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Daniel Nevins: Economics for Independent Thinkers

Daniel Nevins: Economics for Independent Thinkers

It’s time we stop trusting the ‘experts’

Economists are supposed to monitor and analyze the economy, warn us if risks are getting out of hand, and advise us on how to make things runs more effectively — right?

Well, even though that’s what most people expect from economists, it’s not at all how they see their role, warns CFA and and behavioral economist Daniel Nevins.

Economists, he cautions, are modelers. They pursue academic lines of thought in order to make their models more perfect. They live in a universe of equations and presumptions about equilibrium states and other chimerical mathematical perfections that don’t exist in real life.

In short, they are the wrong people to advise us, Nevins claims, as they have no clue how the imperfect world we live in actually works.

In his book Economics For Independent Thinkers, he argues that we need a new, more accurate and useful way of studying the economy:

However far you go back, you can find economists who had a more realistic approach to how humans actually behave, than the way that mainstreamers assume they behave in the models that the Fed uses to pick winners and losers.

You mentioned credit cycles, business environment, and behavioral economics. What I’ve done is to say, “Okay. We know that the modeling approach, the systems of equations approach doesn’t work. But instead of starting completely from scratch, what can we find in the economics literature that is maybe more realistic?”

And the interesting thing is that if you look at the work that was done, the state of the profession before the 1930s, before Keynesianism took hold, you can find a lot of work that was quite sensible.

 

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Central Bank Musical Chairs

If the last few stock market days are interrupting your sleep, Jim Bianco and CNBC’s Rick Santelli are saying, get used to it.  The total assets of all central banks hit $16.4 trillion plus (an all-time high) and these banks now, collectively, own 33 percent of all the world’s sovereign bonds (someone/something had to buy ‘em).

Santelli’s question to Bianco was, if the aggregate size of the world’s central banks is at an all-time high, and these bank’s have purchased a third of all government paper, will these banks be able to “normalize in size” (shrink) without “going through a lot more stock market anguish?” Bianco’s response was a flat, “no.”

Reversing trillions of dollars worth of securities purchases will create market turmoil.  And now that price inflation has entered the equation, the ride is bound to be bumpy. So, who should 401k investors be worried about and keeping an eye on? Bianco and Santelli agree, that person is ECB head man Mario Draghi. Santelli believes Draghi may be caught without a chair in this game of monetary musical chairs. By the way, it’s not all about the Fed any more. “All central bank stimulus is fungible,” says Bianco, “it doesn’t matter who does it.”

The patron saint of central bankers, John Maynard Keynes, wrote in The General Theory,

For it is, so to speak, a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musical Chairs — a  pastime in which he is victor who says Snap neither too soon nor too late, who passed the  Old Maid to his neighbour before the game is over, who secures a chair for himself when  the music stops. These games can be played with zest and enjoyment, though all the players know that it is the Old Maid which is circulating, or that when the music stops  some of the players will find themselves unseated.”

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

America’s Great Depression and Austrian Business Cycle Theory

America’s Great Depression and Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The capitalist system is a great engine of human prosperity.

When Murray Rothbard’s America’s Great Depression first appeared in print in 1963, the economics profession was still completely dominated by the Keynesian Revolution that began in the 1930s. Rothbard, instead, employed the “Austrian” approach to money and the business cycle to explain the causes for the Great Depression, and to analyze the misguided and counterproductive policies that followed in the early 1930s, which, in fact, only intensified and prolonged the economic downturn.

To many of the economists in the early 1960s, Rothbard’s “Austrian” approach seemed out-of-step with the then generally accepted textbook, macroeconomic approach that focused on a highly “aggregate” analysis of economic changes and fluctuations on general output and employment as a whole. There was also the widely held presumption that governments could easily maintain economy-wide growth and stability through the use of a variety of monetary and fiscal policy tools.

We can now see that it represented the revival of the “Austrian” monetary tradition in the post-World War II period.

However, in the early to mid-1930s, the Austrian explanation of the Great Depression was at the forefront of the theoretical and policy debates of the time. Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) first developed the “Austrian” theory on the causes of inflations and depressions in his book, The Theory of Money and Credit (1912; 2nd revised ed., 1924) and then in his monograph, Monetary Stabilization and Cyclical Policy (1928).But the Austrian theory’s international recognition and role in the business cycle debates and controversies in the 1930s were particularly due to Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992). His version of the theory was presented in his works, Prices and Production (1932), Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (1933), and Profits, Interest and Investment (1939).

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

If Economists Are So Smart, Why Are They Always Wrong?

If Economists Are So Smart, Why Are They Always Wrong?

When I took Econ 101 and 102 as a young college student back in antediluvian times the textbook we were assigned was Paul Samuelson’s Economics: An Introductory Analysis. This book is the all-time best selling economics textbook and is still around today (19th ed.).

I had the 1961 edition. In it, Samuelson, a prominent Keynesian economist who won the Nobel prize in economics, predicted that the economy of the Soviet Union would overtake the U. S. economy in 23 years (by 1984). Even as late as the 11th edition (1980), Samuelson stood by his prediction.

As anybody who knows anything about the Soviet Union, their top-down centrally planned economy was a disaster that left its citizens in poverty. It was inefficient, wasteful, driven by coercion, politics, corruption, and cronyism. Consumer wishes were ignored. Goods were under-produced or overproduced. There were shortages of everything, except vodka and hydrogen bombs.

There was a joke floating around Moscow at the time about shortages: Yuri Gagarin’s daughter (he was the first man in space and hero of the Soviet Union) answers the phone: “No, mummy and daddy are out,” she says. “Daddy’s orbiting the earth, and he’ll be back tonight at 7 o’clock. But mummy’s gone shopping for groceries, so who knows when she’ll be home.”

They were far, far behind us.

So how is it possible that Samuelson and his fellow Keynesians could even consider that a planned economy could work better than a free economy? For 11 editions he persisted in believing that failed theory. And a generation of students left school with the idea that a centrally planned economy could work.

Mainstream economists today aren’t much better.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

The Sermon On The Mount[ain Of Debt]

The Sermon On The Mount[ain Of Debt]

“Blessed are the young, for they shall inherit the national debt.” – President Herbert Hoover

The Hoover administration thought there was no room and was ideologically opposed to fiscal expansion to stimulate aggregate demand.  Furthermore, Keynesian theory was not even developed at the time.  The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money  was not published until February 1936.

A policy error, partially due out of  ignorance, that led to the Great Depression, though it was monetary policy and the Fed’s failure as “lender of last resort” that “put the Great in the Great Depression.”

…what happened is that [the Federal Reserve] followed policies which led to a decline in the quantity of money by a third. For every $100 in paper money, in deposits, in cash, in currency, in existence in 1929, by the time you got to 1933 there was only about $65, $66 left. And that extraordinary collapse in the banking system, with about a third of the banks failing from beginning to end, with millions of people having their savings essentially washed out, that decline was utterly unnecessary  – Milton Friedman

Here is Ben Bernanke,

The problem within the Fed was largely doctrinal: Fed officials appeared to subscribe to Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s infamous ‘liquidationist’ thesis, that weeding out “weak” banks was a harsh but necessary prerequisite to the recovery of the banking system. Moreover, most of the failing banks were small banks (as opposed to what we would now call money-center banks) and not members of the Federal Reserve System. Thus the Fed saw no particular need to try to stem the panics. At the same time, the large banks – which would have intervened before the founding of the Fed – felt that protecting their smaller brethren was no longer their responsibility. Indeed, since the large banks felt confident that the Fed would protect them if necessary, the weeding out of small competitors was a positive good, from their point of view. – Ben Bernanke

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Keynes: A Master of Confused and Confusing Prose

Keynes: A Master of Confused and Confusing Prose

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[This article is a selection from Where Keynes Went Wrong]:

Paul Samuelson, professor of economics at MIT after World War II and author of a best-selling economics textbook, was one of Keynes’s most ardent American disciples. Here is what he has to say about the latter’s General Theory:

It is a badly written book, poorly organized. . . . It is ar­rogant, bad-tempered, polemical, and not overly gener­ous in its acknowledgements. It abounds in mare’s nests and confusion….

In reading this, one recalls Keynes’s infatuation with paradox. Samuelson, the ardent disciple, is telling us that the master’s book is good because it is bad.

We do not, however, have to take Samuelson’s word about the bad writing, poor organization, and general confusion of The General Theory. Following publication in 1936, many lead­ing economists pointed to the same problems, although some of them hesitated to criticize or quarrel with Keynes and thus chose their words carefully. Frank H. Knight, a leading American econ­omist, complained that it was “inordinately difficult to tell what the author means. . . . The direct contention of the work [also] seems to me quite unsubstantiated.”

Joseph Schumpeter noted Keynes’s “technique of skirting problems by artificial definitions which, tied up with highly specialized assumptions, produce paradoxical-looking tau­tologies. . . .” British economist Hubert Henderson privately stated that: “I have allowed myself to be inhibited for many years . . . by a desire not to quarrel in public with Maynard . . . . But. . . I regard Maynard’s books as a farrago of confused sophis­tication.”

French economist Etienne Mantoux added that the whole thing simply appeared to be “rationalization of a policy … long known to be . . . dear to him.

In The General Theory itself, Keynes has a good word to say about clarity, consistency, and logic.He is quick to pounce on what he considers the errors of others. But he then leads us down a rabbit hole of convolution, needless and misleading jar­gon, mis-statement, confusion, contradiction, unfactuality, and general illogic.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Hidden Forces of Economics

Waiting for the Flood

We have noticed a proliferation of pundits, newsletter hawkers, and even mainstream market analysts focusing on one aspect of the bitcoin market. Big money, institutional money, public markets money, is soon to flood into bitcoin. Or so they say.

A weekly chart of bitcoin – it actually looks pretty “flooded” to us already. [PT] – click to enlarge.

We will not offer our guess as to whether this is true. Instead, we want to point out something that should be self-evident. If big money is soon to come in, and presumably drive the price up to whatever new height — perhaps even the magic $1,000,000 — what comes after?

In the restless churn that has overgrown our capital markets, investors speculators are always seeking to get into whatever asset is bubbling up. Big money leaving will follow big money entering, as surely as a rock thrown into the air will fall back down.

In last week’s Supply and Demand Report, we excerpted a quote from economist John Maynard Keynes. He cited Vladimir Lenin discussing how to destroy Western civilization. Here is the full quote (from The Economic Consequences of the Peace):

“Lenin is said to have declared that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currency. By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. The sight of this arbitrary rearrangement of riches strikes not only at security but [also] at confidence in the equity of the existing distribution of wealth.

Those to whom the system brings windfalls, beyond their deserts and even beyond their expectations or desires, become “profiteers,” who are the object of the hatred of the bourgeoisie, whom the inflationism has impoverished, not less than of the proletariat. As the inflation proceeds and the real value of the currency fluctuates wildly from month to month, all permanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ultimate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery.

Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.”

J.M. Keynes at a relatively young age. In his 1919 book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes sounded quite sane for the most part, both in terms of his political and economic analysis (although his interventionist leanings were already shining through. For reasons  unknown he went completely off the rails in the 1930s). He wrote the book after attending the Paris Peace conference, where he argued for much more generous peace terms than the victorious allied nations were prepared to grant. While no-one will ever be able to prove it, there is a reasonable chance that a less vindictive peace treaty may have helped avert the German hyperinflation catastrophe and further down the road, perhaps the rise of Hitler as well. After all, Hitler’s influence grew on the fertile soil of Germany’s impoverished, antagonized and increasingly radicalized former middle class – and the event that arguably contributed to this state of affairs like no other was the collapse of the currency after the war. [PT]     Photo credit: Bettmann / Corbis

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

What Is the Liquidity Trap?

What Is the Liquidity Trap?

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Some economists such as a Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman are of the view that if the US were to fall into liquidity trap the US central bank should aggressively pump money and aggressively lower interest rates in order to lift the rate of inflation. This Krugman holds will pull the economy from the liquidity trap and will set the platform for an economic prosperity. In his New York Times article of January 11, 2012, he wrote,

If nothing else, we’ve learned that the liquidity trap is neither a figment of our imaginations nor something that only happens in Japan; it’s a very real threat, and if and when it ends we should nonetheless be guarding against its return — which means that there’s a very strong case both for a higher inflation target, and for aggressive policy …(of the central bank).

But does it make sense that by means of more inflation the US economy could be pulled out of the liquidity trap?

The Origin of the Liquidity-Trap Concept

In the popular framework of thinking that originates from the writings of John Maynard Keynes, economic activity presented in terms of a circular flow of money. Spending by one individual becomes part of the earnings of another individual, and spending by another individual becomes part of the first individual’s earnings.

Recessions, according to Keynes, are a response to the fact that consumers — for some psychological reasons — have decided to cut down on their expenditure and raise their savings.

For instance, if for some reason people have become less confident about the future, they will cut back on their outlays and hoard more money. Therefore, once an individual spends less, this worsens the situation of some other individual, who in turn also cuts his spending.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

On Borrowed Time

On Borrowed Time

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There are a number of things you don’t want to hear a central banker say. One of those things just popped out of Janet Yellen’s mouth – “I don’t believe we will see another financial crisis in our lifetime.” That has to be up there with Irving Fisher’s deathless observation from 17 October 1929 that “Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau” or John Maynard Keynes’ comparably adept forecast from 1927 that “We will not have any more crashes in our time.”

So far, so anecdotal. How about some data to back up the thesis that, as Thorstein Polleit puts it, the super bubble is in trouble ?

First, define your Super Bubble. We can do this in two ways. One relates to longevity (how long has the bull run lasted ?), the other to valuation (how expensive is the market now ?). The global bond bull began back in 1981, when 30 year US Treasury yields peaked at 15.2%. Now, over 35 years later, long bond yields are below 3%.

Polleit expresses it a little differently, citing the p/e ratio of bonds so that they might more fairly be compared to stocks. To calculate the p/e ratio of a government bond, he divides 1 by the 10 year government bond yield. His results are shown below.

Source: Thomson Financial / Thorstein Polleit

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¹For bonds, calculated as 1 divided by the 10 year government bond yield

In his words,

You do not need to be a financial market wizard to see that especially bond markets have reached bubble territory: bond prices have become artificially inflated by central banks’ unprecedented monetary policies. For instance, the price-earnings-ratio for the US 10-year Treasury yield stands around 44, while the equivalent for the euro zone trades at 85. In other words, the investor has to wait 44 years (and 85 years, respectively) to recover the bonds’ purchasing price through coupon payments.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Why the Fed Will Fail Once Again

Why the Fed Will Fail Once Again

[Ed. Note: Jim Rickards’ latest New York Times bestseller, The Road to Ruin: The Global Elites’ Secret Plan for the Next Financial Crisis, is out now. Learn how to get your free copy – HERE. This vital book transcends rhetoric from the Federal Reserve to prepare you for what you should be watching now.]

John Maynard Keynes once wrote, “Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”

Truer words were never spoken, although if you updated Keynes today, the quote would begin with “practical women” to take account of Fed Chair Janet Yellen. The “defunct economist” in question would be William Phillips, inventor of the Phillips curve, who died in 1975.

In its simplest form, the Phillips curve is a single-equation model that describes an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment. As unemployment declines, inflation goes up, and vice versa. The equation was put forward in an academic paper in 1958 and was considered a useful guide to policy in the 1960s and early 1970s.

By the mid-1970s the Phillips curve broke down. The U.S. had high unemployment and high inflation at the same time, something called “stagflation.” Milton Friedman advanced the idea that the Phillips curve could only be valid in the short run because inflation in the long run is always determined by money supply.

Economists began to tweak the original equation to add factors — some of which were not empirical at all but model-based. It became a mess of models based on models, none of which bore any particular relationship to reality. By the early 1980s, the Phillips curve was no longer taken seriously even by academics and seemed buried once and for all. RIP.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Bankers, Always the Last to Know

Bankers, Always the Last to Know

Commercial real estate is starting to cool, with deal volume last year dropping 10% from 2015 to $493.7 billion, while, as Peter Grant reports for the Wall Street Journal and Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, “the early stages of 2017 have delivered even weaker results: $50.3 billion in transaction value through March 1 compared to $80.1 billion in the like period in 2015 (a 37.2% yearly drop).”

One would guess bankers would take notice and turn shy. However, Craig Bender of ING real estate, tells  the Wall Street Journal:  “The banks are hungry.  The life insurance groups are hungry”.

It seems Lord Keynes had one thing right when he wrote, “Banks and bankers are by nature blind. They have not seen what was coming…. A ‘sound banker,’ alas! is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way along with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.”

In America’s hottest commercial market, New York, a veritable magnet for hot, cheap, and foreign funds, the first quarter of 2017 was a bust. Large office property sales (those with over 50,000 square feet) that closed in Q1 2017 plunged 63% year-over-year, from $5.54 billion in Q1 2016 to $2.1 billion. It was the lowest transaction amount in any quarter since Q1 2013, writes Wolf Richter.

Not only did the amount of square footage sold nosedive, but the price per square foot fell as well. Richter points out the commercial property bubble has been inflating unabated since 2009. “The big freeze in New York City may be another sign that this bubble too can only go so far, and that peak craziness has been reached,” he writes. “The Fed is now specifically fretting about this commercial real estate bubble, and how to contain it before it takes down the financial system.”

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

 

Don’t Blame Trump When the World Ends

Don’t Blame Trump When the World Ends

There was, indeed, a time when clear thinking and lucid communication via the written word were held in high regard.  As far as we can tell, this wonderful epoch concluded in 1936.  Everything since has been tortured with varying degrees of gobbledygook.

The fall from grace was triggered by the 1936 publication of John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.  The book is rigorously indecipherable.  What’s more, it has the ill-effect of making those who read it dumber.

Nonetheless, politicians and establishment economists remain enamored with Keynes’ gibberish.  For it offers academic rationale for governments to do what they love to do most – borrow money and spend it on inane programs.  In particular, Keynes advocated filling bottles with money and burying them in coalmines for people to dig up as a way to end unemployment.  Somehow, this public works egg hunt would make everyone rich.

Over the years this reasoning has inspired countless government stunts to save the economy from itself.  Not long ago, Keynes devotee, Paul Krugman, took this logic and ran with it to the outer limits of deep space.  In the process, he seems to have lost his mind.

According to Krugman, the proper way to propel an economic growth chart up and to the right is to borrow massive amounts of money and spend it preparing for an alien invasion. Naturally, it takes a Nobel Prize winning economist to come up with such nonsense.

Better Markets

Unfortunately, Keynes’ drivel became the archetypical for illogical economic thought, and still infects economic discourse to this day.  You can hardly browse the headlines of Yahoo finance without your eyeballs being lacerated by it.

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The Coming Of Depression Economics

The Coming Of Depression Economics

Like it or not, this is where we have been all along and a great many people are just now catching up. No matter what Janet Yellen says about the economy, she is talking out the side of her mouth. Internally, the recovery is gone, and it is never coming back. Externally, we have sub-5% unemployment so we all should be so happy, especially with, in her view, stable prices.

To their credit, many prominent economists aren’t so enthusiastic about those prospects. Among them are Larry Summers, Paul Krugman, and Brad DeLong, all who recognize that “something” just isn’t right and therefore “something” else should be done about it. Thus, the real economic debate over the coming years (unfortunately) will take shape around those two facets. Having wasted nearly a decade on purely central bank solutions that were never going to work, the real discoveries can now possibly take place.

The problem is as I wrote yesterday, where in a rush to do anything and everything “different” the Trump administration might actually spoil the process. De-regulation and income tax cuts, as well as the repeal of Obamacare, are all very good things that sorely need to be addressed; but they didn’t cause this depression and thus won’t get us out of it. And you can bet that none of Summers, Krugman, or DeLong will be in favor of those options, so if they all fail to restore economic growth, as I believe they will if left in isolation, then that will severely diminish those ideas for perhaps a generation or more. That would be a fatal mistake, especially since for the first time in many generations people outside of Economics are receptive to “new” ideas (that are only new because they have been out of practice and actively discouraged for so long).

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Get Ready… Change Is Upon Us

Get Ready… Change Is Upon Us

The ‘economic peace’ we’ve enjoyed for decades is over
“After four years of warfare that tore the world apart like never before, a peace was finally reached.  But it was a peace which one man in particular vociferously condemned — and that man was John Maynard Keynes.

In just two months, Keynes wrote the book that would make him a household name around the world — The Economic Consequences of the Peace.

In the book, Keynes was highly critical of the deal struck at Versailles, which he felt sure would lead to further conflict in Europe — describing the agreement as a “Carthaginian peace” — and with the passing of a surprisingly short period of time, he would be proven correct.”

~ Grant Williams in The Economic Consequences of Peace

After WWI, a particularly noxious set of treaties and economic reparations agreements were put in place that all but guaranteed a future WWII.   Mr. Keynes sniffed that out and, sadly, was proven correct.

The lesson from this is that, at certain times, it’s really not that hard to predict “what” is going to happen next after disastrously short-sighted and self-interested policies are enacted. Predicting the “when”, with precision, is much trickier. But obvious misguided economic policies are destined to have a limited period of apparent (but false) prosperity, after which they end with a nasty Bang!.

We have entered just such a time. This isn’t a Trump vs. Clinton thing; I’d make this claim regardless of who won this week’s presidential election — as our plight is much bigger than a single Administration. And my observation is that neither political party had much interest beyond some temporary election year lip-service to the economic plight of the middle class.

And by “middle class” I mean anybody not in the top 5% economic bracket. For those doing the math at home, that leaves the remaining 95% of us stuck in the meat grinder.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Mises.org: Keynes’s Critique of Econometrics is Surprisingly Good

In a recent article we had a brief look at Ragnar Frisch’s (1895–1973) vision of econometric model building. As mentioned, Frisch was the first economist chosen over Mises to win the Nobel Prize in 1969. In fact, there was a second one in the same year. Frisch won the prize jointly with Dutchman Jan Tinbergen (1903–1994), who applied Frischian econometrics for the first time in large-scale macro models by the end of the 1930s.

In the first volume of his investigations into business cycles commissioned by the League of Nations, entitled Statistical Testing of Business Cycle Theories, published in 1939, Tinbergen exonerates the statistician and econometrician from his responsibility and explains:

The part which the statistician can play in this process of analysis must not be misunderstood. The theories which he submits to examination are handed over to him by the economist, and with the economist the responsibility for them must remain; for no statistical test can prove a theory to be correct.

While classical and Austrian economists would agree that an economic theory cannot be proven correct empirically, they would not as easily let the statistician off the hook. Indeed, the econometrician and statistician have some responsibility for the economic theories that come to be accepted, especially if one holds, as Tinbergen does, that those theories can be proven “incorrect, or at least incomplete, by showing that it does not cover a particular set of facts.”

This is an odd claim, since practically any theory is incomplete, but this does not mean that it is incorrect. Obviously there remains a twofold danger: A wrong theory might not be proven wrong, although it could be done in principle, and a true theory might be “proven wrong” mistakenly, because it is incomplete as it does not account for some particular set of facts. The econometrician would of course be responsible for these errors.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

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