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Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVIII–Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 4

October 28, 2024

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVIII–Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 4

Knossos, Greece (1988). Photo by author.

This Contemplation follows from Part 1 (Website; Medium; Substack), 2 (Website; Medium; Substack), and 3 (Website; Medium; Substack) that was prompted by the devastation brought to the southeastern United States by way of Hurricane Helene. This recent natural disaster (followed closely by Hurricane Milton) is but one of dozens to hit the globe during the past year.

As I stated in the introductory Contemplation “my own immediate reaction to the significant damage and a few articles/conversations with others has me viewing the tragedy that is unfolding as another step in the path towards ‘collapse’ of the U.S. nation as currently constructed. Another straw, as it were, on the camel’s back that supports societal complexity for this particular nation state/empire–which would have repercussions for most other societies on our planet given U.S. global hegemony (and its faltering nature).”

In Part 1, I describe how complexity and collapse are viewed in archaeologist Joseph Tainter’s thesis (See: The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge University Press, 1988. (ISBN 978-0-521-38673-9)). Part 2 looks at diminishing returns and begins to explore what the ‘collapse’ process entails, i.e., what occurs during and what follows the loss of sociopolitical complexity. Part 3 expands on what the past tells us about what a large, complex society experiences as it is in the process of ‘collapse’, what it looks like post ‘collapse’, and began to touch on what our present-day complex societies may have in store as we continue along the path of increasing complexity while encountering diminishing returns.

In this Contemplation I review the patterns that past complex society collapses exhibit and what this suggests for those of us alive today as our exceedingly complex, globalised industrial society gets rather long in the tooth.

Past Collapse Patterns
Let me begin by summarising the previous three Contemplations that provide an overview of what Dr. Joseph Tainter argues the archaeological evidence shows with respect to the changes that occur over the lifespan of a complex society–particularly its ‘collapse’ phase.

First, society is viewed as a problem-solving organisation that forms to address the stresses that arise from living in an unpredictable and occasionally chaotic environment (both biogeophysically and socioculturally). Problem solving requires resources (especially energy) for its technological innovations and/or organisational growth of problem-solving institutions. A significant consequence of our problem-solving strategies is increasing complexity.

The ‘costs’ of problem solving are met easily during a society’s growth phase when return on investments is high (due to resource surpluses being abundant) and ‘solutions’ are relatively simple in nature. However, complexity and its associated costs are cumulative in nature resulting in ever-increasing costs and ever-decreasing returns on investments. This results in a continuous drawdown of resources (particularly the least costly, easiest-to-access ones) and ever-growing demands upon the populace (especially via labour and/or ‘taxes’). Note that along with growth in complexity comes an increase in social differentiation, inequality, centralisation, and social control mechanisms.

In the face of ever-increasing complexity and costs, the speed of declining returns intensifies until a point is reached where they turn negative and greater and greater inputs/costs are needed just to sustain society. The perceived benefits of evermore societal investments begin to fade as reserves are increasingly drawn upon, leaving less and less for problem solving (which is becoming more difficult), and demands upon the population grow.

Increasingly, problems are poorly addressed or not resolved at all. Subsequently, citizen dissatisfaction grows–especially apathy towards the polity and its elite–with some individuals and/or small social units ‘opting out’ of the larger community. As a result of all these changes, the economic strength of the polity falters creating a positive feedback loop that is increasingly difficult to halt or reverse.

Once diminishing returns are encountered, a society becomes more susceptible to stress surges that may overwhelm its various institutions/systems. The increasing failure of societal problem solving leads greater numbers of people to lose faith in the polity and its elite to meet the challenges that arise. People also begin to lose faith in the problem-solving strategy of ever-increasing complexity.

The collapse process is marked by: falling benefits for society as a whole—mostly impacted are the masses since the elite (those that sit atop a society’s power and wealth structures) tend to be insulated in a number of ways; substantial cost increases and demands on the public; population decline with increasing numbers opting out, typically via migration elsewhere; and, growing negative impacts upon the environment as the drawdown and use of biogeophysical resources increases exponentially in attempts to offset diminishing returns.

One typical elite response is the imposition of strict sociobehavioural controls—usually via legitimisation activities and/or oppressive control mechanisms—to try and decrease inefficiencies and sustain their revenue streams and positions of prestige. Perhaps the primary and overarching response is to increase the pursuit of complexity. This, however, exacerbates resource drawdown and negative impacts upon the environment leading to a quickening of diminishing returns and turning them negative. In turn, more and more of the population opt for simplification and withdraw support for the polity.

“Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold…”
-William Yeats, 1920
The Second Coming

As a result of diminishing returns and faltering support, the polity’s revenues begin to fall with the elite further burdening their citizens to sustain themselves. The standard response to this situation is currency debasement that tends to lead to lower living standards for the masses. As a result of decreasing revenue and increasing costs, especially for the military, foreign challengers meet with greater success. Domestic unrest also rises, with some regions breaking away. With a fall in energy-averaging systems, self-sufficiency grows. Technology simplifies to that which can be developed and maintained locally.

Societal ‘collapse’ is signalled, then, by a simplification (a reversal of fortunes as it were) in all of the aspects that growing complexity brought, including: social stratification/differentiation; economic/occupational specialisation; centralised control/regimentation (especially sociobehavioural); epiphenomena of growth (e.g., monumental architecture, artistic and literary achievements); information flow; energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade); societal organisation/coordination; and territorial expansion.

Collapse In the Present
Our hominin species has been present on Earth for about 300,000 years. Most of that time it has sustained itself via a hunting-gathering lifestyle. These groups were still complex in nature and used technological innovations to meet their basic needs, but their size, sociopolitical complexity, and technology was limited in nature relative to today’s global, industrial societies. Growth of groups that might overshoot the carrying capacity of the surrounding natural environment–placing pressure upon sustainability and requiring sociopolitical complexity–was primarily dealt with by some small group of members breaking off and seeking an unexploited region. Migration was perhaps one of the primary means of dealing with population pressures for millennia.

It is primarily during the past 12,000 years or so (and especially the last 6000) that evidence suggests a different mode of living arose where much larger groups formed and began to solve the stressors of existence via ever-increasing sociopolitical complexity that involved more technological innovations and the development of hierarchical social institutions to organise and distribute surpluses (that has been kicked into hyper-exponential change via hydrocarbon reserves). The differential access and control of these resources eventually morphed into a large, hierarchical society displaying increasing inequality and complexity.

But once diminishing returns on their investments in this approach kicked in time, or a series of unexpected stress surges, caused it all to come crashing down in the form of drastic simplification from a previous peak of complexity. EVERY. TIME. Sometimes this ‘collapse’ was short-lived and the remnants of society began to pursue complexity again, but most of the time this was not the case. The overwhelming majority of the time society dissolved to a point that was no longer recognisable relative to previous times. The society had ‘collapsed’.

As Tainter reiterates in his text: “Collapse is recurrent in human history; it is global in its occurrence; and it affects the spectrum of societies from simple foragers to great empires.” (p. 193)

To close, I wish to highlight the primary response typically pursued by the elite and that we are already bearing witness to, and will likely see much more of in the years ahead: opting to pursue increased complexity to address perceived problems.

Evidence would suggest that this is the exact opposite of what we should likely be attempting but we are pursuing it regardless. Unfortunately, in doing so we are exacerbating all of the negative aspects of growing complexity: inequality; specialisation (and thus interdependency, both nationally and internationally); mechanisms for sociobehavioural control; currency debasement; resource drawdown and concomitant environmental/ecological-systems destruction.

As Tainter suggests, these observations are important to us in the present since they can inform us as to what we are likely to face as our societies attempt to counter the consequences of diminishing returns and its numerous impacts upon us.

Scanning the media regularly over the past couple of decades would suggest that some of these societal collapse consequences have already taken place or begun to for some nation states and for some regions within nation states. This is not necessarily for the reason of diminishing returns in many but for the reason of geopolitics where power struggles have or are occurring, and for some where stronger powers have undercut the ruling elite to sow chaos–usually with the aim to fill the subsequent power vacuum and control the nation’s wealth and resources.

But even if we ignore such cases and focus upon seemingly strong nations, we can begin to see some of the collapse process unfolding. Certainly it would appear that central authority, or at least support for it, is breaking down for a number of nation states. Civic strife between opposing factions can be seen increasing in intensity, if not actual ‘battles’. Government revenues are faltering and the typical response of currency debasement is occurring to counter this. Resources are being redirected from the masses to the privileged few that sit atop the power and wealth structures of society. Supply chains are being disrupted due to trade disputes and other geopolitical maneuvering.

Many of these changes are being hidden or rationalised away as one-offs, or due to some nefarious ‘other’. But they are occurring nonetheless in a number of places, including supposed stable nations. It is only through willful ignorance that they are not perceived for what they are: signals of impending sociopolitical collapse due to an elite class attempting to offset diminishing returns on our investments in complexity.

What exactly will befall our large, sociopolitically complex societies is anyone’s guess. But, throw our predicament of ecological overshoot on top of this cyclical phenomenon and the writing is on the wall: societal simplification is inevitable.

Perhaps one of the more significant impediments for our species in being able to accept that societal collapse is inevitable is that in our human proclivity to deny/avoid/ignore anxiety-provoking thoughts, the vast majority of us disregard the overwhelming evidence…so we support, even encourage, the elite response to keep pushing on the string of increased complexity and technology. Because, you know, human ingenuity. But all we are accomplishing by doing this is helping to make a tough situation even worse.

We mostly ignore, at our peril, the alternative (and one that will appear whether we wish it or not): simplification.

If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).

Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).

If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.

Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99

Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…

https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US

If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.

You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.

Released September 30, 2024

It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2

A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.

With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.

The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.

Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.

The Bulletin: October 10-16, 2024

October 16, 2024

The Bulletin: October 10-16, 2024

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Social Trust: It’s Not Warm and Fuzzy, It’s the Money, Honey

Disinformation Isn’t the Problem. Government Coverups and Censorship Are the Problem – Global Research

The History Of “Round Up” and pathways for Glyphosate Detox (from the soil and human body)

A Tipping Point for Global Population and Economic Growth: What it Means for Oil | Art Berman

‘The water wars are coming’: Missouri looks to limit exports from rivers, lakes

Climate Change is Coming for Your Supply Chain

When the Electricity Dies | The Epoch Times

My New Book Is Unleashed: The Mythology of Progress

Facebook Faces Heat for Blocking Report on Arrest of US Journalist in Israel

The weeds are winning | MIT Technology Review

Assess Your Local Landscape For Collapse

UN warns world’s water cycle becoming ever more erratic

Planetary Health Check: The State of Earth’s Critical Systems

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Can We Rein In the Excesses of Financialization Without Crashing the Economy?

#291: The coming shock | Surplus Energy Economics

Electric Power Update: Big Data, AI, Bitcoin, Natural Gas, and More

This Is How Oil Ends | Art Berman

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVI– Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 2

October 15, 2024 / 2 Comments on Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVI– Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 2

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVI–Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 2

Tulum, Mexico (1986). Photo by author.

This Contemplation follows from Part 1 (Website; Medium; Substack) that was prompted by the devastation brought to the southeastern United States by way of Hurricane Helene. This recent natural disaster (followed closely by Hurricane Milton) is but one of dozens to hit the globe during the past year.

I view impending societal ‘collapse’ through the thesis proposed by archaeologist Joseph Tainter who basically posits that complex societies become susceptible to socioopolitical collapse/simplification as they encounter diminishing returns on their investments in problem-solving. This is primarily due to a society’s tendency to solve issues via greater complexity requiring more resources (especially energy) that become more difficult to acquire given our proclivity to extract the easiest-to-access reserves first, leaving more difficult-to-access ones for later use. All it then takes is time–with society using increasing amounts of its resource surpluses to maintain complexities–or a sudden stress surge that then overwhelms available resources to experience ‘collapse’.

As Tainter states: ”[c]omplex societies are problem-solving organizations, in which more parts, different kinds of parts, more social differentiation, more inequality, and more kinds of centralization and control emerge as circumstances require.” (p. 37)

Societal ‘collapse’, then, is a reversal of this increasing complexity. Again, as Tainter argues: “Collapse…is a political process. It may, and often does, have consequences in such areas as economics, art, and literature, but it is fundamentally a matter of the sociopolitical sphere. A society has collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity.”

In Part 1, I describe how complexity and collapse are viewed in Tainter’s thesis. In this Contemplation I look at diminishing returns and begin to explore what the ‘collapse’ process entails, i.e., what occurs during and what follows the loss of sociopolitical complexity.

What are diminishing returns?

While Tainter’s collapse thesis is primarily concerned with the sociopolitical realm, it’s vital to understand that complex societies are dependent upon continuous energy flows. The acquisition and distribution of resources is integrated within sociopolitical institutions. These must evolve in harmony and the energy must be enough to maintain the sociopolitical institutions that serve to organise and maintain society’s numerous complexities. Energy, then, is THE fundamental resource supporting societal complexity (and this explains why access to/control of hydrocarbon reserves motivates so much of human geopolitics; and probably has for a century or more).

Tainter proposes that the return on investment in complexity varies and such variation follows a specific curve; that “in many crucial spheres, continued investment in sociopolitical complexity reaches a point where the benefits for such investment begin to decline, at first gradually, then with accelerated force. Thus, not only must a population allocate greater and greater amounts of resources to maintaining an evolving society, but after a certain point, higher amounts of this investment will yield smaller increments of return. Diminishing returns, it will be shown, are a recurrent aspect of sociopolitical evolution and of investment in complexity.” (p. 92)

As Tainter argues complex societies, as problem-solving organisations, are maintained through control and specialization but “[t]he reasons why investments in complexity yields a declining marginal return are: (a) increasing size of bureaucracies; (b) increasing specialization of bureaucracies; (c) the cumulative nature of organizational solutions; (d) increasing taxation; (e) increasing costs of legitimizing activities; and, (f) increasing cost of internal control and external defense.” (p. 115)

As a society becomes more complex, its costs increase but the benefits of each additional change is not in proportion to the costs, and in some cases there are no benefits at all. Once more complex features are added, they are rarely abandoned so growth in complexity tends to be exponential. By adding greater complexity “the potential for problems, conflicts, and incongruities develops disproportionately.” (p. 116)

There are benefits for many added complexities but they only provide less and less positive return for the cost. Eventually “societies do reach a level where continued investment in complexity yields a declining marginal return. At that point the society is investing in an evolutionary course that is becoming less and less productive, where at increased cost it is able to do little more than maintain the status quo.” (p. 117)

Keep in mind that ‘collapse’ is a process and not an event. As a process, it should be viewed as occurring along a continuum with a somewhat elongated timeline; it does not occur with a specific event (usually, but catastrophic natural disasters may have it happening ‘overnight’; for example, the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and its impact upon Pompeii and surrounding regions of the Roman Empire). And although the recognition from a complex state to a simpler one may be relatively ‘quick’ (say a generation or two), in most cases it seems to take a relatively long time (perhaps a century or more).

This recognition of ‘collapse’ seems more a cognitive one than an actual physical one. Humans being who they are create narratives to view societal collapse in a rather simplistic way to help it make more sense. It’s one of the reasons we suggest that wars begin with specific events (say the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand for World War 1) rather than the result of a build-up of small and seemingly innocuous grievances and geopolitical maneuvers. It’s simpler to associate a singular event (assassination) as being the cause of something (war), rather than attempting to understand the many complexities that accumulate and lead to certain consequences. It also provides leverage/cover to the stories of ‘blame’ and ‘response’ that circulate–especially during wars when ‘rulers’ are attempting to persuade citizens to support their actions/decisions and to rationalise their own atrocities during wars.

A good parable/metaphor for understanding what I am suggesting may be that regarding boiling a frog. This is primarily about a cognitive shift/awareness after a period of small but cumulative changes. Recognising when ‘collapse’ has occurred is perhaps more about human perceptions and the need to identify a discreet moment or event where everything changed. This need is basically a heuristic to help us understand and simplify what is a complex process that likely does not exhibit a precipitous causal event.

Boiling a frog is a metaphor for the problem we all have perceiving changes that are gradual but cumulatively significant, that may creep up and have devastating consequences: a little increase here, a little there, then later some more. Nothing changes very much and things seem normal. Then one day the accumulation of changes cause the appearance of normality to disappear. Suddenly things have changed a great deal. The world is different, and it has been altered in a manner that may not be pleasant.

Joseph Tainter & Tadeusz W. Patzek, 2012
Drilling Down: The Gulf Oil Debacle and Our Energy Dilemma

Certain events and societal tendencies contribute significantly to ‘collapse’ but it appears primarily to be the result of a sudden, unexpected stress surge after a prolonged period of diminishing returns. And while the stress(es) may be the result of particular ‘events’, the ‘collapse’ is typically a process that takes time to unfold–how much time varies. For example, evidence suggests that the ‘collapse’ of Easter Island’s complex society took only a generation or two, while that of the Roman Empire several centuries.

Diminishing returns eventually require that surpluses be consumed to maintain status quo complexities. But at some point in a society’s existence, stressors cannot be adequately addressed–at least not in the eyes of the people who belong to the sociopolitical organisation–and the necessary human support to maintain the various institutions begin to fray and eventually break.

Also remember that ‘collapse’ can be regional, occurring in localised areas; not necessarily consuming the entire complex society in question. For example, the ‘collapse’ of specific regions of Mayan society where the archaeological evidence for the Lowlands Indicates that this particular region was abandoned (viewed as ‘collapse’) while surrounding regions continued uninterrupted or show some growth in complexity (perhaps as a result of Lowlands people migrating into them). This is also true for the Western Roman Empire that ‘collapsed’ long before the eastern provinces.

For Tainter, ‘collapse’ occurs when the sociopolitical system can no longer sustain itself and breaks down as a result of members ‘opting out’. This is primarily an economic decision: if the cost/benefit ratio of providing support for the sociopolitical institutions is too high, citizens will remove their support in various ways. Refusing to participate in activities of expansion or defense, or not paying ‘taxes’ could prove too much to sustain sociopolitical systems in a region. It could also be as simple as migrating out of the area. Ultimately, the complex systems break down and ‘collapse’ ensues.

Unexpected stress surges and ‘collapse’

As Tainter argues, the systems that maintain a functioning society weaken with diminishing returns. A weakening of these systems opens the door to ‘collapse’ due to sudden stress surges.

“Unexpected stress surges must be dealt with out of the current operating budget, often ineffectually, and always to the detriment of the system as a whole. Even if the stress is successfully met, the society is weakened in the process, and made even more vulnerable to the next crisis. Once a society develops the vulnerabilities of declining marginal returns, collapse may merely require sufficient passage of time to render probable the occurrence of an insurmountable calamity.” (p. 121)

In addition, declining marginal returns can lead people to view complexity as a failed problem-solving strategy. As Tainter states: “Where marginal returns decline, the advantages to complexity become ultimately no greater (for the society as a whole) than for less costly social forms. The marginal cost of evolution to a higher level of complexity, or of remaining at the present level, is high compared with the alternative of disintegration.” (p. 121)

For some, then, the option of detaching from larger sociopolitical forms is more attractive since fewer benefits are resulting from the costs they are incurring. As a result, smaller social units begin to pursue their own goals, forsaking those of larger units. The status quo may respond to this shift through greater legitimisation activities and/or control. Peasant revolts may occur or, more commonly, apathy towards well-being of the polity increases.

Sustaining services for a population becomes increasingly difficult as rising marginal costs due to declining resources saps economic strength. Unexpected stresses and normal operations are met by using reserves. Society begins to disintegrate as local entities break away or the ruling government is toppled militarily.

A society increasing its complexity through ever-increasing investment will eventually reach a point when marginal productivity can no longer rise; complexity can still accrue benefits past this point but at a declining marginal rate and stress will begin to rise (e.g. between growth/no-growth factions). Although greater investment is made in research and development and education in an attempt to find solutions, taxes and inflation increase making collapse more likely. A point may be reached when increasing complexity actually results in decreased overall benefits.

A society with inadequate reserves becomes extremely vulnerable at this time since a significant stress surge can overwhelm the various systems required to maintain complexities. The leadership may impose strict behavioural controls in response in an attempt to decrease inefficiencies.

What follows ‘collapse’?

I am convinced by the archaeological evidence–and thus believe–that societal ‘collapse’ as proposed by Tainter for our current iteration of it is inevitable. 12,000 years of pre/history during which time countless numbers of experiments in complex societies have been attempted suggest this. Is it guaranteed? Of course not. No one can predict the future with much if any accuracy but why would our go at it have the ‘Goldilocks’ outcome of being just right. You know the ‘this time is different’ ending, especially given the ecological overshoot predicament we are also trapped within.

On top of the issue of diminishing returns on our investments in complexity we have so exceeded numerous planetary boundaries that the natural environmental carrying capacity of almost all regions of the planet are greatly depressed, making the possibility of societal ‘rebirth’ after the collapse of our global industrial society as close to zero as we might get (if not zero, depending on whose story of the future one subscribes to). Of course, pre/history also shows that some form of society always ‘rises from the ashes’…so there’s that for those holding out ‘hope’.

(See: https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/the-nine-planetary-boundaries.html)

Keep in mind, however, that the discussion that follows is focused upon the evidence of what has befallen past complex societies. The future of global, industrial societies is likely to rhyme with the past, with its own variations upon the tendencies that arise with sociopolitical collapse of human complex societies, but it will not be exactly like the collapses of the past.

In Part 3, I will expand on what the past tells us about what a complex society looks like post ‘collapse’. As some have argued, it is a ‘simplification’ and/or ‘adaptation’ to circumstances and not the ‘end of the world’. A ‘dark age’ in comparison to what preceded it may occur, but human existence continued. Of course, what this will look like alongside ecological overshoot responses is entirely up in the air.

While awaiting Part 3, ponder our current responses to diminishing returns and growing stressors given previous societal responses. It certainly appears to be rhyming to me…

Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).

If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.

Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99

Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…

https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US

If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.

You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.

Released September 30, 2024

It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2

A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.

Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.

The Bulletin: October 3-9, 2024

October 9, 2024

The Bulletin: October 3-9, 2024

Grid Apocalypse Hits Carolinas: 360 Substations Down, Power Restoration Could Take “Months” | ZeroHedge

From a Bunker in Israel, American Empire is Over – Charles Nenner | Greg Hunter’s USAWatchdog

Why Political “Solutions” Don’t Fix Crises, They Make Them Worse

Bank Of America Customers Report Widespread Outage, Zero Balances | ZeroHedge

Politicians Who Promise “Economic Growth” Are Lying 💰

Helene is now the deadliest mainland U.S. hurricane since Katrina » Yale Climate Connections

Taiwan shuts down for second day as Typhoon Krathon makes landfall

The Double Bind With Mitigating Ideas

The One World Order Is Here. UN Pact of the Future. “United under UN Tyranny” – Global Research

Doug Casey Exposes the Global Elites’ Plan for Feudalism 2.0—and How You Can Resist

Reckoning with Growth – by Steve Keen – The Ideas Letter

The Western Media Helped Create These Horrors In The Middle East

Green Jobs or Greenwashing? – Biocentric with Max Wilbert

The Superorganism and the Self – by Nate Hagens

Adapt or Die, Or…? – Charles Hugh Smith’s Substack

Dramatic Footage Shows Tanker Blown Up In Critical Maritime Chokepoint As Disasters Mount For Biden-Harris | ZeroHedge

Think Climate Change Is a Hoax? Try Betting on It | Art Berman

Nowhere in America is safe from climate-fueled storms and fires, say scientists

What Would World War III Really Look Like? It’s Already Starting… – Alt-Market.us

Never Let Your Government Tell You Who Your Enemies Are

#290: Project 2050, part two | Surplus Energy Economics

Burn the Planet and Lock Up the Dissidents

As Empire Of Lies Crumbles, Hillary Clinton Warns: “We’ll Lose Total Control” If Social Media Stops Censoring Content | ZeroHedge

Julian Assange Exposes CIA’s Plot to Assassinate Him in First Public Hearing Since Release – Vigilant News Network

The Second Bronze Age – The Honest Sorcerer

Manufacturing Energy Crises – by Rachel Donald

This is what Peak Cheap Energy looks like

The Rogue Primate — Revisited | how to save the world

7 Key Takeaways: 2024 State of the Climate Report

Yes, You Need To Be Able To Do This [The Market Ticker ®]

Bye-bye, Civilization. It’s Been Nice Knowing You.

Flooded industrial sites and toxic chemical releases are a silent, growing threat in hurricanes like Milton and Helene

It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2

September 30, 2024

It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 2

A fresh compilation of writers focused upon our unfolding predicaments.

RELEASED September 30, 2024

CLICK HERE TO ACCESS VOLUME 2 AS A PDF FILE, FREE TO DOWNLOAD.

July 12-31 Articles of Interest

August 2, 2024

Click on the following link for PDF with embedded links: July 12-31 Articles of Interest

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXIII–Complexity and Sustainability

July 30, 2024

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXIII–Complexity and Sustainability

I believe that in many ways the past is a prologue to our future. Every experiment our species has attempted in the development of complex societies (from small to large ones) has eventually ‘failed’ to sustain the systems that make them complex and simplification/decline/collapse has followed.

Regardless of this pre/history and the lessons inherent in it, our species seems to make the same unsustainable choices with each and every iteration of complex societies. An argument can be made that such repetitive behaviour is unavoidable as our ‘successes’ cannot help but lead to our ‘failures’. It is our ‘nature’ (as it is perhaps for virtually every species) to grow in numbers and, if the circumstances ‘permit’ (i.e., fundamental resources are present), to exceed the natural carrying capacity of its habitat and proceed into ecological overshoot (see William Catton Jr.’s Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change)

Our longest lasting and perhaps most ‘sustainable’ living arrangements were when our species followed a somewhat nomadic, hunting and gathering existence that relied upon living within the restraints imposed by local natural resources. When population pressures arose due to human reproductive success, groups could split up with some moving to adjacent, unexploited lands. Eventually, however, this process bumped up against limits to such expansion and it was through technological ‘innovations’ that population pressures were addressed.

While there are many theories regarding the reason for a society’s ‘collapse/simplification’, it would appear that part of the answer is that the organisational structures (i.e., sociopolitical and/or socioeconomic) that share important information and goods to maintain themselves, experience declining returns on the investments necessary to keep them active–particularly if an unexpected crisis erupts after a prolonged period of diminishing returns.

Eventually, when the ‘costs’ outweigh the ‘benefits’, support from the masses is withdrawn resulting in a much more simplified world where small, local groups develop that are primarily dependent upon the immediate environment’s carrying capacity and significantly less so on widespread energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade, especially long-distance forms) and the complex organisational structures necessary to sustain these systems.

In general, the article (Complexity and Sustainability: Perspectives From the Ancient Maya and the Modern Balinese) summarised below–comparing a ‘technotasking’ approach to a ‘labourtasking’ one–concludes that it is our technological innovations that have served to sustain our species growth but that these same innovations lead invariably to the ‘collapse’ of a complex society that employs them. This is due to technologies expediting the drawdown of finite resources (leading to diminishing returns on investments in resource extraction and thus complexity) and the overloading of various compensatory sinks. The authors emphasise that social stresses are increased by the implementation of new technologies but that because such innovations disproportionately benefit those at the top of societal political and economic structures (primarily via the control of key resources), they are employed regardless of the negative impacts that arise–social and/or environmental.

While reading through the article, I had a variety of thoughts relating to my understanding of the ‘collapse’ process and our modern trend towards that somewhat inevitable outcome.

First, it is a net surplus of resources (especially energy) that is perhaps the key result of human adaptations (see Dr. Tim Morgan’s Surplus Energy Economics for more on this). This surplus allows for expansion. No surplus means no expansion and/or use of ‘savings’ to sustain society, leading to a more vulnerable situation when/if crisis erupts as per archaeologist Joseph Tainter’s thesis regarding how and why complex societies ‘collapse’ (see The Collapse of Complex Societies). It would seem that ‘stability’ appears when new energy is NOT harnessed and growth/expansion curtailed. This possibility now appears unachievable (without a severe disruption to current complexities) because of the creation of a world predicated upon such growth and increasingly ‘necessary’ due to its dependence upon the extraordinary expansion of debt-/credit-based fiat currency that has allowed us to pull growth from the future–but that requires payback of both principal and interest.

Second, technological innovations (what the authors refer to as ‘technotasking’) appear to create jumps in complexity and are limited by immediately available resources. If resource demands cannot be met, collapse or simplification is the most likely outcome. A ‘labourtasking’ path (one that depends primarily upon manual labour), however, displays only small, incremental increases in complexity and costs. This alternative pathway is far more ‘sustainable’ than one that employs technologies; it can still result, eventually, in collapse/simplification just taking much longer to get to that endgame.

Third, today’s energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade) is a global, complex industrial product-reliant enterprise fundamentally based upon hydrocarbon extraction and refinement. The fragility and complexity of such a system has led to enormous reliance upon finite resources (especially hydrocarbons, and most located far away) and led to a significant loss of skill/knowledge in self-sufficiency for most of our species. The need for resources to maintain our societies’ complexities and the movement of them has led to massive militaries and ongoing geopolitical brinkmanship.

Fourth, our modern societies are similarly following the collapse trajectory of the Maya as we accept a top-down strategy and employ a technotasking approach in offsetting production deficiencies and countering population pressures. In fact, we have accelerated this approach in a number of ways, including the use of technology to make more technology and are now contemplating using technology (artificial intelligence) to guide our decision-making far more than practised to date. (see Erik Michaels’ Problems, Predicaments, and Technology for more on the issues surrounding technology use and the predicament it has led our species into)

Fifth, we can see in the Maya a faltering of technological innovations and their maintenance as a result of organisational communications breaking down. This eventually led to a degradation of important complexities, especially pertaining to food production. This occurred as the elite consolidated resources for themselves to offset the limits society was encountering. Elite self interest resulted in more and more resources being directed towards this ruling minority and less towards the systems necessary to support the societal complexities needed for everyone.

Sixth, despite assurances in modern times by the priesthood of economic ‘science’ that resource limits are meaningless in a world of ‘free’ market economies where human ingenuity and technology can counter deficiencies in resource supplies, hard biogeophysical limits to infinite growth exist. These real limits lead to massive issues for the technotasking pathway but it is almost always chosen to be pursued because it can accommodate rapid growth and the consolidation of social/economic power for the ruling elite to whom most of the benefits accrue. This occurs without much thought or concern, if any, about sustainability.

Finally, it may only be with the fall of nation states and other forms of large, complex societies (and the caste of elite that accompany such social organisations) that more sustainable forms of human existence can be pursued. This depends on a number of important factors not least of which are: the number of our species that survive the fall of the current industrial-based, globalised complex society; the state of the planet’s ecological systems once all mass, extractive enterprises are curtailed; the survivability of our planet due to our overshooting of various planetary boundaries; the availability of certain, important natural resources (especially potable water, food sources, and regional shelter needs); and the ability of any remaining human populations to live within the capacity of their local natural resources/environment.

A handful of previous Contemplations looking at how the past informs the possible future…

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXIX–Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse May 24, 2024

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXVI–Societal Collapse: The Past is Prologue November 27, 2023

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXLVIII–What Do Previous Experiments in Societal Complexity Suggest About ‘Managing’ Our Future September 1, 2023

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse cometh CXLIII–Ruling Caste Responses to Societal Breakdown/Decline August 3, 2023

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXLI–Declining Returns, Societal Surpluses, and Collapse July 19, 2023

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXXXIX–Our Deep Future: Techno-Utopia Or A Return To the Distant Past July 10, 2023

Complexity and Sustainability: Perspectives From the Ancient Maya and the Modern Balinese

V.L. Scarborough and W.R. Burnside

American Antiquity, April 2010. Vol. 75 No. 2, pp. 327-363

Scarborough and Burnside argue that there exists several different pathways for societal complexity to emerge in human populations (where complexity is defined “as the nonlinear escalation of costs and emergent infrastructure with rising energy use and concentrated power as societies develop.” (p. 327)) Using examples drawn from the ancient Maya and modern Balinese, two of the pathways are compared highlighting “their relative costs, benefits, and potential for long-term sustainability.” (p. 327)

After a brief discussion of how best to conceptualise societal complexity for the purposes of their research, the authors concentrate upon socioenvironmental relationships, especially around water management for their compare/contrast analysis with the complexity resulting from increasing ‘throughput’.

Human groups self-organise within their biophysical environment with their culture altering the environment. New cultural systems can be highly adaptable but they are also more fragile and can lead to relatively quick ‘collapse’. Social modifications usually lead to stressed living conditions with increased costs and three possible futures if harmful conditions cannot be absorbed by the biophysical and/or sociocultural systems: “(1) the cultural system cuts its exaggerated and mounting social costs by lessening its intensity of resource use resulting in a partial reversion to an earlier lifeway of reduced costs and relative simplicity; (2) the system suffers from relatively abrupt social collapse; or (3) the system cultivates and focuses its energy and social capital on greater “complexity” associated with an evolved set of institutional structures–an emergent organizer of information and resources.” (pp. 329-330)

Research suggests that societies follow a labourtasking or technotasking path (or combination) to incorporate new resources or reset old ones.

Technotasking offsets production deficiencies by investing in ‘technological innovation’ that can help establish surpluses. In an early/primary state, ‘canalisation’ (i.e., riverine drainage system) was a commonly employed innovation as it could be adopted relatively quickly. The resource concentration such adaptations resulted in led to the emergent phenomenon of urbanisation and organisational structures, with those in ‘control’ of these economic/political structures benefitting disproportionately–“…those profiting most from the newly invented technologies accrued greater quantities, concentrations, and control of key resources.” (p. 332).

Deployment of a new technology is costly in terms of society and its environment but even after costs ‘level-out’ time and entropy can begin to increase costs. These increased costs can lead to a slowing of growth, collapse, or, with a new technology, a restart of the process. Transitions to greater complexity seem to be triggered by these rapid reorganisations. Successful and long-term shifts are limited by immediately available resources. Such change creates vulnerability if the new structural complexity cannot adjust to resource use/demand “If the new structure and the necessary resources are not synchronized and compatible, then the social system will collapse or at least slip back to an earlier, less complex social order.” (p. 335)

Labourtasking relies upon trained labour pools to help modify the landscape rather than a technological ‘breakthrough’. Here, the resulting change is incremental, long lasting, monitored, promoted generationally, and refined according to local conditions. Complexity and its social costs increase over time but in a smooth, uninterrupted manner. There are no abrupt transitions preceded by breakthrough technologies. Complexity costs increase but at a smaller ratio than in technotasking societies.

The ancient Maya and modern Balinese both have tended to employ labourtasking to aid in their adaptation to their somewhat similar semitropical settings whereby heavy seasonal rains were followed by prolonged dry periods. Both developed microwatershed adaptations but via different ‘technologies’.

The Maya would take advantage of natural drainage catchments and enhance them via landscape modifications (channel systems and reservoir) with household and monumental architecture mound volume equivalent to drainage volume. “[T]he system was likely a communitywide effort monitored by a collective interested in sustaining the entire group.” (p. 338) Although labourtasking was their primary economic means for some time, the Maya shifted into and out of technotasking as needs required. Innovations, however, would hasten resource drawdown and quicken negative impacts (e.g., erosion and sediment accumulation).

It appears that the Mayan success led to its eventual demise. Turmoil within large centres disrupted community communication beginning in the west. Information exchange faltered and the elite succumbed to immediate self-interest and became less responsive to other needs investing fewer resources in the many and more to the few; a scramble for hegemonic control between the large centres ensued. Written records suggest a governing council was implemented at Chichen Itza as depopulation hit its southern contemporaries but rather than adjust social networks (i.e.., economic and political) the elite chose to seek greater control. During the Terminal Classic demise phase there is evidence that the cost-complicated landscapes suffered the most from this, In particular, was the impact upon irrigation channels and reservoirs that show massive sediment/silt buildup; impacts that can still be seen today.

Mayan ‘collapse’ appears to have ensued once the environment and its natural resources could no longer support societal complexities. While several major centres and their hinterlands experienced ‘collapse’ (especially acute depopulation and the overshoot of local resources), some smaller communities were resilient and avoided the fate of the large ones–mostly by specialising in local resources and establishing trade with nearby populations. Those populations that shifted towards labourtasking-based adaptations were able to sustain themselves for a period of time beyond those that depended upon technotasking. “Generally speaking, the more long-term time and energy invested in the system, the greater the degree of collapse if the fields or related surfaces are neglected or abandoned for even a short period.” (p. 349)

The modern Balinese, in comparison, have oriented towards a labourtasking pathway after having their initial attempts (circa 11-12th century) to recreate their Javanese roots fail due to significant geographical differences. Its highly-dissected, steep-sided valleys with little in the way of natural resources required more decentralised structures. Indigenous farming populations managed their own affairs avoiding centralised bureaucracies and their demands. Groups self organised within their unique ecological circumstances. This approach proved productive and shaped the social system. “Balinese social institutions remain responsive to the complex adaptive system they have spawned, providing the flexibility to accommodate and locally manage accretional landscape change.” (p. 353)

The Balinese, with their labourtasking approach that focuses upon decentralisation (as opposed to the hypercentralisaiton characterised by the Late Classic Maya), have so far avoided collapse and suggests a path forward for sustainability. Resilience and long-lived stability would appear to be the result of small, incremental adjustments in a labourtasking approach as opposed to the frequent and rapid shifts that result from a technotasking one. However, near the end of an extended run, labourtasking systems may still result in extreme social ‘collapse’.

“A key difference between the two systems is the expectations for grand collapse…Because of the ever-changing, nonlinear interdependencies within and between groups and their environments, labortasking leads to a set of ‘phase transitions’ that produce adaptive forms of social organization and built environments. This process is long-lasting, resilient, and generally well-adjusted to resource limitations, making it relatively sustainable. However, acute vulnerability or collapse can occur if drastic external and/or social structural change is unleashed.” (pp. 355-356)

Technological innovations that tend to buffer humans from the environment but negatively impact it are often chosen because they accommodate rapid growth and the consolidation of social/economic power without much thought or concern about sustainability. While improvements in human health and welfare can be attributed to technotasking these need to be evaluated in terms of the costs, especially upon the environment whose ‘health’ human societies depend on.

The longer summary notes of the article can be found here.

Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).

If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.

Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99

Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…

https://paypal.me/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US

If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.

You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.

It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1

A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.

With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.

Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.

July 10, 2024 Readings

July 10, 2024

July 10, 2024 Readings

AS POLITICAL PARTIES FALL, GOLD AND SILVER WILL RISE – VON GREYERZ AG

Dark Side Of ‘The Next AI Trade’: Seizing Private Property For Transmission Lines | ZeroHedge

Goldman Sachs Failed Major Test – by David Haggith

The Climate Is Falling Apart. Prepare for the Push Alerts. – The Atlantic

Can we air condition our way out of extreme heat?–The Climate Brink

Weaker Ocean Circulation Could Worsen Warming, Study Finds – Yale E360

Environmental Apocalypse Stock Photo Theater–Degrowth Is The Answer

Beryl Sparks Power Outages For Over 2 Million, Disrupts Port And Energy Operations | ZeroHedge

Ukraine worsens its attacks on ZNPP, injuring personnel and destroying critical machinery–InfoBRICS

Joe Rogan Exposes Disturbing Contrast in Government Spending–Vigilant Fox

Authorities Are Literally Losing Control Of The Streets As America’s Societal Collapse Accelerates–The Economic Collapse Blog

Canada’s “climate change” envoy racked up over $250,000 in luxury travel expenses | The Daily Bell

Four Unbelievable Narratives – The Daily Reckoning

The meme that is destroying Western civilisation Part VI–Steve Keen

The Foundations of Resistance – by Justin McAffee

The Great Monetary Pivot of 2024 – International Man

Does Inflation Lead To Civilizational Collapse? A Look At Rome

May 19, 2024

Does Inflation Lead To Civilizational Collapse? A Look At Rome

With the US national debt at $34 trillion and climbing, USD reserve status under pressure, inflation destroying standards of living, and the Biden administration stoking costly war on several fronts, perhaps it’s time for more thoughts on the Roman empire.

In a Tuesday thread posted to X, user ‘Culture Critic‘ (@Culture_Crit) posted a deep dive into the unraveling of the Rome in the 3rd century. Let’s jump in;

When Augustus slowed the expansion of the empire, wealth stopped flowing from conquered lands into the treasury. Managing expenditures (construction, armies, bureaucracy) became increasingly difficult.

Whenever costs exceeded tax income, emperors minted new coins to cover it. Mining precious metals increased the supply of gold and silver coinage.

Things remained pretty stable for two centuries…

But the army was an immense burden. In the mid-2nd century, it was 70% of the entire budget — half a million soldiers were on the payroll.

Then, crisis struck.

Frontiers across the empire came under attack in the 3rd century. Military expenses soared as entire provinces were being abandoned and their tax yields lost. Plus, the mines were drying up…

When soldiers’ wages could no longer be paid, “debasing” the currency was the only option.

Emperors issued new denarius (the silver coin troops were paid in) with less and less silver content — i.e., further increasing the money supply.

Nero had already begun clipping coins and diluting silver purity in 64 AD. The state soon got addicted to solving its problems this way — and lining the pockets of political insiders at the same time.

The denarius was down to 60% silver purity by the 3rd century AD. Of course, prices inflated with it.

Still, the state kept spending to maintain the illusion of prosperity, until things got really bad…

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

The Worst Time to Be Alive

April 30, 2024

The Worst Time to Be Alive

The world has ended before.

Sure, the entire world has never ended before. Not all at once. Depending on how you define words like “world” and “end.”

But…

There have been plenty of times in history where it sure tasted like the world was ending, where the future didn’t look so bright, where everything might as well have ended for lots and lots of people.

According to historians, the absolute worst time to be alive was 536-550 AD, when three different volcanic eruptions blotted out the sun across most of the planet. During the first one, the sky went dark for 18 months. It snowed in the summer. An ash sky lit a cycle of droughts and floods that upended agriculture. Crops failed all over the world, and then starvation began.

Societies collapsed.

Records from Rome to Japan reference the events. Archaeologists have found a layer of ash virtually everywhere. They’ve also discovered abnormalities in tree rings around the world during that period.

Nobody was spared.

Some historians argue that the years of winter changed the entire course of human history. It sent humanity into a downward spiral that would take a century to recover from. Wouldn’t you know, the first bubonic plague struck right in the middle of that cold, dark, awful era. In fact, historians believe the cooler temperatures brought about by the volcanic eruptions were precisely what facilitated the spread of the plague bacteria.

Historian David Keys was one of the first to connect the volcanic eruptions to pivotal shifts in history. According to his book Catastrophe, these disasters dissolved the ancient world and planted the seeds of medieval civilizations and religions. His claims faced skepticism at first, but more and more evidence has supported his arguments. Now they’re not so controversial. The year 536 basically changed everything.

In a way, the world really did end.

A new one began.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Our Final Destiny: Catastrophe or Rebirth?

April 29, 2024

Our Final Destiny: Catastrophe or Rebirth?

Millenialism or renewalism?

The “Base Case” scenario of the first version of “The Limits to Growth” study, published in 1972. Note the shape of the curves: a slow growth is followed by a rapid decline, the typical “Seneca Shape.” Note also that the calculation shows a single cycle. Collapse, as seen in this scenario, is final and irreversible. Is it a “millenaristic” view of the future? Maybe, but we cannot exclude that the system will rebound in a farther future.

For decades after it was published, in 1972, the “Limits to Growth” was criticized with the accusation of being a “wrong prediction.” Remarkably, these accusations started immediately after the study was published, way before the main result of the calculations, the impending societal collapse, could be verified. It was a good example of the human attitude of thinking that what you don’t like cannot be true.

Today, more than 50 years later, the tide seems to be turning, and the study is being re-appraised; see, for instance, the book Limits and Beyond. Yet, we may be making the opposite mistake: turning a scenario into a prophecy and seeing collapse in the light of an unavoidable apocalypse for humankind.

It is not surprising. The history of human thought sees two attitudes going in parallel: “millenarism,” the idea that the world will go through a single cycle and then die, and the opposite one, which I might call “renewalism.” It sees death followed by rebirth in an infinite series of cycles, or at least a very long one.

The term “millenarism” is often attributed to Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC), who said that Roma would last one thousand years. It is typical of the Jewish tradition as expressed, for instance, in the Book of Daniel in the Bible…

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Why societies grow more fragile and vulnerable to collapse as time passes

April 26, 2024

Why societies grow more fragile and vulnerable to collapse as time passes

Getty Images

Do societies become more fragile over time? (Credit: Getty Images)

An analysis of hundreds of pre-modern states suggests that civilisations tend to have a ‘shelf-life’ – a pattern that holds lessons for today’s ageing global powers.

The rise and fall of great powers is a cliche of history. The idea that civilisations, states, or societies grow and decline is a common one. But is it true?

As a group of archaeologists, historians and complexity scientists, we decided to put this idea to the test. We undertook the largest study to date to see if societal ageing can be seen in the historical record. Our results, published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, suggest that states do age, becoming gradually more likely to terminate over time. Could there be lessons here for the present day?

Comment & Analysis

Luke Kemp is a research associate with the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study, and a research affiliate with the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge.

The mortality of states

Defining civilisations or societies is tricky, and the former often carries unsavoury baggage. We instead restricted our analysis to pre-modern “states”: centralised organisations that enforce rules over a given territory and population (much like the nation-states of the US and China today).

We took a statistical approach across two different databases. We created our own “mortality of states” dataset (Moros, named after the Greek God of Doom) which contains 324 states over 3,000 years (from 2000BC to AD1800). This was compiled from numerous other databases, an encyclopaedia on empires, and multiple other sources. We also drew on the Sehat databank, the world’s largest online depository of historical information curated by archaeologists and historians, which had 291 polities.

Getty Images

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Designing Collective Security | Olivia Lazard

April 26, 2024

Designing Collective Security | Olivia Lazard

Navigating existential crisis in a time of political and social upheaval

We’re breaking all kinds of records at the moment: cities are boiling at 62C, ocean temperatures are literally off the charts, and governments have increased the global defence budget to an alarming $2440 billion.

War costs life, and not just human life. The environmental impacts of war are colossal, with one study already showing that the first few months of Israel’s assault on Gaza emitted more carbon dioxide than 20 climate-vulnerable nations do in one year. Our ecosystems are at their breaking point, with six of nine planetary boundaries crossed. We need global collaboration to commit the huge systems overhaul necessary to survive the planetary crises and mitigate the catastrophic decisions of the last centuries.

Olivia Lazard, environmental peacemaker and research fellow at Carnegie Europe, joins me to discuss just how complex that task is, detailing the five steps of the Anthropocene and how violence increases at each step. We discuss these legacy systems of extraction and violence and how they are embedded into decisions being made around A.I., creating security risks in a resource-scarce world. We also cover the dematerialisation of our economies, the myths that blind us to energy and materials, before discussing the balance of power tipping our planet and human systems further into crisis.

EROEI and Civilization’s Forced Decline

April 21, 2024

EROEI and Civilization’s Forced Decline

EROEI (Energy Return on Energy Invested) is possibly the most important ratio to human existence. This measure is foundational to our civilization, yet understood by few.

Photo by NASA / Unsplash

EROEI (Energy Return on Energy Invested) is possibly the most important ratio to human existence. This measure is foundational to our civilization, yet understood by few.

EROEI is why we’re able to support 8 billion humans, why atmospheric CO2 is 425ppm and also why human civilization will eventually collapse.

It’s an essential metric that explains why we have computers, retirement funds and air travel. It’s essential to our progress as a species. This has been true since the dawn of agriculture and is even more so in a post-industrialized world.

To help broaden understanding of this deceivingly simply measure, I’m writing the following primer on EROEI.

What is EROEI?

EROEI is a metric used to evaluate the efficiency of energy production systems. It measures the amount of energy obtained from a particular source compared to the amount of energy invested to harness that energy. The formula used is:

Rethinking Growth Part Two - Pure Advantage

Example of EROEI: Solar Panels

Consider a solar panel system:

Energy Invested: This includes the energy used in manufacturing the solar panels, transporting them, installing them, and maintaining them over their lifespan.
Energy Produced: This is the energy the solar panels generate during their operational lifetime.

If a solar panel system uses 1,000 units of energy for its entire process (from manufacturing to operation) and generates 10,000 units of energy in its lifetime, the EROEI would be 10. This means that for every unit of energy invested, ten units of energy are returned.

EROEI in Agriculture: An Example of Caloric Return Versus Energy Investment

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh LX–Infinite growth. Finite planet. What could possibly go wrong? Part Two

February 10, 2024

Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh LX

July 19, 2022 (original posting date)

Infinite growth. Finite planet. What could possibly go wrong? Part Two

This is Part Two of a contemplation regarding what humanity’s future path ‘may’ look like. Part One can be found here.

Based on the evidence found in our pre/history and our biological proclivities (both of which I touched upon in Part One), it would appear we are likely to experience a variety of crises as we increasingly encounter diminishing returns on our investments in complexity and go through the withdrawal of surplus energy[1] that has fed our ‘growth’ and supported our organisational ‘problem solving’ abilities, but also because we have created and come to rely significantly upon systems that require such growth to keep from collapsing (for example, our increasingly debt-based financial/economic/monetary systems that, in turn, support our expanding energy-averaging systems and ensuring overexploited regions can be ‘maintained’ — i.e. globalised trade).

Throw on top of this the overshoot predicament and one should realise that the future is sure to not be the one painted by the techno-cornucopians who optimistically envision more of a Star Trek future than a Mad Max or The Road one.

I, personally, am of the opinion that ‘collapse’ of some type is imminent[2] primarily due to our overwhelming reliance upon important finite resources (especially fossil fuels) that we are now experiencing significant diminishing returns upon (and, yes, it’s an opinion; as is every other view of the future no matter how much ‘science’ is behind it or how sophisticated the model used to project the trends going forward — some are better than others but only the passage of time can ultimately decide which, in retrospect, were accurate).

At the same time we are going to be increasingly impacted by environmental/ecological crises brought about by our ecological overshoot and its concomitant overwhelming of the planetary sinks that previously helped cleanse the waste products of our expansion and technological creations[3] — to say little regarding the impacts that are going to be experienced around diminishing returns on food production and its very real reliance upon fossil fuels. Whether it be increasing frequency of extreme weather events and/or toxic environments leading to physical/physiological consequences for its inhabitants, including humans, the repercussions of our expansion appear to be growing in nature and impact.

How we view ‘collapse’ depends very much on our interpretation of it. It may be ‘the end of the world as we know it’ but that does not mean it will be dark and dreary. That perspective may be one that has been widely propagated in order to ‘scare’ people into believing the status quo economic and power structures need to continue and be supported at all costs. They do not.

‘Collapse’ seems scary because it is mostly about uncertainty, something humans abhor. We don’t know what the future holds and it reduces our cognitive dissonance greatly to cling to some certain future, even if completely and utterly wrong.

I’ve shared before what Tainter says about ‘collapse’ and it’s not all that bad depending upon one’s point of view:

“Collapse…is a political process. It may, and often does, have consequences in such areas as economics, art, and literature, but it is fundamentally a matter of the sociopolitical sphere. A society has collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity…[It manifests itself] as:
· a lower degree of stratification and social differentiation;
· less economic and occupational specialization, of individuals, groups, and territories;
· less centralized control; that is, less regulation and integration of diverse economic and political groups by elites;
· less behavioural control and regimentation; less investment in the epiphenomena of complexity, those elements that define the concept of ‘civilization’: monumental architecture, artistic and literary achievements, and the like;
· less flow of information between individuals, between political and economic groups, and between a center and its periphery;
· less sharing, trading, and redistribution of resources;
· less overall coordination and organization of individuals and groups;
· a smaller territory within a single political unit.”[4]

Some (most?) of these consequences may actually be welcomed by some, especially those who rail against what appears to be a growing tyranny of the ruling elite as we creep further into the banquet of consequences of our overshoot and diminishing returns on investments in complexity.

However, the ‘collapse’ that may accompany overshoot — a massive ‘die-off’ — seems a tad bit more cataclysmic depending upon how quickly such population reduction occurs. A relatively short recalibration of our population would, for all intents and purposes, appear truly calamitous to those experiencing it and most certainly would create a chaotic disintegration of the complexities we have come to rely upon for our survival. We have recently experienced the knock-on effects of shutting down world trade/economies over the fears associated with a relatively mild novel coronavirus[5]; the disruption of something far more impactful would make this seem very tame in comparison.

It seems clear to me that we have predicaments creating a vice on our continuation of any type of complex society. And my thinking about how this might all unfold has led me to review more closely John Michael Greer’s thesis that attempts to develop an ecological model of ‘collapse’. This ‘catabolic collapse’ suggests, at least in my interpretation, that we will see ‘crises’ that lead to more ‘simplified’ levels of society that then later experience more ‘crises’ resulting in another step down to an even simpler state and so on due to the fact that “production fails to meet maintenance requirements for existing capital…[and as a result get caught up in] a self-reinforcing cycle of contraction converting most capital to waste.”[6]

Given the increasing likelihood of ‘collapse’, it would seem we have two stark choices/strategies (very similar to what Greer argues regarding Catabolic Collapse). Continue on attempting to sustain unsustainable systems, virtually guaranteeing an overshoot die-off of gargantuan proportions. Or, attempt to ‘manage’ our ‘collapse’ as it unfolds by being pre-emptive via purposeful downsizing[7], degrowing[8], and simplifying[9].

What this second option looks like depends almost entirely on those agreeing with this approach. In fact, I sense a growing bifurcation of opinions even within the ‘degrowth’ movement with some arguing for a very slow transition and movement towards ‘green/clean’ technologies and others countering that such an approach is far too late and much more radical shifts need to be made if we are to have any ‘hope’ of making it thru the bottleneck we have created for our species (and others).

Unfortunately, given the lack of consensus, the psychological processes that lead to significant denial and bargaining (to reduce cognitive dissonance)[10], and the fact that the ruling elite will likely fight with all their ‘tools’ to avoid the elimination of their control/expansion of the wealth-generation/extraction systems that provide their revenue streams (their primary motivation), it is most probable we will go with the first option above: attempt to sustain the unsustainable (probably via ‘green’ technology), which will then lead to mother nature choosing how the planet is rebalanced — and our wishes and concerns will be null and void in this scenario.

In addition, given our current geopolitics and the frequency at which a society’s ruling elite choose war during times of stress, rather than diplomacy, I very much see the possibility of a global conflagration of conflict occurring — that could, of course, go nuclear.

As a result of all the above, I am increasingly leaning towards our future being far more dystopian in nature than utopian. The version of dystopia is still very much up to us I believe depending on what we do from this point onwards (my hope is that we make ‘good’ choices but my fear, as I admit above, is that doing so is beyond our capability because of the nature of our society’s power structures and protection of them by those who leverage crises to their benefit; along with the human tendencies to defer to authority and the need to ‘belong’).

Is there a way out of this conundrum? I personally waffle between ‘hope’ (something I wish for but really have no agency in) and despair (see image below).

My ‘hope’ is that we will come to realise that our pursuit of the perpetual growth chalice is taking us to a dark place where few of us survive (and that would be many species, not just homo sapiens) and reverse our trajectory; what can referred to as ‘degrowth’: a purposeful cessation of our current path and ‘deconstruction’ of almost all our socioeconomic and sociopolitical excesses until we reach a standard of living and population level that is ‘sustainable’.

My despair is that we will refuse to do this for a variety of reasons both psychological and biological in nature, but especially because if it is to have any positive impact we likely need to do it deeply and quickly. Instead, we will likely do everything we can to kick-the-growth-can-down-the-road to delay the inevitable and ultimately make the ‘correction’ all the more colossal in its size and scope; especially if, as Catton argues, we will have to undershoot our ‘natural’ carrying capacity by quite a bit given that everything we have done has reduced it significantly[11].

So, basically I believe that if we continue to hold that more technology[12] and money will address our issues, then I tend to think we will drift towards the darker dystopian path. If, however, we begin to ‘collapse’ on our own terms by degrowing, downsizing, and simplifying our societies we might be able to steer our future towards the lighter dystopian future where relatively small, local communities live within their region’s carrying capacity and are in ‘sync’ with the ecological systems within which they live and depend upon. We cannot and should not continue to believe that humans exist above and beyond these systems. Frankly, without them we are destined to disappear as well.

This ‘light dystopian’ vision, if you will, may appear calamitous to many because it is void of most of the technological ‘conveniences’ (what some have termed ‘energy slaves’) we currently embrace and is sure to involve much more manual labour and expose us to many of nature’s uncertainties that we have come to believe we can tame and avoid. But as nature so often reminds us, although we are reluctant to admit it, it always bats last and has the final say.

Given the evidence and my personal inclinations, more and more I’m leaning towards the realisation that it is the ‘scarier’ dystopian future that we, or at least future generations, will experience.

Of course only time will tell since making predictions is difficult, particularly if they’re about the future…

The following image was posted recently by someone on Facebook and I find it is frighteningly apropos to my personal reflections about our predicament:

[1] See Dr. Tim Murphy’s blog for more on this: https://surplusenergyeconomics.wordpress.com/professional-area/

[2] By ‘imminent’ I mean it’s a matter of when, not if. It could be a relatively long-lasting decline as painted by John Michael Greer (https://newsociety.com/books/l/the-long-descent-pdf?sitedomain=row) and James Howard Kunstler (https://www.amazon.ca/Long-Emergency-Converging-Catastrophes-Twenty-First/dp/0802142494); or a relatively quick one as suggested by Jared Diamond for Easter Islanders (https://www.amazon.ca/Collapse-Societies-Choose-Succeed-Revised/dp/0143117009). Also note that I do not ‘wish’ for this outcome; while the ‘effort justification’ aspects of my mind would love to be proven right — given all the ‘energy’ I’ve put into the ‘collapse’ narrative — I have children whom I do NOT want to experience a ‘declining’ world constantly in crisis and with significant uncertainty.

[3] See this for evidence of our breaching of various planetary limits: https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/the-nine-planetary-boundaries.html

[4] Tainter, J. The Collapse of Complex Societies. P. 4.

[5] Regardless of one’s perspective on Covid-19 and its political roots and/or implications, the millions of deaths attributed to it are but a fraction of several historical pandemics. The mortality rate for Covid has been relatively low compared to other ‘plagues’ that have spread through human populations and resulted in much more significant ‘die-offs’, such as the Black Death (1347–1351), Spanish Flu (1918–1919), Plague of Justinian (541–542), Third Plague Pandemic (1855–1960). https://www.publichealthonline.org/worst-global-pandemics-in-history/

[6] https://www.ecosophia.net/civilizations-fall-theory-catabolic-collapse/

[7] See this (https://justcollapse.org/) for one version of how to do this in a ‘just’ manner.

[8] See https://degrowth.info/degrowth for one version of degrowth.

[9] Nate Hagens’s podcast series provides some great insight into this approach: https://www.thegreatsimplification.com/.

[10] My second university degree was focused on psychology and anthropology (Honours Diploma, 1987, Western University). An Honours Diploma is equivalent to a Bachelor’s Degree but Canadian universities do not give out second B.A.s to the same student and instead give these. At least that was the case during my 1980s post-secondary years. I also have a Bachelor of Education which is the field in which I spent my formal employment (Brock University, 1989, St. Catharines, Ontario); 10 years as a classroom teacher, 15 as an administrator.

[11] Catton, Jr., W.R.. Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change. University of Illinois Press, 1980. (ISBN 978–0–252–00988–4)

[12] See Erik Michaels’s https://problemspredicamentsandtechnology.blogspot.com/ for some insight into why technology is perhaps our undoing, not some ingenious ‘saviour’ for humanity.

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