support, even encourage, the elite response to keep pushing on the string of increased complexity and technology. Because, you know, human ingenuity. But all we are accomplishing by doing this is helping to make a tough situation even worse.
We mostly ignore, at our peril, the alternative (and one that will appear whether we wish it or not): simplification.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
Released September 30, 2024
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVII–
Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 3
Tulum, Mexico (1986). Photo by author.
This Contemplation follows from Part 1 (Website; Medium; Substack) and 2 (Website; Medium; Substack) that was prompted by the devastation brought to the southeastern United States by way of Hurricane Helene. This recent natural disaster (followed closely by Hurricane Milton) is but one of dozens to hit the globe during the past year.
As I stated in the introductory Contemplation “my own immediate reaction to the significant damage and a few articles/conversations with others has me viewing the tragedy that is unfolding as another step in the path towards ‘collapse’ of the U.S. nation as currently constructed. Another straw, as it were, on the camel’s back that supports societal complexity for this particular nation state/empire–which would have repercussions for most other societies on our planet given U.S. global hegemony (and its faltering nature).”
In Part 1, I describe how complexity and collapse are viewed in archaeologist Joseph Tainter’s thesis (see: The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge University Press, 1988. (ISBN 978-0-521-38673-9)). Part 2 looks at diminishing returns and begins to explore what the ‘collapse’ process entails, i.e., what occurs during and what follows the loss of sociopolitical complexity. In this Contemplation, I will expand on what the past tells us about what a large, complex society experiences as it is in the process of ‘collapse’, what it looks like post ‘collapse’, and begin to touch on what our present-day complex societies may have in store as we continue along the path of increasing complexity while encountering diminishing returns.
A ‘Collapsing’ Society
Let me begin by expanding on what past societies tell us about the ‘collapse’ process.
Tainter’s thesis posits that complex human societies of all sizes tend to be problem-solving organisations. Their primary means of solving the problems that they encounter have been technical innovations and/or via expanding investments in complexity, particularly sociopolitical complexity. For relatively large complex societies, ever-larger amounts of resources are funneled towards increasing: its territory and/or reach; its problem-solving institutions and associated bureaucracies; and, its variety of social roles and mechanisms to organise all of the various parts. Over time, however, this approach encounters a point of diminishing or declining returns on its investments.
Problem-solving costs are initially borne through regular operating budgets, typically raised through societal surpluses, taxes, and/or conscripted labour. But as diminishing returns increase the costs of greater complexity, these costs are met through enlarging the drawdown of societal reserves and demanding greater inputs by the masses. Reserves, however, are finite and what can be borne by the society is limited in nature.
Eventually a point may be reached when burgeoning complexity actually results in decreased overall benefits for society as a whole, especially since because of diminishing returns problem solving becomes more difficult and more costly, and less successful–it takes more and more time and resources to achieve satisfactory problem-solving results. It is at this juncture that a society becomes more susceptible to stressors that arise and the bonds that hold it together have an increasing likelihood to fray, perhaps even fall apart as increasing numbers of people find ‘simplification’ more attractive than increased complexity.
“Where marginal returns decline, the advantages to complexity become ultimately no greater (for the society as a whole) than for less costly social forms. The marginal cost of evolution to a higher level of complexity, or of remaining at the present level, is high compared with the alternative of disintegration.” (p. 121)
Archaeological evidence and pre/historical records suggest that during the collapse process the following is experienced:
1) Benefits to the population fall as the costs of complexity rise;
2) Shortly before the collapse, costs increase substantially and burden a society already weakened by declining marginal returns;
3) The demands of supporting a complex system negatively impact the well-being of people, who’s population had leveled off/declined before collapse;
4) Growth affects the environment in a negative fashion.
As complexity’s costs rise, and especially once diminishing returns have been encountered, it appears that those that sit at the top of the society’s power and wealth structures (and benefit the most from the status quo organisation and institutions) typically respond by imposing strict behavioural controls in order to try to decrease inefficiencies and sustain the arrangements that provide their revenue streams and positions of power. This is primarily achieved via greater legitimisation activities and/or control mechanisms. Activities of legitimisation are less expensive than the more violent/oppressive control mechanisms that have been used over time but they both are costly and result in feedback loops that exacerbate the economic decline. Eventually, over time, society’s sociopolitical systems are weakened to the point where they begin to fall apart.
The three societal examples of collapse highlighted by Tainter in his text show that their simplifications can be seen as “responses to declining marginal returns on investment in complexity” (p. 192) When the benefit:cost ratio reaches a point where alternatives to complexity are more attractive, members of society choose to simplify.
Rome’s collapse, for example, was not due to barbarian invasions or internal weaknesses but “the excessive costs imposed on an agricultural population to maintain a far-flung empire in a hostile environment” (p. 191) The Mayan collapse was not brought about by peasant revolts, invasions, or agricultural deterioration but “due to the burdens of an increasingly costly society borne by an increasingly weakened population” (p. 191) The collapse of the Chacoan society was not due to environmental deterioration but because the population choose to disengage when the challenge of another drought raised the costs of participation to a level that was more than the benefits of remaining.
Keep in mind that the societal shifts being discussed take place over a number of years/decades. While each may be perceived as a significant adjustment (i.e., collapse) in isolation and if ‘sudden’, this is not typically how they unfold, nor how they are perceived. As the ‘boiling a frog’ metaphor discussed in Part 2 suggests, they occur in small, incremental changes that are ignored/unnoticed in the moment but accumulate over time. It is not until or unless we step back and compare the situation prior to changes, to that which exists later on, that we recognise the significant shifts that have taken place.
A related aspect of our assessment of change that needs to be considered is the timeframe that we are viewing societal ‘collapse’ from. If we are looking at only a small segment of time, say a generational period (i.e., 20-25 years), there may be evidence of very minimal shifts in society and its institutions. However, if we step back and take in a multi-generational chunk of time, say 7-8 generations, the change over such a time frame might indicate massive societal alterations in any and all indicators. A 150 year long decline/simplification of a 500-1000 year span towards peak complexity is collapse-like in comparison.
It is akin to the Seneca Cliff/Effect proposed by Dr. Ugo Bardi where growth is gradual but decline is much swifter in nature. This is ‘collapse’ when viewed in the context of the entire existence of societal complexity.
“There are centuries in which nothing happens and years in which centuries pass.”
Homero Aridjis, 1991
Christian Science Monitor“Collapse happens slowly…and then very suddenly.”
Dave Pollard, 2020
How to Save the World
Post Collapse
The problem-solving strategies of a society lead to its growth and increased complexity. At first this approach yields positive returns and is supported by the masses for they are receiving more benefits than the costs they must endure. Over time, however, the perceived benefits are lost and these masses become dissatisfied. In such times, any sudden stress surge (such as a significant natural disaster or geopolitical engagement) can lead to a fraying and eventual breakdown of the societal institutions and bonds that keep the society intact.
This process may occur regionally and can but does not necessarily spread to all areas of a larger society immediately. Other regions will, however, eventually also succumb to diminishing returns and eventual simplification; for as Tainter reminds us, it is only a matter of time. This is particularly so if the areas ‘unaffected’ continue to pursue increased complexity in the face of diminishing returns.
In Tainter’s words: “The shift to increasing complexity, undertaken initially to relieve stress or realize an opportunity, is at first a rational, productive strategy that yields a favorable marginal return. Typically, however, continued stresses, unanticipated challenges, and the costliness of sociopolitical integration combine to lower this marginal return. As the marginal return on complexity declines, complexity as a strategy yields comparatively lower benefits at higher and higher costs. A society that cannot counter this trend, such as through acquisition of an energy subsidy, becomes vulnerable to stress surges that it is too weak or impoverished to meet, and to waning support in its population. With continuation of this trend collapse becomes a matter of mathematical probability, as over time an insurmountable stress surge becomes increasingly likely. Until such a challenge occurs, there may be a period of economic stagnation, political decline, and territorial shrinkage.” (p. 127)
In the introduction of his book, Tainter describes what the evidence and records suggest about the collapse process and what follows. Here is a relatively long passage from it: “the characteristics of societies after collapse may be summarized as follows. There is, first and foremost, a breakdown of authority and central control. Prior to collapse, revolts and provincial breakaways signal the weakening of the center. Revenues to the government often decline. Foreign challengers become increasingly successful. With lower revenues the military may become ineffective. The populace becomes more and more disaffected as the hierarchy seeks to mobilize resources to meet the challenge. With disintegration, central direction is no longer possible. The former political center undergoes a significant loss of prominence and power. It is often ransacked and may ultimately be abandoned. Small, petty states emerge in the formerly unified territory, of which the previous capital may be one. Quite often these contend for domination, so that a period of perpetual conflict ensues. The umbrella of law and protection erected over the populace is eliminated. Lawlessness may prevail for a time…but order will ultimately be restored. Monumental construction and publicly-supported art largely cease to exist. Literacy may be lost entirely, and otherwise declines so dramatically that a dark age follows. What population remains in urban or other political centers reuse existing architecture in a characteristic manner. There is little new construction, and that which is attempted concentrates on adapting existing buildings. Great rooms will be subdivided, flimsy façades are built, and public space will be converted to private. While some attempt may be made to carry on an attenuated version of previous ceremonialism, the former monuments are allowed to fall into decay. People may reside in upper-story rooms as lower ones deteriorate. Monuments are often mined as early sources of building materials. When a building begins to collapse, the residents simply move to another. Palaces and central storage facilities may be abandoned, along with centralized redistribution of goods and foodstuffs, or market exchange. Both long distance and local trade may be markedly reduced, and craft specialization end or decline. Subsistence and material needs come to be met largely on the basis of local self-sufficiency. Declining regional interaction leads to the establishment of local styles in items such as pottery that formerly had been widely circulated. Both portable and fixed technology (e.g. hydraulic engineering systems) revert to simpler forms that can be developed and maintained at the local level, without the assistance of a bureaucracy that no longer exists. Whether as a cause or consequence, there is typically a marked, rapid reduction in population size and density. Not only do urban populations substantially decline, but so also do the support populations of the countryside. Many settlements are concurrently abandoned. The level of population and settlement may decline to that of centuries or even millennia previously.” (pp. 19-20)
In summary:
The past is prologue
I have written numerous times that I believe the past is prologue for our future. See, for example: Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse; Societal Collapse: The Past is Prologue; What Do Previous Experiments in Societal Complexity Suggest About ‘Managing’ Our Future; Ruling Caste Responses to Societal Breakdown/Decline; Declining Returns, Societal Surpluses, and Collapse.
The archaeological evidence and historical records indicate a multitude of prior experiments in large, complex societies. And while we cannot predict the future with much if any accuracy, there are dozens if not hundreds of experiments that have been attempted by our hominid species in the realm of complex society development over our approximately 300,000 year existence–particularly the past 12,000 years. Each and every one of these previous trials have ended with a dissolution of the complex society in question. For many of these, it appears that in our attempts to counter diminishing returns on our investments in complexity we end up exacerbating the situation and expedite the ‘collapse’ process.
In the fourth and final part of this Contemplation I will elaborate on what our modern-day, large complex societies might expect as we stumble into the fog of the future. Hints for this dot the discussion so far.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
Released September 30, 2024
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVI–Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 2
Tulum, Mexico (1986). Photo by author.
This Contemplation follows from Part 1 (Website; Medium; Substack) that was prompted by the devastation brought to the southeastern United States by way of Hurricane Helene. This recent natural disaster (followed closely by Hurricane Milton) is but one of dozens to hit the globe during the past year.
As I stated in the introductory Contemplation “my own immediate reaction to the significant damage and a few articles/conversations with others has me viewing the tragedy that is unfolding as another step in the path towards ‘collapse’ of the U.S. nation as currently constructed. Another straw, as it were, on the camel’s back that supports societal complexity for this particular nation state/empire–which would have repercussions for most other societies on our planet given U.S. global hegemony (and its faltering nature).”
I view impending societal ‘collapse’ through the thesis proposed by archaeologist Joseph Tainter who basically posits that complex societies become susceptible to socioopolitical collapse/simplification as they encounter diminishing returns on their investments in problem-solving. This is primarily due to a society’s tendency to solve issues via greater complexity requiring more resources (especially energy) that become more difficult to acquire given our proclivity to extract the easiest-to-access reserves first, leaving more difficult-to-access ones for later use. All it then takes is time–with society using increasing amounts of its resource surpluses to maintain complexities–or a sudden stress surge that then overwhelms available resources to experience ‘collapse’.
As Tainter states: ”[c]omplex societies are problem-solving organizations, in which more parts, different kinds of parts, more social differentiation, more inequality, and more kinds of centralization and control emerge as circumstances require.” (p. 37)
Societal ‘collapse’, then, is a reversal of this increasing complexity. Again, as Tainter argues: “Collapse…is a political process. It may, and often does, have consequences in such areas as economics, art, and literature, but it is fundamentally a matter of the sociopolitical sphere. A society has collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity.”
In Part 1, I describe how complexity and collapse are viewed in Tainter’s thesis. In this Contemplation I look at diminishing returns and begin to explore what the ‘collapse’ process entails, i.e., what occurs during and what follows the loss of sociopolitical complexity.
What are diminishing returns?
While Tainter’s collapse thesis is primarily concerned with the sociopolitical realm, it’s vital to understand that complex societies are dependent upon continuous energy flows. The acquisition and distribution of resources is integrated within sociopolitical institutions. These must evolve in harmony and the energy must be enough to maintain the sociopolitical institutions that serve to organise and maintain society’s numerous complexities. Energy, then, is THE fundamental resource supporting societal complexity (and this explains why access to/control of hydrocarbon reserves motivates so much of human geopolitics; and probably has for a century or more).
Tainter proposes that the return on investment in complexity varies and such variation follows a specific curve; that “in many crucial spheres, continued investment in sociopolitical complexity reaches a point where the benefits for such investment begin to decline, at first gradually, then with accelerated force. Thus, not only must a population allocate greater and greater amounts of resources to maintaining an evolving society, but after a certain point, higher amounts of this investment will yield smaller increments of return. Diminishing returns, it will be shown, are a recurrent aspect of sociopolitical evolution and of investment in complexity.” (p. 92)
As Tainter argues complex societies, as problem-solving organisations, are maintained through control and specialization but “[t]he reasons why investments in complexity yields a declining marginal return are: (a) increasing size of bureaucracies; (b) increasing specialization of bureaucracies; (c) the cumulative nature of organizational solutions; (d) increasing taxation; (e) increasing costs of legitimizing activities; and, (f) increasing cost of internal control and external defense.” (p. 115)
As a society becomes more complex, its costs increase but the benefits of each additional change is not in proportion to the costs, and in some cases there are no benefits at all. Once more complex features are added, they are rarely abandoned so growth in complexity tends to be exponential. By adding greater complexity “the potential for problems, conflicts, and incongruities develops disproportionately.” (p. 116)
There are benefits for many added complexities but they only provide less and less positive return for the cost. Eventually “societies do reach a level where continued investment in complexity yields a declining marginal return. At that point the society is investing in an evolutionary course that is becoming less and less productive, where at increased cost it is able to do little more than maintain the status quo.” (p. 117)
Keep in mind that ‘collapse’ is a process and not an event. As a process, it should be viewed as occurring along a continuum with a somewhat elongated timeline; it does not occur with a specific event (usually, but catastrophic natural disasters may have it happening ‘overnight’; for example, the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and its impact upon Pompeii and surrounding regions of the Roman Empire). And although the recognition from a complex state to a simpler one may be relatively ‘quick’ (say a generation or two), in most cases it seems to take a relatively long time (perhaps a century or more).
This recognition of ‘collapse’ seems more a cognitive one than an actual physical one. Humans being who they are create narratives to view societal collapse in a rather simplistic way to help it make more sense. It’s one of the reasons we suggest that wars begin with specific events (say the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand for World War 1) rather than the result of a build-up of small and seemingly innocuous grievances and geopolitical maneuvers. It’s simpler to associate a singular event (assassination) as being the cause of something (war), rather than attempting to understand the many complexities that accumulate and lead to certain consequences. It also provides leverage/cover to the stories of ‘blame’ and ‘response’ that circulate–especially during wars when ‘rulers’ are attempting to persuade citizens to support their actions/decisions and to rationalise their own atrocities during wars.
A good parable/metaphor for understanding what I am suggesting may be that regarding boiling a frog. This is primarily about a cognitive shift/awareness after a period of small but cumulative changes. Recognising when ‘collapse’ has occurred is perhaps more about human perceptions and the need to identify a discreet moment or event where everything changed. This need is basically a heuristic to help us understand and simplify what is a complex process that likely does not exhibit a precipitous causal event.
Boiling a frog is a metaphor for the problem we all have perceiving changes that are gradual but cumulatively significant, that may creep up and have devastating consequences: a little increase here, a little there, then later some more. Nothing changes very much and things seem normal. Then one day the accumulation of changes cause the appearance of normality to disappear. Suddenly things have changed a great deal. The world is different, and it has been altered in a manner that may not be pleasant.
Joseph Tainter & Tadeusz W. Patzek, 2012
Drilling Down: The Gulf Oil Debacle and Our Energy Dilemma
Certain events and societal tendencies contribute significantly to ‘collapse’ but it appears primarily to be the result of a sudden, unexpected stress surge after a prolonged period of diminishing returns. And while the stress(es) may be the result of particular ‘events’, the ‘collapse’ is typically a process that takes time to unfold–how much time varies. For example, evidence suggests that the ‘collapse’ of Easter Island’s complex society took only a generation or two, while that of the Roman Empire several centuries.
Diminishing returns eventually require that surpluses be consumed to maintain status quo complexities. But at some point in a society’s existence, stressors cannot be adequately addressed–at least not in the eyes of the people who belong to the sociopolitical organisation–and the necessary human support to maintain the various institutions begin to fray and eventually break.
Also remember that ‘collapse’ can be regional, occurring in localised areas; not necessarily consuming the entire complex society in question. For example, the ‘collapse’ of specific regions of Mayan society where the archaeological evidence for the Lowlands Indicates that this particular region was abandoned (viewed as ‘collapse’) while surrounding regions continued uninterrupted or show some growth in complexity (perhaps as a result of Lowlands people migrating into them). This is also true for the Western Roman Empire that ‘collapsed’ long before the eastern provinces.
For Tainter, ‘collapse’ occurs when the sociopolitical system can no longer sustain itself and breaks down as a result of members ‘opting out’. This is primarily an economic decision: if the cost/benefit ratio of providing support for the sociopolitical institutions is too high, citizens will remove their support in various ways. Refusing to participate in activities of expansion or defense, or not paying ‘taxes’ could prove too much to sustain sociopolitical systems in a region. It could also be as simple as migrating out of the area. Ultimately, the complex systems break down and ‘collapse’ ensues.
Unexpected stress surges and ‘collapse’
As Tainter argues, the systems that maintain a functioning society weaken with diminishing returns. A weakening of these systems opens the door to ‘collapse’ due to sudden stress surges.
“Unexpected stress surges must be dealt with out of the current operating budget, often ineffectually, and always to the detriment of the system as a whole. Even if the stress is successfully met, the society is weakened in the process, and made even more vulnerable to the next crisis. Once a society develops the vulnerabilities of declining marginal returns, collapse may merely require sufficient passage of time to render probable the occurrence of an insurmountable calamity.” (p. 121)
In addition, declining marginal returns can lead people to view complexity as a failed problem-solving strategy. As Tainter states: “Where marginal returns decline, the advantages to complexity become ultimately no greater (for the society as a whole) than for less costly social forms. The marginal cost of evolution to a higher level of complexity, or of remaining at the present level, is high compared with the alternative of disintegration.” (p. 121)
For some, then, the option of detaching from larger sociopolitical forms is more attractive since fewer benefits are resulting from the costs they are incurring. As a result, smaller social units begin to pursue their own goals, forsaking those of larger units. The status quo may respond to this shift through greater legitimisation activities and/or control. Peasant revolts may occur or, more commonly, apathy towards well-being of the polity increases.
Sustaining services for a population becomes increasingly difficult as rising marginal costs due to declining resources saps economic strength. Unexpected stresses and normal operations are met by using reserves. Society begins to disintegrate as local entities break away or the ruling government is toppled militarily.
A society increasing its complexity through ever-increasing investment will eventually reach a point when marginal productivity can no longer rise; complexity can still accrue benefits past this point but at a declining marginal rate and stress will begin to rise (e.g. between growth/no-growth factions). Although greater investment is made in research and development and education in an attempt to find solutions, taxes and inflation increase making collapse more likely. A point may be reached when increasing complexity actually results in decreased overall benefits.
A society with inadequate reserves becomes extremely vulnerable at this time since a significant stress surge can overwhelm the various systems required to maintain complexities. The leadership may impose strict behavioural controls in response in an attempt to decrease inefficiencies.
What follows ‘collapse’?
I am convinced by the archaeological evidence–and thus believe–that societal ‘collapse’ as proposed by Tainter for our current iteration of it is inevitable. 12,000 years of pre/history during which time countless numbers of experiments in complex societies have been attempted suggest this. Is it guaranteed? Of course not. No one can predict the future with much if any accuracy but why would our go at it have the ‘Goldilocks’ outcome of being just right. You know the ‘this time is different’ ending, especially given the ecological overshoot predicament we are also trapped within.
On top of the issue of diminishing returns on our investments in complexity we have so exceeded numerous planetary boundaries that the natural environmental carrying capacity of almost all regions of the planet are greatly depressed, making the possibility of societal ‘rebirth’ after the collapse of our global industrial society as close to zero as we might get (if not zero, depending on whose story of the future one subscribes to). Of course, pre/history also shows that some form of society always ‘rises from the ashes’…so there’s that for those holding out ‘hope’.
(See: https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/the-nine-planetary-boundaries.html)
Keep in mind, however, that the discussion that follows is focused upon the evidence of what has befallen past complex societies. The future of global, industrial societies is likely to rhyme with the past, with its own variations upon the tendencies that arise with sociopolitical collapse of human complex societies, but it will not be exactly like the collapses of the past.
In Part 3, I will expand on what the past tells us about what a complex society looks like post ‘collapse’. As some have argued, it is a ‘simplification’ and/or ‘adaptation’ to circumstances and not the ‘end of the world’. A ‘dark age’ in comparison to what preceded it may occur, but human existence continued. Of course, what this will look like alongside ecological overshoot responses is entirely up in the air.
While awaiting Part 3, ponder our current responses to diminishing returns and growing stressors given previous societal responses. It certainly appears to be rhyming to me…
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
Released September 30, 2024
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXV–
Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 1
This is a relatively long Contemplation that I am going to break into several parts and was prompted by the horrific situation that continues to unfold across a number of U.S. states hammered by Hurricane Helene (See this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, and/or this.). In particular, it has been the Asheville region of western North Carolina that has suffered the greatest from this hurricane that made landfall at Big Bend, Florida on September 26, 2024–almost one thousand kilometres (560 miles) from Asheville.
First, this particular hurricane hit home with me a tad more than other extreme weather events simply because my sister and her family lived, up until a couple of years ago, in Asheville, North Carolina, and very close to the area devastated by the torrential rains. They moved further east in NC for work-related reasons not long ago.
Regardless, I am always concerned during the U.S. hurricane season since my 80-year-old mother, 90-year-old stepfather, and a cousin live in the St. Petersburg/Tampa region of Florida–both on the Intercoastal and thus extremely impacted by tropical storms.
Although, fortuitously, my mum and stepdad have recently built a second home just a few houses away from my sister in NC to spend half the year at (most importantly some of the hurricane season) and as ‘luck’ would have it were in NC and for the most part out of harm’s way this time–my sister reports some strong winds and a few large trees down but no significant damage where they all live. My cousin reported first floor flooding of his home in Florida, as was the case for the condominium building my mum/stepdad have resided in for 30+ years.
This is the first full half-year my mum and stepdad have spent in North Carolina, with the home being completed only last year–it was put on hold for a couple of years while my mum battled Stage 4 lymphoma (the same disease that took my dad’s life three years ago when his third fight with it spread to his brain–what are the chances both parents develop lymphoma? I guess that’s not great for my siblings and me…).
Note that as I write this another significant hurricane (Milton) has developed in the Gulf of Mexico with its sights set on impacting the Florida coastline, especially the St. Petersburg/Tampa Bay region, where a state of emergency has been declared for most counties and a slew of mandatory evacuations–including my mother’s/cousin’s county. Things sure are getting ‘spicy’ for coastal residents of this world; well, maybe everyone given the trajectory climate change is taking.
View from my mum’s condominium balcony in Florida looking west with the Intercoastal in the foreground and Gulf of Mexico in the background (Hurricane Milton will be approaching from that direction). Note how close all the buildings are to sea level.Second, my own immediate reaction to the significant damage and a few articles/conversations with others has me viewing the tragedy that is unfolding as another step in the path towards ‘collapse’ of the U.S. nation as currently constructed. Another straw, as it were, on the camel’s back that supports societal complexity for this particular nation state/empire–which would have repercussions for most other societies on our planet given U.S. global hegemony (and its faltering nature). This may be particularly true for my home nation of Canada, a veritable mouse residing next to the elephant that is the U.S. Empire–actually a vassal/client state of the empire, after coming into existence as a vassal/client state of the British and French Empires.
Of course, the thesis I will be discussing is not unique to this particular tragedy that has impacted a specific region of the United States. One could easily find dozens of such horrific plights that have occurred across our globe this past year alone, from flooding to civil war to supply chain disruptions to drought to infrastructure deterioration to wildfires to economic ‘collapse’ to pestilence to nation-state wars to massive crop failures to earthquakes to power grid disruptions, etc. etc..
Power outage map that shows the devastation to the electrical grid by Hurricane Helene.Once again, I am using the lens of archaeologist Joseph Tainter’s proposal regarding societal collapse and how, after a prolonged period of diminishing returns on investments in complexity–where reserves/resources are used to maintain/sustain/grow complexity–a sudden stress surge cannot be adequately adapted/responded to because the systems that are needed/depended upon are already stretched and stressed (see: The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge University Press, 1988. (ISBN 978-0-521-38673-9)). Stressors upon stressors upon stressors…
Stress is a constant feature of any society. Most of the stresses encountered can be accommodated for/adapted to/overcome/solved rather easily during a society’s growth phase when reserves/resources are plentiful and in a state of surplus, and society is not overly complex; they are typically addressed by way of increased complexity. But with time, these stresses accumulate, require evermore resources to address, and seem to, invariably, result in societal ‘collapse’.
Before I get too much further into my personal thoughts, let’s first delineate what Tainter means by complexity and collapse. Please excuse the lengthy quoted passages from his text, but they are important to any understanding of this process and my general point, and I want to be clear regarding his thesis by using his words.
What is complexity?
The growth of complexity in human societies refers to size, distinctiveness and number of parts, variety of social roles, distinctiveness of social personalities, and variety of mechanisms to organize parts into a whole. Concepts for inequality and heterogeneity are important and interrelated but not necessarily positively correlated to sociopolitical complexity. Inequality is a vertical differentiation or ranking with unequal access to resources. Heterogeneity is the number of distinctive parts/components and how a population is distributed amongst them.
Complex societies are an anomaly in human history with autonomous, self-sufficient local communities being the norm (99.8% of human existence). Large, hierarchical complex states have only been around the past 6000 years or so, but once established, have expanded and dominated.
While ‘simpler’ societies are indeed smaller (from a handful to a few thousand) than ‘complex’ ones, they still displayed great variation in size, complexity, ranking, and economic differentiation. They tend to be organized upon kinship relations. Leadership is minimal (based upon personality, charisma, and persuasion) and without privilege or coercive power–any that does exist is usually restricted to special circumstances. Equitable access to resources exists and wealth accumulation does not. Where political ambition exists, it is channeled towards public good and any acquisition of excess resources is redistributed, bringing greater social status.
Where more complex political differentiation exists, permanent positions of authority/rank can exist in an ‘office’ that can be hereditary in nature. Inequality becomes more pervasive. These groups tend to be larger and more densely populated. Political organisation is larger, extending beyond the local community. A political economy arises with rank having authority to direct labour and economic surpluses. With greater size, comes a need for more social organisation that is less dependent upon kinship relations. As a result the kin-ties that constrain individual political ambitions are lost.
Basically, ”[c]omplex societies are problem-solving organizations, in which more parts, different kinds of parts, more social differentiation, more inequality, and more kinds of centralization and control emerge as circumstances require.” (p. 37) They are the anomaly within human history.
What is ‘collapse’?
The discovery of past/lost civilizations raises the implication that “civilizations are fragile, impermanent things” and that modern societies may likewise be vulnerable (although many argue that science, technology, and human ingenuity will prevent it).
A recurrent theme in Western history has been social disintegration and the reason why complex societies do so is significant to those living in one. The theories regarding collapse can be categorised into a number of themes:
“1. Depletion or cessation of a vital resource or resources on which the society depends.
2. The establishment of a new resource base.
3. The occurrence of some insurmountable catastrophe.
4. Insufficient response to circumstances.
5. Other complex societies.
6. Intruders.
7. Class conflict, social contradictions, elite mismanagement or misbehaviour.
8. Social dysfunction.
9. Mystical factors.
10. Chance concatenation of events.
11. Economic factors.” (p. 42)
Tainter’s general thesis attempts to be applicable “across time, space, and type of society” without limitation to specific cases. As he argues, “Collapse…is a political process. It may, and often does, have consequences in such areas as economics, art, and literature, but it is fundamentally a matter of the sociopolitical sphere. A society has collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity.
[And, it manifests itself] as:
-a lower degree of stratification and social differentiation;
-less economic and occupational specialization, of individuals, groups, and territories;
-less centralized control–that is, less regulation and integration of diverse economic and political groups by elites;
-less behavioral control and regimentation;
-less investment in the epiphenomena of complexity, those elements that define the concept of ‘civilization’: monumental architecture, artistic and literary achievements, and the like;
-less flow of information between individuals, between political and economic groups, and between a center and its periphery;
-less sharing, trading, and redistribution of resources;
-less overall coordination and organization of individuals and groups;
-a smaller territory within a single political unit.” (p. 4)
In Part 2, I will explore diminishing returns and why this leads to societal ‘collapse’.
While waiting for it, consider your society, the various stressors that are continually impacting it, and how the various institutions that most of us rely upon (perhaps unwisely) are dealing with it. Are they increasing complexity and thus the drawdown of finite resources, especially energy? My guess is yes! In fact, they’re likely doubling and tripling down on greater complexity.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Knossos, Crete (1988). Photo by author.
‘Renewables’: The Great ‘Solution’ (NOT)
I’ve been very, very slowly reading a paper by archaeologist Joseph Tainter (Problem Solving: Complexity, History, Sustainability Population and Environment, Sep., 2000, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 3-41) that I will comment upon and summarise in a few weeks. In the meantime, I thought I would share a fresh experience.
A recent issue within a Facebook Group (Peak Oil: Twilight of the Oil Age) I am a member of has prompted me to throw together some thoughts, once again, regarding the push by many well-meaning individuals/groups to increase massively the production and distribution of non-renewable, renewable energy-harvesting technologies (aka ‘renewables’) and associated industrial products (e.g, electric vehicles, ‘renewables’-powered manufacturing).
The primary reason given this time is perhaps the most common used to rationalise/justify this push and move quickly towards a ‘clean/green’ energy transition: reduce significantly our extraction/use of hydrocarbons, thereby eliminating the greenhouse gases that are released in the process, and put a halt to rising global temperatures.
While all well and good, this calling for trying to reduce our species’ impact upon the planet, I continue to fear we are doing the exact opposite via a massive expansion of complex industrial products to provide electrical power to our ubiquitous energy-intensive technologies.
These technologies are contributing not only to our increased extraction and burning of hydrocarbons (they are, after all, a highly energy-intensive industrial product requiring massive amounts of hydrocarbons to produce, distribute, maintain, and dispose of/recycle), but to the overshoot of the various planetary boundaries that have been found to be significant to the stability and resilience of the Earth system (i.e., land system changes, novel entity distribution, climate change, biosphere integrity, freshwater change–see here).
Among a handful of arguments by ‘renewables’ advocates are some of the following:
Evidence, however, brings all of these assertions (or ‘hopes’) into question.
I’ve posted quite a number of Contemplations upon ‘renewables’ and attempted to demonstrate that they are not the ‘saviour’ for sustaining our society’s complexities as they are, for the most part, being marketed as.
See some of my more recent Contemplation on ‘renewables’:
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXX-She Blinded Me With Science, and More On The ‘Clean’ Energy Debate…. June 2, 2024. Blog Medium Substack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXVIII-Magic Permeates Our Thinking About ‘Solutions’. February 27, 2024. Blog Medium Substack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXVI–Confessions Of A Fossil Fuel Shill. February 11, 2024. Blog Medium Substack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXI–A ‘Solution’ to Our Predicaments: More Mass-Produced, Industrial Technologies. December 21, 2023. Blog Medium Substack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXX–To EV Or Not To EV? One Of Many Questions Regarding Our ‘Clean/Green’ Utopian Future, Part 1. December 18, 2023. Blog Medium Substack Part 2. January 14, 2024. Blog Medium Substack
Rather than repeat some of the arguments I have made previously, I thought it would be instructive to provide the recent thoughts of two others: Chris Smaje and Dr. Tom Murphy.
Below you will find summations of two recent posts by these two.
Basically, they both challenge the common/mainstream assertions about ‘renewables’ and the associated ‘clean/green’ energy transition. Two additional voices to consider…
Off-grid: further thoughts on the failing renewables transition
Chris Smaje; August 12, 2024
-Chris has argued for some years that he believes “…the future is likely to devolve into low energy-input local societies based around widespread agrarianism…”
-the movement to this may occur in an unmanaged form (societal collapse from pursuing a business-as-usual path) or managed one (purposeful degrowth)
-critics have raised a third option: maintain current high-energy societies via rollout of ‘renewables’
-Chris admits that “A renewables-based transition to a lower-energy, more equitable, local and agrarian economy could be a wonderful thing.”
-his skepticism towards this third pathway, however, is primarily towards the notion that we can quickly transition to from high-carbon to low-carbon energy sources that can sustain our high-energy, growth-oriented global economy
-this perspective, labelled ecomodernism, focuses upon technological innovations and products to address environmental issues
Energy transition–the current state of play
-while the transition literature makes it appear that hydrocarbon use is quickly diminishing and ‘renewables’ is taking its place, the data shows this is not occurring
-the percentage of primary energy used has dipped slightly, but the quantity of hydrocarbon use has continued to increase without much if any of a pause
-looking at electricity generation, ‘renewable’ production has increased significantly from a very low point; but hydrocarbons still account for generating about 60% and in absolute terms has increased more than any other source
2024 Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy
-in other words, there is no ‘transition’ out of hydrocarbons despite the rapid growth of ‘renewables’; if there were, we’d be using less of them, not more
{NOTE: keep in mind, also, that the vast majority of ‘renewables’ are manufactured in China, where the primary energy source is coal and which has reached record extraction/use rates]
-despite these data, many continue to argue (based upon questionable assumptions, see next point) that hydrocarbon use will peak soon and then begin its inevitable decline, being replaced by ‘renewables’
-the International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests in a recent report (New Zero By 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector) that not only must electricity generation increase significantly, but that to reach Net Zero, hundreds of gas/coal plants (particularly in emerging and developing countries) need to be equipped with unproven technologies (carbon capture and storage), and electrical networks everywhere need to be expanded greatly
S-curves
-data, naturally, reflects the past and ‘renewables’ advocates often proffer their arguments with dependence upon impending exponential growth and technological breakthroughs
-appealling to future innovations creates a situation that can neither be proven nor unproven
-and Smaje admits ‘renewables’ are environmentally preferable [NOTE: I do not agree here mostly because there exist many aspects of ‘renewables’ production/distribution/maintenance/disposal/reclamation that are discounted in such a perspective; particularly the hydrocarbon inputs and ecological systems destructiveness of mining for needed components, both the ‘renewables’ and necessary storage products]
The real cost of renewables
-the electricity supply chain consists of several unbundled aspects (generation, transportation, buy/sell wholesalers, and consumers) and price decreases in one do not generally filter down to consumers
-while much has been made of the falling price of the material components of ‘renewables’, other costs have risen (e.g., land, integration of ‘renewables’-produced electricity, price of capital); the ‘levelised cost of energy’ (LCOE) metric often cited as proof of ‘renewables’ inexpensiveness, often excludes these other costs
-the intermittency of ‘renewables’ impacts the price received for electricity (since it varies depending upon supply and demand) making the LCOE low in theory but high in reality
-the IEA report cited above notes that to achieve Net Zero, electrical grids need to more than double in size and scope given the bottleneck it currently is for ‘renewable’-generated power; Chris notes that this will require massive fossil fuel-powered extraction
-adding the grid costs and additional facilities increases the actual cost of ‘renewables’ past that of hydrocarbons
-the financial institutions that provide the capital for ‘renewables’ projects have little interest given the low profitability and debt-servicing issues common in the sector
-while there is some efficiency in ‘renewables’ over hydrocarbons given the amount of energy lost to heat in the latter, hydrocarbons have a distinct advantage in also providing chemical feedstocks important in various other sectors
-in addition, electricity only supplies a fraction of industrial energy use (about 10-20%), with industries that cannot easily (or not at all) electrify
-as it stands, the globe is nowhere close to achieving Net Zero
-even if one accepts the argument that recycling and/or a circular economy can help to address these issues, there exist limits and our current trajectory is taking us nowhere near the ideal
Make Government Great Again?
-could the economic impediments be overcome if governments nationalised their electricity sectors?
-while China, in their quick adoption and rollout of ‘renewables’ suggests this may be possible, there remain difficult if not impossible realities to overcome [NOTE: it’s true that China has adopted a lot of ‘renewables’, and produces the vast majority; but China also is seeing record amounts of coal use in their power generation and use]
-regardless of who is in charge, there remains: industries that are difficult/impossible to electrify; intermittency of generation; high material costs; difficulty matching supply and demand
-nationalisation is no ‘easy’ feat and requires political, bureaucratic, and technical aspects; to say little about the lack of interest in such a move by many in government, industry, and the public–neoliberalism dominates almost everywhere
-instead, governments tend to offer incentives/subsidies; this approach, however, often results in boom/bust situations
-“..neoliberal globalization needs to end–but that’s not going to bring the Keynesian happy place back. There’s too much debt, and too little real growth.”
Batteries to the rescue?
-hydrocarbons are advantageous in that they can be turned on/off as needed; ‘renewables, however, require energy storage systems
-while there are constant cheers for potentially inexpensive and efficient systems to do this, none exist at the moment [current systems require hydrocarbon-based industrial and ecologically-destructive processes to produce] and the costs of decommissioning/reclaiming/disposing current systems must be considered–to say little about scaling such systems up
Minerals
-the mineral requirements for this ‘transition’ are critical and a number of analysts/researchers doubt the ability of our planet to provide what is being called for
-there exist limits/bottlenecks/diminishing returns for finite minerals/other resources (especially hydrocarbons), and concerns over the ecological impacts of the massive mining required
-here, many ‘renewables’ advocates point to the ecological destructiveness of hydrocarbons but “..if you set the bar as low as ‘not as bad as fossil fuels’ then a lot of things can jump over it.”
Energy cliffs, energy traps and economic slips
-while the concept of energy-return-on-energy-invested (EROEI; also known as net energy) is important to the global economic systems geared to growth, its real-life application to this issue is controversial
-despite the EROEI falling for hydrocarbons, it tends to remain higher than that for ‘renewables’
-energy cliff refers to the idea that as the EROEI of an energy source declines, the energy available to an economy declines more quickly; this is especially a problem for ‘renewables’ given their energy investment mostly occurs upfront creating less economic incentive to switch and resulting in a negative feedback (or energy trap)
-a transition may be more feasible for an economy not dependent upon growth, but we do not live in that world [and given the Ponzi-like structure of our economic systems it’s unlikely we could shift to such a system]
Geopolitics
-it appears that many countries (especially those not self-sufficient in hydrocarbons) are building out ‘renewables’ for energy security purposes, not for ‘decarbonisation’, given that world politics has become more volatile as the US’s hegemony wanes
-there is no fossil fuel-replacement occurring, however; what we are witnessing is an energy diversification and “…the pursuit of economic growth, energy security and geostrategic power is likely to drive increases–or at least retrenchment–in all forms of energy, including fossil fuels.”
-in fact, we may witness an increase in hydrocarbon use (especially coal), including the intensive-energy military sector–and particularly from the US is unlikely to “…give up its fossil-fuelled control of its oceanic trade empire without a fight…”
-domestically, governments opt for hydrocarbons over renewables to ensure grid stability during peak demand times and due to them being a less expensive option; this, however, can lead to grid failures when fuel shortages occur
-with global temperatures increasing, we can imagine a positive feedback loop where higher demand (air conditioning) leads to more hydrocarbon use, resulting in higher global temperatures and so on
-it’s also possible grids will be overwhelmed by demand and/or richer nations pushing up prices beyond the reach of poorer ones and impacting supply chains so that ‘renewables’ production is impacted negatively
-many/most poorer nations depend upon relatively cheaper hydrocarbons (especially coal); Africa, for example, produces 74% of its electricity from hydrocarbons and only 11% from ‘renewables’
-for any kind of global ‘transition’ to occur, it’s going to require a massive transfer of wealth from richer nations to poorer ones
On-grid
-‘renewables’ skeptics are often criticised as playing into the pursuits of Big Oil, but Chris counters that it is those who advocate for the transition that have interests that are more in line with Big Oil/Capital
-these interests are dominated by profit-making and many Big Oil companies have invested heavily in ‘renewables’ (deinvesting when profits are waning) [I would add that part of their support for ‘renewables’ is likely because the industrial processes required to produce/distribute/maintain/reclaim them are heavily dependent upon hydrocarbons]
Off-grid
-while techno-fix narratives sound serious, whether they actually offer ‘solutions’ to our meta-crisis times is questionable
-one often used approach is to market ‘renewables’ as beneficial to the ‘poor’ and ’emerging’ economies but what mostly occurs is a loss of autonomy, increased assimilation, disruption of traditional living, etc.
-ecomodern, techno-fix narratives brush aside these concerns
-Chris concludes his thoughts by stating that “I don’t think renewables transitions are a serious likelihood for most people worldwide, but I don’t expect to be taken seriously by those who think otherwise…the more we can get off-grid, use soft-energy paths and agroecology, and build local communities, the more we can avoid getting wrecked by the siren call of banoffees (business as nearly ordinary feasibly-fast (and) future-proofed energy-transition enthusiasts)…[and] off-grid doesn’t have to mean isolation or survivalism. There’s a world o localism to be won.”
Dr. Tom Murphy, August 6, 2024
-Tom presents “various reasons why renewable energy and recycling are not our way out of the predicament modernity has set out for us. It’s just a doubling-down that can’t really work anyway.”
A Past Enthusiast
-having lived an off-grid lifestyle and experimented with a number of off-grid configurations, Tom has an intimate relationship with the concept and products
-he originally believed ‘renewables’ were part of the answer to our issues of climate change and peak oil but has reached the conclusion that such narrow solutions tend to work only for narrowly-defined problems
Cost of Climate Change Dominance
-a narrow view of our ecological predicament where CO2 emissions can be eliminated via ‘renewables’ and all is well is attractive but overlooks the complexities
-the belief that climate change is the main issue and this can be corrected with technology denies the larger picture/complexities
-‘renewables’ fail to get us out of the mess we’ve created
Materials Demand
-‘renewable’ technologies require massive amounts of finite resources
https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jms/article/view/0/47241.
-‘renewables’ require significantly more materials per unit of electrical energy delivered than that of hydrocarbon combustion; it is not a build-once-and-done game
-‘renewables’ are thus not actually ‘renewable’ as they depend upon finite materials in perpetuity
The Genius of Life
-Nature is remarkable in that it has figured out how to accomplish all it does with the small set of elements found upon our planet (e.g., 96% of human mass is composed of oxygen (65%), carbon (18%), hydrogen (10%), and nitrogen (3%)–all derived from air and water)
-natural recycling is essentially 100% efficient and can continue indefinitely
-modern human inventions, however, rely upon the wrong things (e.g., rare earth minerals), don’t last (some not even a human generation and rarely a lifetime), and leave often harmful waste streams (e.g., radioactive waste)
Recycling Limitations
-the common rebuttal to the significant material needs of ‘renewables’ is the idea of recycling or circular economy
-first, the massive initial build-out should not be discounted and you cannot recycle what’s not present
-and it’s worth considering that even the substantial speed of ‘renewables’ production over the past couple of decades has not been able to meet human energy needs with hydrocarbon-use increases being necessary
-the massive outlay required to even meet growing needs would result in significant ecological systems destructive
-second, even the most efficient recycling is imperfect with fantasy-level 90% recovery resulting in a 50% loss of material after just 7 cycles and 90% loss after 22–it is not indefinite
-wind turbines and solar panels last a couple of decades prior to requiring replacement, so at best recycling can push ‘renewables’ out for a handful of centuries (that’s if everything goes ‘just right’)
What Do We DO with Energy?
-at the heart of our predicament is what we do with energy
-much is used to cause ecological systems damage (e.g., clear forests, industrial agriculture, mine, manufacture products, etc.)
-regardless of the energy source or technology, we are destroying planet health
Intent Matters
-with technology in hand, we appear intent on harming Nature
-it matters not if the technology is hydrocarbon-based or ‘renewable-based’
-Tom suspects, however, that it won’t be long before “…the deteriorating web of life will create cascading failures that end up making humans victims, too, and pulling the power cord to the destructive machine.”
Obligatory Titanic Metaphor
-powering modernity with different technology does not change the outcome, just as lithium batteries instead of a coal-fired engine would not have altered the Titanic’s tragedy
Cease What, Exactly
-none of our destructive activities are likely to cease if we alter our energy source
-eliminating CO2 might be great but it doesn’t change our ecological predicament in the least if everything else remains the same
-“…doing so keeps our boot on the throat of the community of life so it can’t breathe. Doing so keeps the sixth mass extinction basically on track, uninterrupted—though perhaps not as quickly or warmly.”
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):Book 1: $2.99Book 2: $3.89Book 3: $3.89Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXIII–Complexity and Sustainability
I believe that in many ways the past is a prologue to our future. Every experiment our species has attempted in the development of complex societies (from small to large ones) has eventually ‘failed’ to sustain the systems that make them complex and simplification/decline/collapse has followed.
Regardless of this pre/history and the lessons inherent in it, our species seems to make the same unsustainable choices with each and every iteration of complex societies. An argument can be made that such repetitive behaviour is unavoidable as our ‘successes’ cannot help but lead to our ‘failures’. It is our ‘nature’ (as it is perhaps for virtually every species) to grow in numbers and, if the circumstances ‘permit’ (i.e., fundamental resources are present), to exceed the natural carrying capacity of its habitat and proceed into ecological overshoot (see William Catton Jr.’s Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change)
Our longest lasting and perhaps most ‘sustainable’ living arrangements were when our species followed a somewhat nomadic, hunting and gathering existence that relied upon living within the restraints imposed by local natural resources. When population pressures arose due to human reproductive success, groups could split up with some moving to adjacent, unexploited lands. Eventually, however, this process bumped up against limits to such expansion and it was through technological ‘innovations’ that population pressures were addressed.
While there are many theories regarding the reason for a society’s ‘collapse/simplification’, it would appear that part of the answer is that the organisational structures (i.e., sociopolitical and/or socioeconomic) that share important information and goods to maintain themselves, experience declining returns on the investments necessary to keep them active–particularly if an unexpected crisis erupts after a prolonged period of diminishing returns.
Eventually, when the ‘costs’ outweigh the ‘benefits’, support from the masses is withdrawn resulting in a much more simplified world where small, local groups develop that are primarily dependent upon the immediate environment’s carrying capacity and significantly less so on widespread energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade, especially long-distance forms) and the complex organisational structures necessary to sustain these systems.
In general, the article (Complexity and Sustainability: Perspectives From the Ancient Maya and the Modern Balinese) summarised below–comparing a ‘technotasking’ approach to a ‘labourtasking’ one–concludes that it is our technological innovations that have served to sustain our species growth but that these same innovations lead invariably to the ‘collapse’ of a complex society that employs them. This is due to technologies expediting the drawdown of finite resources (leading to diminishing returns on investments in resource extraction and thus complexity) and the overloading of various compensatory sinks. The authors emphasise that social stresses are increased by the implementation of new technologies but that because such innovations disproportionately benefit those at the top of societal political and economic structures (primarily via the control of key resources), they are employed regardless of the negative impacts that arise–social and/or environmental.
While reading through the article, I had a variety of thoughts relating to my understanding of the ‘collapse’ process and our modern trend towards that somewhat inevitable outcome.
First, it is a net surplus of resources (especially energy) that is perhaps the key result of human adaptations (see Dr. Tim Morgan’s Surplus Energy Economics for more on this). This surplus allows for expansion. No surplus means no expansion and/or use of ‘savings’ to sustain society, leading to a more vulnerable situation when/if crisis erupts as per archaeologist Joseph Tainter’s thesis regarding how and why complex societies ‘collapse’ (see The Collapse of Complex Societies). It would seem that ‘stability’ appears when new energy is NOT harnessed and growth/expansion curtailed. This possibility now appears unachievable (without a severe disruption to current complexities) because of the creation of a world predicated upon such growth and increasingly ‘necessary’ due to its dependence upon the extraordinary expansion of debt-/credit-based fiat currency that has allowed us to pull growth from the future–but that requires payback of both principal and interest.
Second, technological innovations (what the authors refer to as ‘technotasking’) appear to create jumps in complexity and are limited by immediately available resources. If resource demands cannot be met, collapse or simplification is the most likely outcome. A ‘labourtasking’ path (one that depends primarily upon manual labour), however, displays only small, incremental increases in complexity and costs. This alternative pathway is far more ‘sustainable’ than one that employs technologies; it can still result, eventually, in collapse/simplification just taking much longer to get to that endgame.
Third, today’s energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade) is a global, complex industrial product-reliant enterprise fundamentally based upon hydrocarbon extraction and refinement. The fragility and complexity of such a system has led to enormous reliance upon finite resources (especially hydrocarbons, and most located far away) and led to a significant loss of skill/knowledge in self-sufficiency for most of our species. The need for resources to maintain our societies’ complexities and the movement of them has led to massive militaries and ongoing geopolitical brinkmanship.
Fourth, our modern societies are similarly following the collapse trajectory of the Maya as we accept a top-down strategy and employ a technotasking approach in offsetting production deficiencies and countering population pressures. In fact, we have accelerated this approach in a number of ways, including the use of technology to make more technology and are now contemplating using technology (artificial intelligence) to guide our decision-making far more than practised to date. (see Erik Michaels’ Problems, Predicaments, and Technology for more on the issues surrounding technology use and the predicament it has led our species into)
Fifth, we can see in the Maya a faltering of technological innovations and their maintenance as a result of organisational communications breaking down. This eventually led to a degradation of important complexities, especially pertaining to food production. This occurred as the elite consolidated resources for themselves to offset the limits society was encountering. Elite self interest resulted in more and more resources being directed towards this ruling minority and less towards the systems necessary to support the societal complexities needed for everyone.
Sixth, despite assurances in modern times by the priesthood of economic ‘science’ that resource limits are meaningless in a world of ‘free’ market economies where human ingenuity and technology can counter deficiencies in resource supplies, hard biogeophysical limits to infinite growth exist. These real limits lead to massive issues for the technotasking pathway but it is almost always chosen to be pursued because it can accommodate rapid growth and the consolidation of social/economic power for the ruling elite to whom most of the benefits accrue. This occurs without much thought or concern, if any, about sustainability.
Finally, it may only be with the fall of nation states and other forms of large, complex societies (and the caste of elite that accompany such social organisations) that more sustainable forms of human existence can be pursued. This depends on a number of important factors not least of which are: the number of our species that survive the fall of the current industrial-based, globalised complex society; the state of the planet’s ecological systems once all mass, extractive enterprises are curtailed; the survivability of our planet due to our overshooting of various planetary boundaries; the availability of certain, important natural resources (especially potable water, food sources, and regional shelter needs); and the ability of any remaining human populations to live within the capacity of their local natural resources/environment.
A handful of previous Contemplations looking at how the past informs the possible future…
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXIX–Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse May 24, 2024
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXVI–Societal Collapse: The Past is Prologue November 27, 2023
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXLVIII–What Do Previous Experiments in Societal Complexity Suggest About ‘Managing’ Our Future September 1, 2023
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse cometh CXLIII–Ruling Caste Responses to Societal Breakdown/Decline August 3, 2023
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXLI–Declining Returns, Societal Surpluses, and Collapse July 19, 2023
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXXXIX–Our Deep Future: Techno-Utopia Or A Return To the Distant Past July 10, 2023
Complexity and Sustainability: Perspectives From the Ancient Maya and the Modern Balinese
V.L. Scarborough and W.R. Burnside
American Antiquity, April 2010. Vol. 75 No. 2, pp. 327-363
Scarborough and Burnside argue that there exists several different pathways for societal complexity to emerge in human populations (where complexity is defined “as the nonlinear escalation of costs and emergent infrastructure with rising energy use and concentrated power as societies develop.” (p. 327)) Using examples drawn from the ancient Maya and modern Balinese, two of the pathways are compared highlighting “their relative costs, benefits, and potential for long-term sustainability.” (p. 327)
After a brief discussion of how best to conceptualise societal complexity for the purposes of their research, the authors concentrate upon socioenvironmental relationships, especially around water management for their compare/contrast analysis with the complexity resulting from increasing ‘throughput’.
Human groups self-organise within their biophysical environment with their culture altering the environment. New cultural systems can be highly adaptable but they are also more fragile and can lead to relatively quick ‘collapse’. Social modifications usually lead to stressed living conditions with increased costs and three possible futures if harmful conditions cannot be absorbed by the biophysical and/or sociocultural systems: “(1) the cultural system cuts its exaggerated and mounting social costs by lessening its intensity of resource use resulting in a partial reversion to an earlier lifeway of reduced costs and relative simplicity; (2) the system suffers from relatively abrupt social collapse; or (3) the system cultivates and focuses its energy and social capital on greater “complexity” associated with an evolved set of institutional structures–an emergent organizer of information and resources.” (pp. 329-330)
Research suggests that societies follow a labourtasking or technotasking path (or combination) to incorporate new resources or reset old ones.
Technotasking offsets production deficiencies by investing in ‘technological innovation’ that can help establish surpluses. In an early/primary state, ‘canalisation’ (i.e., riverine drainage system) was a commonly employed innovation as it could be adopted relatively quickly. The resource concentration such adaptations resulted in led to the emergent phenomenon of urbanisation and organisational structures, with those in ‘control’ of these economic/political structures benefitting disproportionately–“…those profiting most from the newly invented technologies accrued greater quantities, concentrations, and control of key resources.” (p. 332).
Deployment of a new technology is costly in terms of society and its environment but even after costs ‘level-out’ time and entropy can begin to increase costs. These increased costs can lead to a slowing of growth, collapse, or, with a new technology, a restart of the process. Transitions to greater complexity seem to be triggered by these rapid reorganisations. Successful and long-term shifts are limited by immediately available resources. Such change creates vulnerability if the new structural complexity cannot adjust to resource use/demand “If the new structure and the necessary resources are not synchronized and compatible, then the social system will collapse or at least slip back to an earlier, less complex social order.” (p. 335)
Labourtasking relies upon trained labour pools to help modify the landscape rather than a technological ‘breakthrough’. Here, the resulting change is incremental, long lasting, monitored, promoted generationally, and refined according to local conditions. Complexity and its social costs increase over time but in a smooth, uninterrupted manner. There are no abrupt transitions preceded by breakthrough technologies. Complexity costs increase but at a smaller ratio than in technotasking societies.
The ancient Maya and modern Balinese both have tended to employ labourtasking to aid in their adaptation to their somewhat similar semitropical settings whereby heavy seasonal rains were followed by prolonged dry periods. Both developed microwatershed adaptations but via different ‘technologies’.
The Maya would take advantage of natural drainage catchments and enhance them via landscape modifications (channel systems and reservoir) with household and monumental architecture mound volume equivalent to drainage volume. “[T]he system was likely a communitywide effort monitored by a collective interested in sustaining the entire group.” (p. 338) Although labourtasking was their primary economic means for some time, the Maya shifted into and out of technotasking as needs required. Innovations, however, would hasten resource drawdown and quicken negative impacts (e.g., erosion and sediment accumulation).
It appears that the Mayan success led to its eventual demise. Turmoil within large centres disrupted community communication beginning in the west. Information exchange faltered and the elite succumbed to immediate self-interest and became less responsive to other needs investing fewer resources in the many and more to the few; a scramble for hegemonic control between the large centres ensued. Written records suggest a governing council was implemented at Chichen Itza as depopulation hit its southern contemporaries but rather than adjust social networks (i.e.., economic and political) the elite chose to seek greater control. During the Terminal Classic demise phase there is evidence that the cost-complicated landscapes suffered the most from this, In particular, was the impact upon irrigation channels and reservoirs that show massive sediment/silt buildup; impacts that can still be seen today.
Mayan ‘collapse’ appears to have ensued once the environment and its natural resources could no longer support societal complexities. While several major centres and their hinterlands experienced ‘collapse’ (especially acute depopulation and the overshoot of local resources), some smaller communities were resilient and avoided the fate of the large ones–mostly by specialising in local resources and establishing trade with nearby populations. Those populations that shifted towards labourtasking-based adaptations were able to sustain themselves for a period of time beyond those that depended upon technotasking. “Generally speaking, the more long-term time and energy invested in the system, the greater the degree of collapse if the fields or related surfaces are neglected or abandoned for even a short period.” (p. 349)
The modern Balinese, in comparison, have oriented towards a labourtasking pathway after having their initial attempts (circa 11-12th century) to recreate their Javanese roots fail due to significant geographical differences. Its highly-dissected, steep-sided valleys with little in the way of natural resources required more decentralised structures. Indigenous farming populations managed their own affairs avoiding centralised bureaucracies and their demands. Groups self organised within their unique ecological circumstances. This approach proved productive and shaped the social system. “Balinese social institutions remain responsive to the complex adaptive system they have spawned, providing the flexibility to accommodate and locally manage accretional landscape change.” (p. 353)
The Balinese, with their labourtasking approach that focuses upon decentralisation (as opposed to the hypercentralisaiton characterised by the Late Classic Maya), have so far avoided collapse and suggests a path forward for sustainability. Resilience and long-lived stability would appear to be the result of small, incremental adjustments in a labourtasking approach as opposed to the frequent and rapid shifts that result from a technotasking one. However, near the end of an extended run, labourtasking systems may still result in extreme social ‘collapse’.
“A key difference between the two systems is the expectations for grand collapse…Because of the ever-changing, nonlinear interdependencies within and between groups and their environments, labortasking leads to a set of ‘phase transitions’ that produce adaptive forms of social organization and built environments. This process is long-lasting, resilient, and generally well-adjusted to resource limitations, making it relatively sustainable. However, acute vulnerability or collapse can occur if drastic external and/or social structural change is unleashed.” (pp. 355-356)
Technological innovations that tend to buffer humans from the environment but negatively impact it are often chosen because they accommodate rapid growth and the consolidation of social/economic power without much thought or concern about sustainability. While improvements in human health and welfare can be attributed to technotasking these need to be evaluated in terms of the costs, especially upon the environment whose ‘health’ human societies depend on.
The longer summary notes of the article can be found here.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Pompeii, Italy (1984). Photo by author.
Tech ‘Solutions’ Are Us
I wanted to share another one of those conversations I have been involved in. It is not unlike many I see occur (and sometimes get involved in) when someone posts definitive support for the pursuit of complex technologies to sustain our current energy-intensive and resource-extractive living arrangements. In this particular case, it was a link I shared to an article by energy writer/researcher Alice Friedemann. The original post and comments that lead to my final response can be found at the end of this introductory few paragraphs and my final response.
First, I wanted to highlight that I am about half-way through reading and summarising another archaeology research article, with some of the arguments made in it finding its way into my final response during the conversation about technological ‘solutions’ to our energy/resource predicament.
It’s most interesting to see how the archaeological evidence regarding past society’s adaptations to resource and environmental issues is not significantly dissimilar to modern-day attempts, except perhaps in scale (and we can thank significant surplus net energy from hydrocarbons for this). Technological innovations are pursued to help problem solve and adapt, but not all are successful and can lead to ‘collapse’. This ‘collapse’ may take centuries or, if the innovations are unsuccessful, only a generation or two.
The April 2010 article entitled Complexity and Sustainability: Perspectives From the Ancient Maya and the Modern Balinese by V.L. Scarborough and W.R. Burnside was published in the journal American Antiquity. It concludes that “Both of these complex societies used labortasking to adapt to local ecological limitations in semi-tropical settings. These societies used heterarchical organizations to accretionally engineer and manage their environments, strategies that promoted long-term resilience. Case studies such as these provide a nuanced picture of different paths to social complexity and highlight their relative costs, benefits, and potential for long-term sustainability.”
I’m perhaps halfway through the article and its summarising (already over 15 pages of typed notes) and hope to get through it sometime in the next few weeks; the unusually high amount of precipitation our region north of Toronto has received so far this growing season has led to phenomenal growth in my garden requiring constant maintenance and most of my time. I think the unusually high humidity has also contributed to some disease issues in a few of my fruit trees that has me needing to ‘problem solve’ a bit more than usual–leaf curl in my peach trees, mosaic virus in my apple trees, and no blossoms on my cherry tree (but no sign of cherry aphids this year, a win).
In the meantime, here’s my final response in that conversation from the following post:
Original post that I put out back on March 24, 2024:
Peak hydrocarbons. If you’re not aware of why the peak of hydrocarbons (especially diesel) should send warning sirens blaring through our world, you need to read this article (and most of the other articles on the linked site) by energy researcher and writer Alice Friedemann.
My final response with previous commentary immediately afterwards:
LB, We will have to agree to disagree, especially as it pertains to the feasibility and consequences of chasing complex technological ‘solutions’ to our energy predicament.
Pre/history is pretty clear that virtually every complex society over the past dozen millennia or so has eventually ‘collapsed’. This ‘collapse’ appears to result from diminishing returns on societal investments in complexity along with overexploitation of the natural environment, especially the resources required to support growing complexities.
Further, those societies that pursue novel technological innovations to sustain their growth tend to ‘collapse’ faster than those that do not. In fact, adoption of a misguided innovation can lead to ‘collapse’ relatively quickly, in just a generation or two. The most ‘sustainable’ societies are those that focus upon ‘labourtasking’ that leverages human and draft animal power (as opposed to technology) which serves to severely limit ecological destruction and drawdown of resources.
Rather than pursue a more sustainable path (although labourtasking is still not fully sustainable since complexities of large human groupings, even if based upon manual labour, are still resource/energy dependent and encounter diminishing returns as they grow leading to eventual ‘collapse’), we are increasingly pursuing complex and heavily resource-dependent technologies–a sure recipe for a quick and broad ‘collapse’.
Not surprisingly, this approach (and the narrative that it’s fully doable, clean/green, and sustainable) is being heavily marketed and pushed by those at the top of our power/wealth structures that stand to profit immensely from the pursuit (including academia)—to say little about the geopolitical resource wars this path spawns and that seem to be growing and spreading as we bump up against biophysical limits evermore seriously. That many (most?) support this approach is not surprising given the vast propaganda/marketing machine of our ruling caste and the vilification of dissenters.
Further, our current experiment with a global, industrial-based society has turbo-charged this ‘technotasking’ approach via its leveraging of hydrocarbons and economic machinations (i.e., debt/credit creation to pull growth from the future). The past two centuries in particular have witnessed incredible population and economic growth. While some view this as positive, this one-sided perspective completely ignores the ecologically-destructive enterprises involved and that have spread to almost every corner of the globe. And all of it, of course, depends very much upon exponentially-increasing energy/resource extraction and production, the pursuit of which has already encountered significant diminishing returns.
Part of the reason so many buy into the technotasking approach is because of the perceived ‘success’ our species has encountered over the past dozen or so millennia in using it, but this completely ignores/denies so much of the negative impacts; impacts that are metastasizing as our population and energy/resource demands grow exponentially—consider for a moment the requirements being bandied about to support the AI ‘revolution’; a pursuit that is estimating energy needs that far, far surpass current abilities and are calling for a tripling/quadrupling (or more) of our current energy/resource production/extraction.
As for a 2050 plan for a “world of 7 billion middle class affluent consumers”, we can make all sorts of ‘scientific’ predictions based upon possibilities founded upon our technological prowess and human ingenuity, but the hope of exponential growth of our exploitive and extractive consumption has already bumped up against the limits to such a path and we are increasingly seeing the negative impacts and consequences. It’s just that in our unique story-telling way we have created a world where inconvenient reality to our wishes/hopes are denied/ignored/rationalised away.
Untestable mathematical models of the future can be devised to support anything. Sure small-scale prototypes might suggest some marginal possibilities but use one flawed assumption in the modelling to propose global adoption and the conclusions that suggest success are less than meaningless–they are dangerous, especially if we adhere to the precautionary principle.
Yes, we will likely continue to pursue these damaging and unattainable ‘solutions’ since the world’s profiteers (especially the media, financial institutions, and political systems) are pushing/supporting them. And many (most?) will support them because the idea of limiting our growth/expansion has been broadly vilified and we have been conditioned to believe such a path is our ‘right’ and that everything has a ‘solution’—if just enough resources are thrown into them–we just need to believe.
War over resources? Never. Wars are simply some ‘other’ wishing to destroy our ‘democracy’ and living standards because they hate us. We need to protect ourselves by imposing our will upon them and then we’ll make sure their natural resources are used judiciously–especially for green/clean tech.
Overloaded planetary sinks? Exaggeration. We just need to consume more clean/green products. In fact, let’s replace every industrial product currently in existence with these ‘sustainable’ products while bringing the entire population up to ‘advanced economy’ standards. What’s not to love? Ponies and lollipops for everyone.
Sociopolitical roadblocks? Nothing the election of the ‘correct’ individual/party with the ‘proper’ regulations and policies can’t rectify. The political caste has only the best interests of the citizens and planet in mind in their decision-making.
Planetary overshoot and toxic legacies? Nonsense, we can have 7+ billion middle class consumers if we just do things ‘right’ and in a sustainable and non-polluting way. And if there are negative side-effects, we’ll figure out a way to deal with them.
Resource limits? Non-existent concern. With human ingenuity and ‘free’ markets there are no limits. In fact, if some important resources–say water–becomes scarce we’ll simply mine passing asteroids or leave our solar system for other habitable planets. Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos will get us there.
Financial machinations? Balderdash. We can fully trust the banking industry and political systems that run them. All that debt requiring even greater growth is a great thing. Just ignore all that evidence that inequality has been increasing significantly and the middle class eviscerated over the last several decades as greater and greater amounts of debt pile up resulting in increasing price inflation.
And then there’s the notion that the so-called overwhelming support could be as ‘simple’ as a misguided paradigm/worldview that has yet to be ready for broad criticism and overturning. Paradigms have a way of protecting themselves, especially if they have the backing of the-powers-that-be and serve their interests.
As the saying goes, however, Nature bats last. Given it’s the ninth inning, the bases are loaded, there’s no out, we’re up by only a run, and our pitcher is struggling to find the strike zone with a 3-0 count, things are looking dicey. Just believing it is possible to win because it’s in our best interest isn’t enough to prevent the walk-off hit Nature has in store for us.
The Laws of Thermodynamics, especially Entropy, are unforgiving no matter how ‘intelligent’ our species might be. And, frankly, we’re not looking very smart given what we’ve been doing…
Commentary that began June 25, 2024:
LB
If you are familiar with “final stage ERoI,” fossil fuel is on an energy cliff. The ratio of useful fossil energy in application to the energy required to produce it has fallen to 1.0 useful unit per 6.0 input units. Society needs about 10.0. Renewables are over 40.0.
Alaska oil has been energy negative for years. North Sea oil is marginal at best.
https://ageoftransformation.org/greatoversimplification/
LFP battery is now “lifetime” warranty and cost drops another 50% yr/yr in 2024.
Perovskite tandem pv cells (made at room temperature from common recyclable materials) has passed durability field tests and is in MW installation phase of commercial production. That is a 40% efficiency gain with, again, a 50% price drop yr/yr in 2024.
https://thedriven.io/…/catl-announces-electric…/…
Alice Friedemann
LB, LFP batteries and PV cells require fossil fuels for every single step of their life cycle, from mining, to ore crushing, smelting, transportation to hundreds of factories to make parts, more transportation from these hundreds to the single place something will be made, transport to destination, and so on, plus the electric grid can’t stay up without Natural gas
LB
Oh, contraire…
https://reneweconomy.com.au/worlds-biggest-grids-could…/
Alice Friedemann
LB, energy storage doesn’t scale up
LB
Alice Friedemann, energy storage scales up.
Steve Bull
LB, Sure, and to hell with the ecological destruction left in its wake.
Alice Friedemann
LB, what exactly scales up?
LB
Alice Friedemann, every grid integration analysis by qualified scientists…. in all journal literature.
That includes the synergy of solar primary by day and wind primary by night. Their complementary production overlay to both load follow and peak match… both daily and seasonally.
Steve Bull
LB, Simon Michaux’s work challenges this assertion that EVERY analysis supports the idea of the possibility of a successful scaling up.
LB
Steve Bull ….Michaux’s challenge has been blunted. He is a lone wolf. The literature doesn’t support his notions. Here are literally 19 thousand 2024 journal articles on the matter, including 4300 review articles.
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=energy+transition+materials+mining&hl=en&as_sdt=0,6&as_ylo=2024
LB
…and where are the comprehensive and numerically detailed studies for a 2050 world of 7 billion middle class affluent consumers that do not feature RE, EV, electrification, and transactive hypergrids? Where is a master plan other than the 195 nation Paris Accord as aligned with the 195 nation IPCC?
The real plans all look like this:
ABSTRACT: “The roadmaps call for a 100% transition of all-purpose business-as-usual (BAU) energy to wind-water-solar (WWS) energy, efficiency, and storage, ideally by 2035, but by no later than 2050, with at least 80% by 2030. Grid stability analyses find that the countries, grouped into 24 regions, can exactly match demand with 100% WWS supply and storage, from 2050–2052. Worldwide, WWS reduces end use energy by 56.4%, private annual energy costs by 62.7% (from $17.8 to $6.6 trillion per year), and social (private plus health plus climate) annual energy costs by 92.0% (from $83.2 to $6.6 trillion per year) at a present-value cost of $61.5 trillion. The mean payback times of the capital cost due to energy- and social-cost savings are 5.5 and 0.8 years, respectively. WWS is estimated to create 28.4 million more long-term, full-time jobs than lost worldwide and may need only 0.17% and 0.36% of world land for new footprint and spacing, respectively. Thus, WWS requires less energy, costs less, and creates more jobs than BAU.”
http://web.stanford.edu/…/I/145Country/22-145Countries.pdf
Simon Michaux
LB, Soon my work comes out in peer reviewed journal. Full calculations. So I call bullshit on every one elses work and we can have a discussion. I don’t mind being different to evryone else as long as I have data to support my points.
LB
Simon Michaux …fair enough. Thanks.
Alice Friedemann
Simon Michaux, Can’t wait to see it!
If you’ve made it to the end of this Contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Tulum, Mexico (1986). Photo by author.
The Politics of Dancing: The politicians are now dj’s…
It seems nowadays we’re always trapped in the silly season of election campaigning. Perhaps my memory is foggy but where it used to be a short window of inane proclamations and ever-grander promises (that never actually happen as declared), this period of electioneering now appears to carry on everyday, 24/7/365. If it’s not related directly to an upcoming election, it’s about extolling the great work of those in office and the shortcomings of those in opposition parties (or, gasp, wanting to dismantle ‘democracy’)–the bankrolling of which is via that theft mechanism of taxes or, even worse, perpetual debt (I just love that the narrative management/control and surveillance of domestic citizens being carried out by the ruling caste is paid for by the masses themselves that the ‘elite’ are marketing their beneficence to).
With my understanding of societal change through time, one of the aspects of our complex societies that I’ve come to hold as true is that our polities are ‘governed’ by people focused on improving/maintaining their personal/familial/influential benefactor prestige, power, and wealth. It is not, as they crow on about and market repeatedly, a yearning to benefit society-at-large and others–that’s the narrative they want us all to believe in and support. It is about maintenance/expansion of the wealth-generation/-extraction systems from which the ruling caste mostly and extraordinarily benefits.
In this vein, I have lost complete faith in our governing systems to do anything but leverage situations to this end. And a lot of the time this has to do with putting in place monetisation schemes in the form of a racket whereby–as U.S. Marine Corps Major General Smedley Butler argued about war–a small group benefits greatly at the expense of the many, and then, via mass marketing/propaganda/legislation, coercing society to support the scheme (and call out anyone, usually via the media, who criticises/challenges it). And our conditioning and those psychological mechanisms that strive to reduce anxiety-provoking/stressful thoughts/beliefs lead us to believe the narratives weaved by our ruling caste. It’s the water we swim in and don’t even realise it’s there.
“A racket is best described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of the people. Only a small “inside” group knows what it is about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few, at the expense of the very many. Out of war a few people make huge fortunes.”
-Smedley Butler, War Is A Racket (1935).
As I’ve written and argued before, our globalised, industrial societies can be characterised as full of such rackets that funnel national treasuries/wealth from the masses to the few that sit atop the power and wealth structures that develop as a society becomes larger and more complex. It’s not a conspiracy, it’s simply the epiphenomena of societal adaptations to increased organisational needs as the population grows and society problem-solves via greater complexity–thanks, surplus net energy and the technologies that have helped to produce these surpluses. That those who hold positions of power and influence conspire to maintain/expand these should be self-evident to anyone peering beyond the veneer of mainstream social stories.
What follows is another one of those difficult conversations I had with another following a Facebook post that popped up in my feed recently.
[NB: I saw Frank Zappa and the Mothers of Invention in concert at the London Gardens (London, Ontario) on November 5, 1980. My friends of the time and I were frequently listening to his music so a few of us had to see him when he performed in our home town.]
JK: You all had better get a handle on our USA 2 party system. If you contribute to the election of Republicans you ain’t seen NOTHING yet.
Steve Bull: JK, Right. Left. Center. Blue. Red. Green. Doesn’t matter. ‘Government’ protects the minority ruling caste, not the masses. Been that way for millennia. Elections are theatre to give the impression of choice and agency in a rigged and corrupt system.
TH: Steve Bull, I have a badge: “If voting changed anything, it would be illegal!” Let the jesters speak! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CjJLTslWp_Q
JK: Steve Bull, So 2016 made no difference? Trump/ Hillary, same same? Stupid. Clueless. The parties are not the same, not even close. You just need someone to blame for your failures, might as well be everyone.
TH, It’s easy to move to a better country. Do it!!
Steve Bull: JK, I think you need to read a bit of pre/history—especially as it pertains to how ruling systems developed and changed as large, complex societies arose (pay particular attention to the sociological/anthropological concepts of integrationist and conflict theories as to how hierarchical systems came about—the ruling elite want us to believe in the integrationist perspective but the evidence more broadly aligns with the conflict one).
And, yes, most every politician and political party is essentially the same—especially when it comes to ‘big ticket’ items. Some marginal differences may exist but in most ways there is little difference. Massive debt continues to accumulate. Various rackets expand and/or new ones arise (think military-security complex, big energy, financial institutions, media, big pharma, etc). Wars continue. Domestic surveillance expands. Inequality grows. Price inflation increases. Narrative management/control enlarges. Ecological systems continue to be destroyed in order to pursue the infinite growth chalice. Etc. Etc.
The most significant change that occurs after an election are the stories we tell ourselves and others. My team wins and all is right or improving in the world (and if it doesn’t it’s because the other team is interfering in our ability to get things done); the other team wins and everything continues to or will soon go to hell in a hand basket. And much, if not everything, that occurs after the election is interpreted through these lenses. We see differences in order to reduce the stress of cognitive dissonance that would occur if we recognize that we’re being bamboozled by those few sitting atop society’s wealth and power structures.
EM: Steve, it really is a shame that more people don’t have the comprehensive understanding how these systems work, who actually benefits (the most), and what the eventual outcome is. Too many people like J are out there telling people to move to a better country when they can’t see that they’re the ones being owned and bamboozled, especially here in the US.
TH: JK, Luckily I don’t live in the US…! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiuA6Tfy-pM
We have our own problems fighting off 5 Eyes, NATO associate membership, and being a very close friend of the US….Empire stretches down here, and a lot of uber wealthy Americans have bolt holes here….
We live with the illusion of democracy, while living under a government of occupation on behalf of Empire. The political classes are owned, and their owners pass down agendas that are all about dividing and conquering any communities of resistance, and continuing to open up the country to rape/pillage/extraction. The owners are the corporations/banksters/elites. We are being farmed.
JK: EM, nobody owns me. I’m doing fine. I work hard and have a great life.
Our tool is the ballot box. Standing on a street, holding signs, protesting doesn’t do shit. Get involved, complaining won’t get you anywhere. Run for office, be psrt of the change. Revolution at this point is not in the cards.
Steve Bull, how do you propose fixing it? Complaining on Facebook? You aren’t going to change the Constitution and feeble little protests do nothing. Americans can run for office and if you look at Congress you’ll see Reps from the poorest of families. Get off your butt and run for office. Bitching Facebook won’t cut it. Going to take a lot of work.
EM: J, first of all, what we suffer from is a predicament, not a problem. Predicaments have outcomes, not solutions. So, you aren’t going to fix squat with politics, period. Vote for whoever you want, we and they lack agency to solve anything because it isn’t a problem we face.
As for Steve, he is Canadian, so he won’t be running for office here in the US.
Steve Bull: JK, Sure, just like this image suggests:
And, I wasn’t complaining. I was making a statement based on my understanding of pre/history.
JK: Steve Bull the mafia? B. S.
The hate I see on these posts and some MAGA cult people are very similar. Lot of whining, victimhood and makes me sick. Blaming Biden and Jews for genocide while HAMAS cowers behind civilians, does NOTHING except kill Jews.”Degrowth” while pretending to be off grid. I’ll give y’all another 30 days. Maybe you’ll figure out Tammy Baldwin is different than Ron Johnson. Biden is different than Trump. Makes me sick.
If I thought the USA and the mafia were the same I would ABSOLUTELY get out of the USA as fast as I could. No question. I sure as hell wouldn’t whine about it. I’d take action.
Steve Bull: JK, Perhaps you can take solace in the fact that this is not simply a US phenomena; it is an epiphenomena of large, complex societies. It pervades virtually every level of government across the entire globe and has been with humanity for some 12,000 or more years. We, in the West, just wrap it up in a cloak called ‘representative democracy’ and hold theatrical performances to give the masses the impression they have choice and agency in societal decisions and actions. All the while, a relatively small group of well-connected and influential power brokers continue to raid national treasuries (especially in terms of natural resources) and siphon wealth from the masses.
JK: Steve Bull, What do you mean “pre history?” Sounded like complaining. Hey, I have no problem with complaining —that’s what I’m doing. I’m complaining about the anti-semitism I see, hypocrisy, misunderstanding our political system, thinking the 2 parties are the same, whining without acting, and misinformation. For example, I saw an interview of an LGBQ woman holding a pro-Palestine sign without understanding that HAMAS would kill her if she were there. It’s insane. I’ve never seen an anti-Hamas word in these posts.
Steve Bull: JK, Prehistory is simply human history prior to written documentation. It begins a couple of million years ago up until about 5000 years ago with the introduction of writing systems. Most of our knowledge of those times is determined via physical anthropology and archaeology–the latter an area of study that I concentrated on for a few years and received my Master of Arts in. As far as a misunderstanding of our political systems, most people ‘misunderstand’ them because it is in the interests of the few that benefit (power and wealth wise) from them to keep the masses ignorant, mollified, and complacent…so they craft narratives that these systems provide agency and choice to the masses and that they are ‘representative’, and ultimately serve as a net benefit while hiding their true intent: the control and expansion of the wealth-generating and -extraction systems that provide their power, influence, and prestige. Quite frankly, sociopolitical systems are in place to protect the ruling caste of a society; they are not there to protect and serve the masses apart from throwing them a few bones occasionally. And there is about 12-15,000 years of evidence to support this assertion.
JK: Steve Bull So is your point that little has changed in all those years?
Steve Bull: JK, No, much has changed. But not the general tendency of a ruling elite to leverage as much as possible to their advantage.
JK: I do realize the power of big money, millionaires and billionaires, but smart voting will go a very long way toward fixing things. I guarantee you that if Hillary had won in ‘16 the world would be better. If Biden loses this year things will even worse than we’ve ever seen in our lifetimes. There is a gigantic difference between the parties now. Anyone with integrity who doesn’t vote or votes 3rd party is supporting Republicans. The danger is real.
Steve Bull: JK, We have to agree to disagree. And your comment aligns with what I said above: “The most significant change that occurs after an election are the stories we tell ourselves and others. My team wins and all is right or improving in the world (and if it doesn’t it’s because the other team is interfering in our ability to get things done); the other team wins and everything continues to or will soon go to hell in a hand basket. And much, if not everything, that occurs after the election is interpreted through these lenses. We see differences in order to reduce the stress of cognitive dissonance that would occur if we recognize that we’re being bamboozled by those few sitting atop society’s wealth and power structures.”
I also wanted to share this piece of writing from my late step-grandfather, Jack Flynn, written some 40+ years ago but that could have been penned today. I miss the long conversations/debates we used to have over any number of social and political issues of the day. He was one of, if not the most important influences in my thinking during my formative years.
Can This Be Our World?
As we waste and squander finite natural resources,
that are our children’s heritage.
As we watch their future disappear.
Are we witnessing the beginning of the end?
As I view the waste and squander,
one thing comes to mind.
“Where ignorance is bliss, tis folly to be wise.”
Seems to be the universal trend.
How did a species such as ours,
with the ability to reason, and think,
who certainly knows wrong from right.
Allow such a magnificent planet
to fall into such plight?
Truth and wisdom are lost in a barrage of words,
Which emit from mass media, twenty-four hours a day.
Endless innuendo, rhetoric and cliches,
We are expected to understand and obey.
In our modern world a few powerful nations
dominate the whole planet.
Co-operation is considered, passe.
They use and abuse, threaten and gesture,
invade smaller nations, and no one can tell them nay!
Inevitably there must come the time,
when the “immovable object, meets the irresistible force”,
then things should become more clear.
Being powerful nations, afraid to lose face,
they will probably try something Nu-clear.
This post was named after Re-Flex’s 1983 pop song based upon people’s expressive nature displayed during dance. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ht-S4YQpteg. I love the music of the 1980s. I spent some years as a ‘disc jockey’ including a brief stint at Western University’s radio station and some paid party gigs. I also continue to hold a rather large album collection, with the very recent addition of a signed Men Without Hats disc cover that I purchased at a concert they performed at our town’s annual music festival and around the corner from our house–what was not to love? Free. Close by. And, mid-afternoon so I didn’t have a late night and mess up my early-to-bed, early-to-rise routine…
If you’ve made it to the end of this Contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my websiteor the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click hereto access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXIX–Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse
It’s been a few months since I last posted a Contemplation. There are a variety of reasons for this.
I’ve been ‘distracted’ by the preparations in my gardens for the upcoming growing season. The unseasonably warm weather here north of Toronto allowed me to get outside quite a bit earlier than previous years and I’ve put that time to use performing all those preparatory tasks I need to do: post-winter clean-up, setting up my rain barrel system (that gets ‘dismantled’ in the fall given the snow and cold our region receives in the winter), preparing the ever-increasing number of garden beds, getting seed potatoes and a variety of other seeds in (i.e., pea, bean, carrot, and kale), mixing up new soil (compost + ‘used’ soil + peat moss + vermiculite), spreading mulch over many of the beds, and finishing up some stairs and a work area in behind my greenhouses that I began last year. These things are on top of the hydroponic seed-growing system I established in the past couple of years and some weeks ago began several dozen seeds (tomato, squash, eggplant) and required periodic attention and, finally, transplanting into pots/grow bags/raised beds.
As most of this prepping is now complete my activities have already shifted towards maintenance of crops (especially the perpetual trimming/training of vines/canes) and working on the next ‘big’ project (dismantling an older experiment with composting and replacing the wooden retaining walls with brick/stone).
On top of this, I made a pledge to myself to reduce significantly my screen time. So that’s also reduced my reading and writing time. While not helping to minimise my cathartic needs that writing brings, less screen time does focus my energies on actionable, physical endeavours that in the end I believe are far more immediately relevant; and which require a bit more time with each passing year–apparently, I’m not getting any younger as my back and various joints periodically remind me; and ‘suffering’ through a torn rotator cuff due to a fall playing pick-up hockey (who knew it’s hard to stay upright when you step on another player’s stick?) that has slowed me even more than my ever-increasing age–although I’m ‘fortunate’ that it’s only certain arm motions that have been restricted and I’ve still been able to haul heavy objects around and do the majority of physical chores that need doing.
In addition, I occasionally think of that line from the Talking Heads song, Psycho Killer: “Say something once, why say it again”. And as I think about many of my Contemplations, the repetition of some themes/topics cannot help but be obvious; and the repeating of them increasingly seems pointless since we all believe what we wish to believe (especially that which addresses our confirmation biases)–the choir that I preach to will accept my stories while those who do not will in all likelihood never, regardless of ‘evidence’ or persuasiveness–we are a rationalising species, not a rational one.
And, this writing ‘hobby’ (despite the long-ago initial motivation: marketing my ‘fictional’ novel trilogy) is a money-losing prospect where the income from my novel sales is significantly less than the ‘channel fees’ I pay to my self-publisher for keeping the print version of my first book available; to say nothing of the fees for maintaining a website presence. Being on a pension for the past 10+ years makes one just a tad more concerned about ‘superfluous’ expenditures such as personal hobbies.
I’ve also been spending a lot of time attempting to both update my website (still more to do) and post all my Contemplations on Substack (now complete). So, if you’re relatively new to my writing and find yourself looking for more to confirm or challenge your beliefs, please peruse my website, Substack, or Medium page.
Finally, perhaps most importantly, I am attempting to spend more time with my wife. We try to get our dog out for a 30-45 minute forest walk every morning, and have been enjoying other time together as we reconnect after many years of giving our time and energy to ‘raising a family’ and careers in education (and other people’s children). And as I experience my adult children’s periodic struggles with our increasingly complex (dare I say, ‘collapsing’) world, I am also attempting to be present and supportive for them more than I have in the past.
Realising that one is closer to the end of this roller-coaster ride of life than the beginning puts things in perspective and pulling back on the amount of time I engage in a somewhat self-indulgent ‘hobby’ seems apropos. Reading and writing have taken a distant backseat to my attempts to ‘live in the moment’, that is sometimes ‘difficult’ when one filters a lot of what’s going on in our world through an ‘overshoot-collapse’ lens.
Or, maybe all the above is a personal rationalisation/justification for just being ‘collapse weary’ and realising how fubar our species is and my ‘pontificating’ over it is accomplishing little. Actions over words is where my mind is settling, and those actions are oriented towards personal, familial, and community resiliency and sufficiency in a ‘collapsing’ world.
In summary, my time spent sitting in front of my computer or even just with a book/article is being reduced significantly as a result. What time I have had in the early mornings as I’m enjoying a couple of mugs of coffee, is oriented towards perusing some articles and doing some other personal chores. I am even going to be scaling back the ‘current events/articles’ I share via my website–perhaps just performing this periodically.
And as I continue to reflect upon and contemplate our predicament and how to perhaps ‘insulate’ my family/community from the changes to come, I am shifting towards an attempt to understand more fully what past complex societies did in response to societal decline/collapse/simplification. There are clues in these responses as to how we can better adapt to the societal transition that is upon us.
Given the above, then, I am thinking of changing tack with my writing. I am going to begin reading, summarising, and commenting upon academic/research articles that pertain to the two most common themes of my writing: societal collapse and human ecological overshoot. Combined with the aspects I outlined above, this will necessarily slow down significantly my screen time and writing; academic work can oftentimes be more ‘dense’ and time-consuming to process (especially if one is not repeatedly immersed in the field of study and the style of writing)–at least, this is true for me. I am going to aim for posting a new Contemplation at a rate of about once every 4-8 weeks; maybe more, maybe less–we’ll see.
The first such article I wish to share and comment upon is one from archaeologist Joseph Tainter that looks at the archaeological evidence that suggest examples of ecological overshoot and societal collapse. My thoughts regarding it follow…
Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse
Joseph A. Tainter
Annual Review of Anthropology, 2006, Vol. 35, pp. 59-74.
After suggesting that the concept of overshoot traces its roots to Malthus’s argument that population (which grows exponentially) would overshoot food supply (which grows linearly), Tainter argues that population numbers, consumption of resources, and waste production are the main concerns surrounding human ecological overshoot. He also suggests that the concept of collapse has been poorly defined by researchers but commonly is assumed to be a loss of both population numbers and societal complexity.
He reviews the pre/historic record for evidence of societal collapse brought on by ecological overshoot and proposes that overshoot goes beyond simply population and consumption, and may include political aspects, economic costs to society (especially its ability to pay for ever-growing complexities), and technological capabilities (particularly with regard to transportation and communication).
The studies Tainter reviews include collapse for the Maya lowlands (whose collapse has been blamed upon ecological factors, a growth system, and sociopolitical and socioeconomic policies), and Mesopotamia (Ur dynasties, that experienced diminishing returns on its resource base, and overreach via excessive socioeconomic policies).
Chew’s (2001) studies of ecological degradation over the past 5000 years using World Systems Theory concluded that excess consumption led to environmental degradation and eventual collapse for societies of the past. Basically, “… over-exploitation of resources due to capital accumulation, urbanization, intense land use, and population growth led to constraints on continued expansion and ‘a downscaling of material and cultural lifestyles’”.
Diamond’s (2005) overshoot model similarly argues that the foundational cause of collapse for a society is degradation of the environment, however it also includes the variables of local ecology, hostile neighbours, social responses, climate, and trade partners. While disagreeing with most of Diamond’s examples (mostly because of rare, adverse conditions that prevented adaptation), Tainter suggests the best case for overshoot, resource degradation, and collapse presented is that for Easter Island.
Tainter appears to agree fully with the assessment that Easter Island’s complex society ‘collapsed’ in the sense of a loss of organisational capacity. Several researchers suggest deforestation kicked off a cascading set of events: decline in fishing and farming, increase in warfare and insecurity, settlement pattern shifts, population decline, and, finally, sociopolitical collapse.
Tainter reviews a number of theories regarding overshoot and collapse, using the archaeological record as a measuring stick to gauge their viability, including: Meggar’s (1954) environmental limitation theory, Cooke’s (1931) and Sanders’s (1962) research regarding the consequences of low-production swiddening leading to overshoot and collapse, and Culbert’s (1988) elite-driven agricultural intensification resulting in resource degradation and eventual overshoot.
He suggests that Ur’s Third Dynasty and the Abbasid Caliphate may be the best candidates for assessing population overshoot, resource degradation, and sociopolitical collapse, but then argues the evidence indicates that neither show Malthusian overshoot, nor one brought on by excess production (today’s primary concern).
Further, he concludes that Chew’s (2001) analyses of Bronze Age societies are not supported by the empirical evidence.
Diamond’s (2005) analyses demonstrate a misunderstanding of ‘collapse’ (Norse Greenland and Pitcairn and Henderson Island) and confuse Malthusian overshoot with overshoot due to extreme climatic conditions (Maya and Southwest U.S.). And even Easter Island is not likely to qualify as a case of overshoot and collapse since the loss of giant palms (the identified tipping point leading to collapse by many) was likely more due to the rats brought by the original settlers than to human population overshoot.
Tainter concludes that the archaeological literature contains few cases that suggest population and/or mass consumption overshoot followed by environmental degradation and sociopolitical collapse. He further suggests that most of the interpretations that argue for overshoot are not credible; those that are lead to the conclusion that overshoot only occurs during extreme conditions [this aligns with his thesis in The Collapse of Complex Societies in that collapse is brought about by a society’s inability to respond to crises due to reserves being depleted via their use to sustain status quo systems as a consequence of diminishing returns having been encountered on investments in problem-solving].
Rather than cases of overshoot, we see examples of elite mismanagement and lack of proper feedback to governing institutions to correct misguided policies and actions. The human ability to adapt, especially in terms of agricultural intensification, is often denied by those seeking examples of overshoot. Greater resource production always appears possible via capital and technology application, labour, knowledge intensification, and/or energy subsidies.
The argument can be made that increasing mechanisation, irrigation, fertilisation, and/or labour have all resulted in increased production–proving Wallace, Erlich, Jevons, and Malthus wrong. In addition, societies may choose to simplify to a less costly organisation and/or reduce consumption; this is what the Byzantine Empire chose in the 7th-century AD when it lost its wealthiest provinces (Tainter notes this “may be history’s only example of a large complex society systematically simplifying” (p. 72)).
Despite the above, Tainter wonders whether our modern world can continue to intensify production indefinitely escaping a Malthusian fate. Neoclassical economists argue markets will always uncover new resources so overpopulation and/or overconsumption is not ever a concern.
“The contrary view is well known. We must reduce our ecological footprint or eventually collapse. The neoclassical argument is based on faith that markets will always work and denial of diminishing returns on innovation. Should we base our future on faith and denial, or on rational planning?” (p. 72).
More detailed summary notes can be found here.
My Thoughts
The lack of agreement over what constitutes overshoot and/or collapse is not unimportant. One of the ‘insights’ I gained over my decade of post-secondary education and subsequent observations of human perceptions of our universe is that the exact same observable phenomena are oftentimes (if not always) interpreted in different ways–sometimes even diametrically opposed to one another. I would argue that this is especially true when one is dealing with broad concepts such as ‘collapse’ and ‘overshoot’. Ask archaeologists what ‘collapse’ is and you’re likely to get many different answers; in fact, you’re likely to also get some that argue the term is inappropriate for what is observed via the artifactual remains of human complex societies (i.e., societies don’t ‘collapse’, they ‘adapt’).
Differences in what societal ‘collapse’ and/or ‘overshoot’ are and how they present themselves in the archaeological record can lead to quite disparate explanations about the process and responses. Despite the ideal of science being a dispassionate and objective enterprise, it is performed by humans with all the subjectivities, foibles, and predilections that we possess. We often if not always see what we want to see and interpret the world to support our beliefs. Scientists are no different and can become enmeshed in particular paradigms and echo chambers. Where one sees clear evidence of societal ‘collapse’, another sees examples of innovative adaptation.
The ability of humans to adapt to changing conditions, particularly around resource production, is predicated upon our capacity to shift behaviour and/or leverage resources–especially energy. One must wonder, as Tainter does, whether this is possible for our modern globalised and industrialised world. It would seem this is especially so where the all-important energy subsidy for hydrocarbons may not exist; certainly not at the scale necessary to support modern, industrial society’s complexities and its finite resource requirements–no matter how ingenious our species perceives itself to be.
This appears to be where the rubber hits the road. The archaeological evidence may indicate no previous examples of societal collapse due to overshooting of the natural carrying capacity, but past societies were vastly different in the sense that most of the population were skilled and knowledgeable in food production with few ‘elite’ being supported by the labour of the masses, and vast regions of land that had yet to be overexploited by humans existed relatively close by.
The ability of our species to intensify resource production in order to support our numbers and complexities seems in the present severely handcuffed by the lack of an energy subsidy that is capable of meeting the ability of hydrocarbons to do this. Despite narratives that a suitable energy ‘transition’ is not only feasible but in the works, every energy system continues to depend upon finite resources, cannot equal the density nor transportability of hydrocarbons, and serves more to support/sustain growth (in that they are additive to our energy use rather than supplanting any) than adapt to a simplifying world with much, much less energy–particularly net energy–to support our expansion and complexities, let alone continue to sustain the status quo.
The combination of increasing ecological systems destruction/degradation–because of our massive expansion in both numbers and corollary resource consumption and waste production–and very significant dependency upon a single energy resource (that is finite in nature and has encountered significant diminishing returns) has painted us into a corner.
While it has been said that history never repeats itself precisely but tends to rhyme with the past, the archaeological record has shown that virtually every iteration of human societal complexity has eventually reached a zenith and then simplified/collapsed. Our story, then, is likely to be quite similar but with idiosyncratic twists and turns not experienced in the past. Predicting exactly what will happen, or when, is complete guesswork.
From my perspective, our pre/historical record can provide signals as to what we might expect (bearing in mind that differences in the interpretation of artifactual remains and their import alters the story told). Whether humanity can avoid and/or mitigate the trials ahead of us is yet to be seen–especially in a fractured world where the worst of us seem to be steering the policies and actions to be taken as we bump up against the limits of what is and is not possible.
The current lack of skills/knowledge to be self-reliant/-sufficient (at a scale far, far beyond past societal simplifications where skilled families/communities could extricate themselves from the sociopolitical/-economic complexities and their disintegration via migration and/or self-sufficiency) combined with widespread ecological systems destruction due to humanity’s expansive reach and extractive proclivities, as well as significant diminishing returns on resource extraction and energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade to subsidise the lack of local resources) indicates exceedingly chaotic times ahead for homo sapiens 8 billion individuals and their complex societies.
The tales that will be told by we story-telling apes as the species collectively stumbles into this chaotic future and argue incessantly over how to ‘solve’ our insoluble predicaments will be something to behold. I can’t help but wonder what myths about our peak global society will emerge on the other side of this stupendous clusterfuck we have created. My ‘hope’ is that humanity can meet these ‘challenging’ times with grace and dignity; my prediction, however, is that we will not.
Best of luck to all in the journey ahead.
Snapshot of articles I’ll be reading/summarising over the next year or more:
A handful of ‘recent’ articles of interest (you can view many more on my website):
https://profstevekeen.substack.com/p/the-role-of-energy-in-production
https://erikmichaels.substack.com/p/new-developments-and-accepting-our
https://collapselife.substack.com/p/the-surveillance-state-will-be-a
https://www.collapse2050.com/living-in-fear/
https://www.thedailydoom.com/p/truth-or-consequences
https://thehonestsorcerer.substack.com/p/musings-on-the-nature-of-technology
If you’ve made it to the end of this Contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
We All Believe What We Believe…Evidence Be Damned.
The following contemplation is my comment on the latest Honest Sorcerer post that explores personality ‘types’ and how these contribute to why we tend to hold such different views of our world.
Very interesting discussion and does help to explain a lot. And, again, you’ve provided me a springboard to share my own thoughts…
Perhaps these inherent differences (not necessarily hard-wired since I can see that my own answers to many of the questions on the test — which I took many years ago as well since my employer at the time regularly discussed and explored such things — have changed significantly over the years; I seem to have ‘come to the middle’ in many areas) are a big contributor to why I’ve come to hold that we believe what we believe, regardless of evidence or well-reasoned, counter-arguments.
In fact, being who we are with our complex cognitive abilities, we fight off non-confirmatory thoughts/ideas to reduce/avoid the stress/anxiety that can arise when our beliefs are challenged.
One of those beliefs I’ve certainly encountered when discussing ‘collapse’ with others is the idea that our pursuit of the perpetual growth chalice on a finite planet is just fine, thank you very much; please don’t regale me with your data and/or pre/historic and research-based examples of societal decline and/or overshoot…I will not listen or I will list off all the evidence of human progress and problem-solving abilities — particularly with respect to complex technologies — to prove my perspective.
And, of course, it doesn’t help the attempt to counter this notion of infinite growth on a finite planet when the ruling caste who significantly profits from the pursuit (in both monetary and power terms) cheerleads and encourages it at every turn and opportunity. I hear nothing but propaganda about the benefits of human expansion and development from my local/regional/federal politicians whenever they open their mouths and rarely, if ever, discussion of the knock-on, negative impacts except assurances that they will be minimal and/or overcome — yes, we are constructing a relatively expansive community upon these wetlands in this ecologically-sensitive area above important aquifers, but we’re putting a butterfly parkette in to benefit the environment…
For anyone agreeing with the herd and/or deferring to authority, as most of us do, or simply sitting on the fence, then it’s next to impossible to break with the majority perspective. I’ve given up my attempts to raise or even discuss the topic with most family members and others in my social circle — unless I am directly asked for my input. They simply do not want to even think about such a ‘depressing’ subject. Better to discuss and debate whether you think the Toronto Maple Leafs will make it through the first round of the upcoming hockey playoffs…
We even see such opposing views within the ‘collapse-aware’ communities, such as the Degrowth Movement, where a major core seems to hold that with just the right tinkering, and then widespread adoption, of ‘correct’ behaviours and technologies, humanity can solve the problems at hand — never recognising that it’s an unsolvable predicament that we might, at best, be capable of slightly mitigating for some small percentage of people.
It’s a right pickle and reminds me of a quote from a Richard Duncan article (an electrical engineer behind the Olduvai Theory of civilisational collapse):
“…according to the Olduvai schematic, world energy production per capita will decrease…[then] there will be a rash of permanent electrical blackouts worldwide. Consequently the vital…functions — communication, computation, and control — will be lost.
…Mother Nature then solves for us the (apparently) insuperable problem of the Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons, which the human race seems either incapable or unwilling to solve for itself.”[1]
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers). Encouraging others to read my work is also much appreciated.
February 16, 2023 (original posting date)
While I take a break from my Contemplation posts here is the sixth installment of chapters from the fourth book in my fictional novel series (that stalled a few years ago but have ready). I will continue to share some of these over the next little while. Here are the links to PDF files of Chapter 1, Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and now Chapter 6.
The storyline: Flowing from actual world events, a damaged environment, dwindling energy resources, and a manipulated market-economy all come crashing together in this tale about the social and individual impact of stresses that overwhelm a precarious and complex global system. Supply chain interruptions, border disputes, increased fascism, growing protest movements, and mass migration out of rural areas into cities dominant the new normal.
Basically, this is a tale (set in Canada) about the individual (and societal) reactions to a breakdown of our complex systems. Life is proceeding ‘normally’ for most while a marginalised minority are increasingly concerned about the unsustainability of our way of life. Governments begin to clash with domestic populations while the machinations of some of the ruling caste, especially around energy systems, is exposed. Chapters trace the lives and experiences of a handful of people during the timeframe of about 3 months before to 3 months after a grid-down situation…
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers). Encouraging others to read my work is also much appreciated.
February 13, 2023 (original posting date)
Theory Is Great, In Theory: More On Our ‘Renewable’ Energy Future
Quite often I get involved in online discussions with others about our predicament(s). Most of the time these are quite friendly in nature and a sharing of ideas and questions.
On occasion these turn into disagreements. And sometimes, unfortunately, these turn quite confrontational with me having to disengage from the dialogue due to the vitriol thrown at me — apparently I am not only anti-humanistic but a Big Oil shill, a climate change denier, and a fucking idiot/liberal/conservative/progressive/Malthusian, etc..
Once the ad hominem attacks begin, I usually just state we will have to agree to disagree and discontinue the interaction. I know people don’t want their beliefs challenged, they want them confirmed so if the interaction has gone sideways there’s little point to continue it. Few if any people change their beliefs due to a well-reasoned or evidence-based argument that runs counter to their own thoughts.
This said, most of the disagreements are civil and the issue stems from a divergence in whether we can ‘solve’ the problem/predicament we are focusing upon. I’ve found that the vast majority continue to believe that we can address the topic we’re discussing via some complex technology — usually non-renewable, renewable energy-harvesting technologies such as those that harness wind or sunshine to produce electricity (aka ‘renewables’).
While at one time during my fall into the rabbit’s hole of Peak Oil and all the related issues, I held out ‘hope’ for humanity and our planet. Nowadays, more often than not, I am tending towards there being no way out of the conundrum we walking, talking apes have led ourselves into. Neither time nor resources are on our side it would seem. Salvation, as it were, has been lost to the sands of time.
Here is one recent example with a fellow member of a Degrowth group I am a member of stemming from an article of The Honest Sorcerer’s that I posted to the group.
LK: “Politics” is just a name for technology of resource allocation on a societal scale.
We’re currently using the 18th century technology based on exponential growth (investments are made to obtain money to make more investments), it’s called “capitalism”.
Degrowth is another technology of resource allocation, and the one we need, because exponential growth on a finite planet is not possible.
(Having said that, we still need to combine degrowth with all kinds of low-emissions energy sources like renewables and nuclear, and we need to work on extending the life of existing low-carbon energy sources for as long as possible)
My response:: While I agree that degrowth (and radical at that) is needed, the alternative energy-harvesting technologies to fossil fuels you suggest we need to pursue require huge carbon inputs for their construction (and in perpetuity), continue to contribute to the destruction of our biosphere via the massive mineral mining and processing necessary, and only serve as an attempt to sustain the unsustainable so end up making our fundament predicament of ecological overshoot even worse. We need to be pursuing a low-/no-tech future with one hell of a lot fewer people. It is increasingly looking like it will have to be Nature that takes us there…
LK: The science is quite clear, low carbon energy sources have much, much lower carbon intensity of energy generation over their lifetimes, and lifetime extension to optimise for energy production instead of returns on investment decreases that carbon intensity even further. And fossil fuels have an enormous mining impact.
This is the third line of defense of fossil fuel companies: first they were straight-out lying about climate change, then they were lying about whether climate change is caused by humans, now they are lying about relative impacts of fossil fuel vs low carbon technologies, and it apparently works.
Low-tech future doesn’t work, it’s just a lie fossil companies are telling us to keep burning fossil fuels. We’re a tool-using social species and we need tools to get out of the shit we got into by using tools.
We will have to agree to disagree.
First, it seems you are assuming a support for fossil fuels in my comment that is not present. One does not have to be in any way supportive of the continuation of our extraction and use of them to see that alternatives are in every way — upstream and downstream — still quite dependent upon them. In fact, if you look at the largest investors in support of ‘alternatives’, you will discover it is the large energy businesses (aka Big Oil). Why would that be? Perhaps because they know that fossil fuels are required in huge quantities for them.
Second, the view that only carbon emissions are important blinds people to all the other complexities concerning our predicament of ecological overshoot. Biodiversity loss, mostly because of land system changes brought on by human expansion, appears to be much more significant. A concerted push to adopt non-renewable, renewable energy-harvesting technologies will ensure continued destruction of our biosphere.
The current refrain seems to be “Complex technologies and human ingenuity will save us from our predicament of ecological overshoot and its various symptoms (e.g., biodiversity loss) because they’ve worked up to this point in our history”…except inductive reasoning/logic does not always work. Continual observations by the turkey of the farmer have provided nothing but overwhelming evidence and positive reinforcement that the farmer is a beneficent and thoughtful caregiver; right up until the day before Thanksgiving and the trip behind the barn to the killing cone.
You should look at the work of energy researcher Alice Friedemann and geologist Simon Michaux to understand better the limitations of the ‘solution’ referred to as our ‘energy transition’.
But you are correct that a low-tech future doesn’t work. It doesn’t work to support our unsustainable living arrangements but more importantly the power and wealth structures of the status quo…that is why the ruling caste is pushing ‘renewables’: to maintain/expand their share of a quickly-shrinking economic pie. And this is ultimately why we will pursue these complex technologies despite the impossibility of what their cheerleaders promise. The profiteers of our world stand to make one hell of a lot of money before it all goes to hell in a handbasket.
These images/memes perhaps sum my perspective up:
LK: There’s one thing that kills people pretty rapidly and effectively and that is the lack of energy.
You can either support low-carbon energy sources or you can support fossil fuels or you can support widespread energy poverty that kills a fuckton of people, and those will be mainly poor people in the Global South.
Degrowth is not anarcho-primitivism, it’s not about the remnants of humanity huddling in cold and without hospitals and sewage networks, it’s about building sustainable future around equitable use of energy for everyone.
But we need low-carbon energy, because climate change drives biodiversity loss, water crises (because rising oceans make a lot of areas lose their access to potable water) and other nasty third-order effects.
My response: Again, we’ll have to agree to disagree. Pre/history shows us overwhelmingly that the utopian future you imagine is not possible on a finite planet with 8 billion (and growing). It is denial/bargaining in the face of biogeophysical realities and limits. Ecological overshoot for homo sapiens will be, I am almost certain, dealt with by Nature, not us — particularly given all the claims/liens on future energy/resources in the form of quadrillions of dollars of debt/credit that currently exist and have been created to sustain our current arrangements with zero concern for the future from which the resources have been stolen.
LK: There’s a lot of research by degrowth theoreticians that demonstrates that we’re perfectly technologically capable of supporting 8 billion people on a finite planet, leaving 50% of it to wild nature. It just would be a different life than the US “cardboard houses in suburbia with 2,5 cars per family and 2+ hours of commuting daily, eating beef and flying regularly”.
It would require end of capitalism, though, which is why capitalists are promoting narratives of “we’re doomed, there’s nothing we can do, all alternatives are bad, I guess we’ll have to die off in the future, but so far, we’re bringing in record annual profits”.
My response: Theory is great, in theory. Reality is something quite different. Every complex society to date has perished/collapsed/declined — most before ‘capitalism’ ever existed. To believe we will do otherwise is, well, just denial/bargaining built upon a lot of assumptions and hope. We would be better to plan for a future much, much different than the one you paint. But, again, I think Nature is going to take care of this predicament for us.
After mostly finishing this contemplation I came across Gail Tverberg’s latest that provides some great insight into why the complex technologies many are arguing will help solve our energy dilemma will not.
There are plenty of similar arguments out there if one so chooses to discover them and the overwhelming evidence that ‘renewables’ are not in any way going to do much except: add to the drawdown of finite resources; contribute to the continuous overloading of planetary sinks; provide more profits for the industrialists, financiers, and well-connected elite; and, sustain the misguided belief system that all is well for the most part, and human ingenuity and our technological prowess can solve any problem that stands in the way of some utopian future where we all (billions and billions of us) live in harmony with nature. Transcending the biological and physical constraints of existence upon a finite planet is well within our reach…if only you believe.
See especially:
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers). Encouraging others to read my work is also much appreciated.
February 11, 2023 (original posting date)
Grieving: A Natural Response To Recognition Of Growth Limits
Denial, anger, bargaining, and depression in the face of grievous reality is everywhere; and we all do it to some extent. Some move through the stages more quickly while others remain bogged down in one or more. And it’s not uncommon to bounce back and forth between different stages.
We don’t want to accept the unpalatable, particularly our (and society’s) mortality. Grappling with such thoughts can be debilitating, both physically and psychologically. I know my first few years of reflecting upon our various predicaments as I travelled down the rabbit’s hole that is Peak Oil was most difficult. My anxiety was, at times, through the roof; but being who I am much of that was channelled into physical activities, particularly constructing some elaborate food gardens.
Psychologists are fairly certain that moving to the final stage of grieving — acceptance — and engaging with reality in a more forthright manner (even when it is not what we wish or want) allows one to deal with the emotions in a way that helps us to validate them in a healthier way. But this is so difficult to do when we are grieving. Extremely difficult.
Accepting, for example, that our complex society and its relatively high living standards (thanks primarily to our leveraging of a one-time cache of photosynthetic-created energy) have an expiration date is a contemplation the vast, vast majority of us do not want to consider. We desperately fight to keep the negative thoughts out of our minds, thereby impacting the belief systems through which we interpret the world — its past, present, and future.
In a world that has experienced significant problem-solving success due to our tool-making abilities and this finite supply of dense and transportable energy reserves, it’s exceedingly difficult to imagine this trend of ‘progress’ is coming to an end. We subsequently weave a variety of comforting narratives to avoid such a disheartening reality.
“Complex technologies and human ingenuity will save us from any problem we encounter, including (place your favourite one here)” is one common narrative…except inductive reasoning/logic of this nature does not always work. Continual observations by the turkey of the farmer have provided nothing but overwhelming evidence and positive reinforcement that the farmer is a beneficent and thoughtful caregiver; right up until the day before Thanksgiving and the trip behind the barn to the killing cone, knife in hand.
Confronting the blinders imposed upon us by these comforting narratives allows us to view our world and reality differently, and very much more accurately in my opinion. Not perfectly, but more reflective of the limits existence upon a finite world brings to a biological species not very much different from all the others on this planet — except perhaps for its tool-making skills and denial of reality.
Alas very, very few want to do this. We would rather remain comfortable in our beliefs that humanity is not limited by its physical environment and stands outside Nature. To paraphrase Nietzsche: we don’t want exposure to reality because that destroys our illusions.
One such illusion among others that I’ve confronted recently is the belief that growth (be in economic or population) is not only inevitable but purely beneficial. It has been driving a significant construction ‘boom’ in my province and more specifically my town for a number of years. I’ve written about this before but I continue to see some rather misguided but quite common beliefs dominating the discussion among locals.
The following thoughts are what bubbled up in my mind as I reflected upon these conversations and what the significant majority of my fellow Ontarians appear to believe.
We need to reject the mythos that growth (especially economic but also population) is always and forever a good/beneficial policy path. It is not. Not only are the very real negative environmental/ecological consequences ignored or rationalized away in such a story, but the limits of what is possible and social problems that arise from it mostly discounted/minimized.
In addition, the tendency to assume such growth is inevitable completely overlooks the fact that it is a sociopolitical/socioeconomic policy choice, not a predestined path. We can stop or reverse it if we so choose.
Finally, little if any attention is paid to the reason(s) our ruling elite cheerlead growth. It is not for the virtue-signalling reasons they shout and market repeatedly. It is about sustaining a Ponzi-type economic system that supports status quo power and wealth structures. It is profit and prestige motivated. It must always be remembered that the primary motivation of our ruling caste is the control/expansion of the wealth-generating/-extracting systems that provide their revenue streams and thus positions of power and prestige. All other considerations are secondary/tertiary and ultimately are leveraged to meet their primary one.
The world is a complex nexus of geography, geology, biology, physics, and chemistry. And the stories told by our ‘leaders’ mostly ignore (or rationalize away) the physical realities of these fundamental sciences in favour of sociocultural myths that reinforce the idea that humans stand outside Nature — and their positions in our societies.
Significantly exponential credit-/debt-based fiat currency growth (thanks to the private financial institutions creating it from thin air and charging interest for its use in order to garner obscene profits, and which is what is feeding all this) collides catastrophically with the realities of existence upon a finite planet and its physical limits.
Given interest-bearing fiat is a claim/lien upon future resources — that we have encountered significant diminishing returns upon — and that we are several quadrillion dollars already in hawk, the writing is on the wall that we are totally and completely fubar. What is unsustainable cannot be sustained; no matter how much money we create. All we are succeeding in doing is stealing resources from the future and ensuring our planetary sinks are beyond repair.
The best option left is to prepare locally for the impending breakdown of the various complex systems that we have grown dependent upon, particularly the procurement of potable water, food production, and regional shelter needs. In addition, we should be degrowing our regions/communities, not making the situation even more dire and compounding its effects by continuing to chase growth — no matter what the profiteers from this perpetual-growth strategy are repeatedly telling us.
What I did say on one of the FB posts to try and keep it relatively succinct and simple:
Infinite growth on a planet with finite resources already encountering diminishing returns and using trillions of dollars of debt-/credit-based ‘money’ to pull them from the future. What could possibly go wrong? We are travelling in exactly the opposite direction of where we should be heading.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers). Encouraging others to read my work is also much appreciated.
