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The Greenspan Moon Cult

The Greenspan Moon Cult

Taking another look at what I wrote about repo and the latest developments yesterday, it may be worthwhile to spend some additional time on the “why” as it pertains to so much determined official blindness, an unshakeable devotion to otherwise easily explained lunar events.

The short version: monetary authorities as well as the “experts” describe almost perfectly risk averse behavior among the central money dealing system in outbreaks like September’s repo – but then bend over backward trying to come up with any other kind of explanation for it. The problem must be some complicated stew of otherwise benign technical issues because there’s no possible way, they tell themselves, it can be anything else. Not with bank reserves abundantly over a trillion (now rising again) and Jay Powell pleasantly whispering in their ears about the unemployment rate every other day.

It takes on religious, cult-like properties to try so hard to prove (to themselves) what has already been so thoroughly disproven.

Start with the bond market and interest rates. Over the last half decade or so, ever since Janet Yellen’s ill-advised first rate hike in December 2015 amidst a near recession, a move she immediately regretted, central bankers and Bond Kings have been on a mission to convince the world monetary policy was a tremendous success. It had to have been because it was the biggest thing ever devised and those devising it had promised it was so big the flood of “easing” couldn’t possibly fail.

Something about a printing press.

Anyway, that’s not logic so much as self-delusion and rationalizing; the fallacy of sunk costs. Rather than recognize all the warning signs that it all had indeed failed, policymakers and Economists instead convinced themselves it just needed more time.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Rate of Change

Rate of Change

We’ve got to change our ornithological nomenclature. Hawks become doves because they are chickens underneath. Doves became hawks for reasons they don’t really understand. A fingers-crossed policy isn’t a robust one, so there really was no reason to expect the economy to be that way.

In January 2019, especially the past few days, there are so many examples of flighty birds. Here’s an especially obvious, egregious one from Atlanta Fed President Raphael Bostic. He was so damn positive at the end of October just three months ago he admitted it was giving him problems wordsmithing. Two and a half months, really.

The economy is in a good place. So good, in fact, that as I was sitting down to write this speech, I struggled to come up with sufficient variations on the word “strong.” Strong has many definitions that can describe physical prowess, the intensity of an odor or flavor, and, in physics, a type of force between particles. But one definition stands out to me as particularly apt to describe the economy at this moment: strong—able to withstand great force or pressure.

And now this week:

So grassroots intelligence from Main Street and messages from Wall Street indicate heightened uncertainty and concern about the economy. But the aggregate economic data continue to paint a robust picture. What is a policymaker to conclude from these mixed signals?

To me, the appropriate response is to be patient in adjusting the stance of policy and to wait for greater clarity about the direction of the economy and the risks to the outlook.

So, maybe unable to withstand great force or pressure? You don’t go from strong to heightened uncertainty in a matter of weeks unless it wasn’t ever strong to begin with. Using the same dictionary as President Bostic, it tells me the antonym for “strong” is “weak.”

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Uh Oh; In A Month Of Big Warnings, The Biggest Yet

Uh Oh; In A Month Of Big Warnings, The Biggest Yet

All better now. It’s a Christmas miracle, the plunge erased by market closure as if FDR had just been re-elected and taken the oath. The Dow is on everyone’s mind, so trading on December 26 has understandably stuck.

Stocks posted their best day in nearly a decade on Wednesday, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average notching its largest one-day point gain in history. Rallies in retail and energy shares led the gains, as Wall Street recovered the steep losses suffered in the previous session.

The sigh of relief is palpable all across the world. The BIS called the steep, worrisome liquidations up to now Yet More Bumps On The Path To Normal, and the rallies especially in stocks and oil have served to confirm the thesis. Just some minor, dare I say transitory discomfort on the road to paradise.

Is it though?

We have been watching eurodollar futures, well, forever but with even greater purpose and intent since mid-June. There is little the eurodollar curve won’t spill information about, and its inversion around then was a huge warning that whatever shook the global money network on May 29 was indeed nothing to just ignore.

Money curves are supposed to be upward sloping reflecting the risks of a healthy environment, including economic opportunity. For it to be distorted to the point of being upside down, that’s big. People have a hard time interpreting regular curves, so unhealthy ones are much more a mystery (thanks to Economics).

The specific contracts displaying eurodollar’s version of oil contango were those out several years, the 2020’s to 2021’s. For a time, the inversion extended into 2022. For the few who noticed, this didn’t seem too much to be concerned about; a far distant probability of some nonspecific hedging case. Surely the world can be fixed given two or three years.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Chart of the Week: Playing With Dominoes

Chart of the Week: Playing With Dominoes

The Great “Recession” was never a recession. It was a monetary event first and foremost, and it continues to be eleven years later. That means by and large it has been a failure of imagination. Central bankers say they’ve done this and that, but what they’ve never done, apart from actually succeed, is examine the way money actually works in this modern world. Greenspan said it in June 2000, this “proliferation of products.” What might happen if they no longer proliferate?

You’d have to imagine an answer because they have none.

In the spirit of imagination, use yours to mentally draw in below DXY or some other equivalent eurodollar signal like repo or even EFF. None of our economic problems are really that difficult. They just don’t fit in the narrow box Economists have constructed so that their DSGE models can be free from singularities. It’s nice, I suppose, eliminating infinities from certain equations (“rational” rather than adaptive expectations) but at the expense of macro competence?

It takes very little imagination, actually, to see how they really have no idea what they are doing.

Still None, and Even More Reasons to Expect None

The parallels between the last few years and those at the end of the 1990’s are striking. There was a few years ago the monetary intrusion of the “rising dollar” which at its worst seriously depressed the global economy. Oil prices crashed, as did several key currencies, and deflationary pressures that often accompany a significant downturn were manifest.

Starting in 1997, there was all of that, too. Oil prices though much lower to begin with were crushed, overseas the “dollar” “rose”, and currency problems were everywhere particularly in Asia (Japan both times, China only the later). And there were asset bubbles in both.

In terms of consumer price inflation, the similarities did not end. In 1999, the Federal Reserve having failed to account for the reasons behind the Asian flu began to act in anticipation of rising inflation. Ignoring bond market warnings, as Economists always do, the Fed took the excuse of oil price effects and their impacts on consumer price indices as justification.

Raising rates throughout 1999 and 2000, the central bank was eventually stopped by the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the deflationary pressures of recession as well as finance it did not foresee even though the bond market had been trading against them all along. Inflation, as a necessary consequence, fell back, too.

At its apex, the PCE Deflator in early 2001 reached a high of 2.87% and went no further. What was missing from the episode was every indication of broad-based consumer price inflation that might have suggested their concerns over acceleration or related imbalance. The so-called core rate never really moved all that much, indicating that oil prices off the 1999 lows were entirely responsible for the rise in the rate (WTI was up more than 60% year-over-year when the PCE Deflator registered that 2.87%).

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

It’s More Than Just the Absences of Acceleration, It’s the Synchronization Where There Should Be None

According to the latest ECB figures, as of yesterday total “liquidity” added to the European banking system for that central bank’s ongoing monetary “stimulus” was just shy of €2 trillion. The outstanding balance in the core current account (reserves) held on behalf of the banking system was €1.296 trillion. In the deposit account, banks are holding €686 billion at -40 bps in “yield.”

To create all these euro-denominated numbers, the European Central Bank through its constituent National Central Banks (NCB) has purchased €2.21 trillion through its three main active LSAP’s (Large Scale Asset Purchases): the PSPP, or QE, which buys up sovereign bonds and is the reason for running them through the NCB’s (out of original concern exactly who would bear any default risk); the CBPP3, or the third time the ECB has bought covered bonds from banks; and the Corporate Sector Purchase Program which is self-explanatory.

The numbers given above don’t appear to balance because of the way all this stuff is accounted for. The NCB transactions of QE and other material operations actually subtract from the ECB’s asset side because it isn’t doing them, becoming instead -€1.21trillion in so far accumulated autonomous factors. On the other side, the liability side of the simple balance sheet, there are outstanding €769 billion in normal liquidity operations (OMO) at the MRO.

The net of all these hundreds of billions and trillions is actually unclear. I don’t mean that in an accounting sense, for all the euros are there in the various statements. Rather, what these massive transactions have produced where it counts is truly negligible.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Political Economics

Political Economics

Who President Trump ultimately picks as the next Federal Reserve Chairman doesn’t really matter. Unless he goes really far afield to someone totally unexpected, whoever that person will be will be largely more of the same. It won’t be a categorical change, a different philosophical direction that is badly needed.

Still, politically, it does matter to some significant degree. It’s just that the political division isn’t the usual R vs. D, left vs. right. That’s how many are making it out to be, and in doing so exposing what’s really going on.

As usual, the perfect example for these divisions is provided by Paul Krugman. The Nobel Prize Winner ceased being an economist a long time ago, and has become largely a partisan carnival barker. He opines about economic issues, but framed always from that perspective.

To the very idea of a next Fed Chair beyond Yellen, he wrote a few weeks ago, “we’re living in the age of Trump, which means that we should actually expect the worst.” Dr. Krugman wants more of the same, and Candidate Trump campaigned directly against that. As such, there is the non-trivial chance that President Trump lives up to that promise.

Again, it sounds like a left vs. right issue, but it isn’t. The political winds are changing, and the parties themselves are being realigned in different directions (which is not something new; there have been several re-alignments throughout American history even though the two major parties have been entrenched since the 1850’s when Republicans first appeared). Who the next Fed Chair is could tell us something about how far along we are in this evolution.

What Krugman wants, meaning, it is safe to assume, what all those like him want, is simple: success. He believes that the central bank has given us exactly that, therefore it is stupid to upset what works.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Forget Draghi, Crude Matters

Forget Draghi, Crude Matters

Despite Mario Draghi’s supposedly misinterpreted comments earlier this week, there are global indications that the best of this round has already been reached. Policymakers are always going to claim things are improving, that much is given. But there is tremendous difference between that and what has occurred, especially if it is indeed rolling over worldwide.

The earliest indicators for China’s economy in June signal that the manufacturing sector may be poised to decelerate, while other challenges loom in the second half of this year.

Small- and medium-sized enterprises showed the lowest level of confidence in 16 months, a gauge of manufacturing drawn from satellite imagery slumped, and conditions in the steel business remained lackluster.

At the center of the story is as always crude oil. There are, of course, direct effects of the ups and downs (more down than up) in the energy market. As the price of it rises there will be more exploration, drilling, production, and transportation required. Some of that has already happened, and accounts for some part of this economic recuperation.

The larger effects are in sentiment, or at least the kind they might measure in PMI’s or surveys. It bears repeating that when the global downturn arrived in early 2015, economists worldwide assured everyone not to worry. They had several plausible reasons for taking that position, flawed as they were. Overall, however, especially from a US perspective the big contrary indicator was WTI.

Dismissing it as a mere “supply glut”, actual economic agents especially in industry would have known better. Even if these important marginal changes weren’t completely understood, it didn’t take any special knowledge or complex series of regressions to link the crash in oil to reduced demand for goods globally. In that way, oil became the best real-time indicator for economic demand and its overall direction no matter what Janet Yellen would say.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

The Coming Of Depression Economics

The Coming Of Depression Economics

Like it or not, this is where we have been all along and a great many people are just now catching up. No matter what Janet Yellen says about the economy, she is talking out the side of her mouth. Internally, the recovery is gone, and it is never coming back. Externally, we have sub-5% unemployment so we all should be so happy, especially with, in her view, stable prices.

To their credit, many prominent economists aren’t so enthusiastic about those prospects. Among them are Larry Summers, Paul Krugman, and Brad DeLong, all who recognize that “something” just isn’t right and therefore “something” else should be done about it. Thus, the real economic debate over the coming years (unfortunately) will take shape around those two facets. Having wasted nearly a decade on purely central bank solutions that were never going to work, the real discoveries can now possibly take place.

The problem is as I wrote yesterday, where in a rush to do anything and everything “different” the Trump administration might actually spoil the process. De-regulation and income tax cuts, as well as the repeal of Obamacare, are all very good things that sorely need to be addressed; but they didn’t cause this depression and thus won’t get us out of it. And you can bet that none of Summers, Krugman, or DeLong will be in favor of those options, so if they all fail to restore economic growth, as I believe they will if left in isolation, then that will severely diminish those ideas for perhaps a generation or more. That would be a fatal mistake, especially since for the first time in many generations people outside of Economics are receptive to “new” ideas (that are only new because they have been out of practice and actively discouraged for so long).

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Like Everything Else, History Repeats (Almost Exactly) Because Power Truly Corrupts

Like Everything Else, History Repeats (Almost Exactly) Because Power Truly Corrupts

With both the Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve today undertaking policy considerations at the same time, it is useful to highlight the similarities of conditions if not exactly in time. As I wrote this morning, what the Fed is attempting now is very nearly the same as what the Bank of Japan did ten years ago. In the middle of 2006, after more than six years of ZIRP and five years of several QE’s, the Bank of Japan judged economic conditions sufficiently positive to begin the process of policy “exit” by first undertaking the rate “liftoff.”

If you read through the policy statement from July 2006 it sounds as if it were written by American central bank officials in July 2016. Swap out the year and the country and you really wouldn’t be able to tell the difference.

Japan’s economy continues to expand moderately, with domestic and external demand and also the corporate and household sectors well in balance. The economy is likely to expand for a sustained period…The year-on-year rate of change in consumer prices is projected to continue to follow a positive trend.

With incoming data judged as meeting predetermined criteria (they were somewhat “data dependent”, too), the Bank of Japan voted to raise their benchmark short-term rate but were careful, just like the Fed since December, to assure “markets” that it would be a gradual change only in the level of further “accommodation.”

The Bank has maintained zero interest rates for an extended period, and the stimulus from monetary policy has been gradually amplified against the backdrop of steady improvements in economic activity and prices…

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

What Have ‘We’ Been Doing All This Time?

What Have ‘We’ Been Doing All This Time?

Amidst all the pearls of wisdom unleashed in mainstream economics over the past unbelievable eight years or so, it was one paragraph of common sense that had it been written and appreciated at the start of this period might have saved us all the inordinate and totally unwarranted trouble.

But borrowers will only demand more credit if they have optimistic expectations of future income—and banks will only supply it if they deem them creditworthy. Interest rates, which is [sic] all ECB policy can affect, are less important than economic expectations.

That was published by the Wall Street Journal in an article describing how European banks are largely if not completely at the margins indifferent to QE and NIRP. Monetarism has failed on every count and by every standard. QE was supposed to be a simultaneous boost to liquidity, a push on banks (into lending) from “portfolio effects”, and then via price channels a huge lift to those very economic expectations.

None of it worked anywhere it was tried. Full stop.

The worst part is that anyone operating on common sense rather than ideology knew it wouldn’t work right from the start at the very least because of the reasons stated in that exact paragraph. Throw in some continued monetary irregularity and there was no chance.

Ben Bernanke claimed that savers would benefit from their disturbed position once QE had performed its magic largely upon expectations – the full recovery would push interest rates back up to their natural position whatever that might be. Savers and investors are still waiting and with interest rates lower now than when QE was in effect; despite Bernanke’s successor having “raised rates” in the meantime. They really don’t know what they are doing. They never have. And nobody stops them.

Olduvai IV: Courage
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Olduvai II: Exodus
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