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The Fed Has Created A “Monster” And Just Made A “Dangerous Mistake,” Stephen Roach Warns

The Fed Has Created A “Monster” And Just Made A “Dangerous Mistake,” Stephen Roach Warns

Stephen Roach is worried that the Fed has set the world up for another financial market meltdown.

Lower for longer rates and the proliferation of unconventional monetary policy have created “a breeding ground for asset bubbles, credit bubbles, and all-too frequent crises, so the Fed is really a part of the problem of financial instability rather than trying to provide a sense of calm in an otherwise unstable world,” Roach told Bloomberg TV in an interview conducted a little over a week ago.

To be sure, Roach’s sentiments have become par for the proverbial course. That is, it may have taken everyone a while (as in five years or so) to come to the conclusion we reached long ago, namely that central banks are setting the world up for a crisis that will make 2008 look like a walk in the park, but most of the “very serious” people are now getting concerned. Take BofAML for instance, who, in a note we outlined on Wednesday, demonstrated the prevailing dynamic with the following useful graphic:

Perhaps Jeremy Grantham put it best: “..in the Greenspan/ Bernanke/Yellen Era, the Fed historically did not stop its asset price pushing until fully- fledged bubbles had occurred, as they did in U.S. growth stocks in 2000 and in U.S. housing in 2006.”

Indeed. It’s with that in mind that we bring you the following excerpts from a new piece by Roach in which the former Morgan Stanley chief economist and Yale fellow recounts the evolution of the Fed and how the FOMC ultimately became “beholden to the monster it had created”.

*  *  *

From “The Perils of Fed Gradualism” as posted at Project Syndicate

By now, it’s an all-too-familiar drill. After an extended period of extraordinary monetary accommodation, the US Federal Reserve has begun the long march back to normalization.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

 

ECB, Monetarism and a Greek Half-Decade

ECB, Monetarism and a Greek Half-Decade

Greece really should not matter, at all, outside of the tragic plight of the Greeks themselves. You’ll see that message echoed particularly inside the US where the status quo takes a contradictory turn toward reasonableness in order to justify further what isn’t. This is all about asset prices and how they have been so skewed almost everywhere that when one part of that systemic imbibing threatens to pull back the curtain the rest works overdrive to convince that it doesn’t matter.

Just fourteen months ago, then-Prime Minister of Greece, Antonis Samaras, went on Greek television and confidently proclaimed, “Today, Greece took one more decisive step to exit the crisis. Confidence in our country was confirmed by the most objective judge – the markets.” Going further, then-Deputy Prime Minister Evangelos Venizelos objected to any other interpretation, “The bond issue proves the debt is sustainable, otherwise the markets wouldn’t have bought it.”

Obviously, those were political statements intended to send a political message in that the “objective” market was on the side of that current Greek political makeup and the “austerity” track into which they proclaimed to be amalgamated, inextricably within the euro currency. Under rational expectations theory, of course, the price with which the Greeks floated that bond was believed to be “correct” and thus efficient. The 4.95% yield at the auction, 20 times oversubscribed, certainly seemed to suggest that it was “market clearing” in at least that respect.

ABOOK June 2015 Greece GRE 5s

The problem with all of that view is apparent right now. The 5-year bond, after having a pretty good week last week with all the false deal rumors, is yielding this morning almost 23%. The losses embedded in that yield and its price were uniquely predictable, which is what is so damning about Greece as it relates to everything outside of the “small country on the Aegean.”

 

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

The Lesson In China: Don’t Go Bubble In the First Place

The Lesson In China: Don’t Go Bubble In the First Place

There can be no mistaking that Chinese stocks are in a bubble. Since November 21, the Shanghai SSE Composite index has risen more than 100%. Going back to July 22, the gain is nearly 145%. Those dates are not random coincidence, as they mark specific points of PBOC activity. The stock bubble in China is certainly a monetary affair, but in ways that aren’t necessarily comparable to our own stock bubble experience (twice).

There is, of course, great similarities starting with leverage; in China at the moment there is no shortage, which is precisely the problem. It is quite precarious, though, in that the PBOC has at times shown far more open contempt for Chinese stock margin than the Federal Reserve or Bank of Japan ever did.

Stock forecasters in search of an early-warning system for the next Chinese bear market are zeroing in on the country’s record $358 billion pile of margin debt.

When that three-year build-up of leveraged positions starts to unwind, regulators will struggle to limit the selloff, according to Bocom International Holdings Co. and Rabobank International. Almost all of this year’s biggest declines in the Shanghai Composite Index, including a 6.5 percent slump on May 28, were sparked by investor concerns over margin-trading restrictions. The securities regulator announced plans Friday to limit the amount brokerages can lend for stock trading.

Unlike central banks here and elsewhere, the PBOC has a vastly different understanding and appreciation for asset bubbles, at least to the point that in 2014 and 2015 under reform it is not shirking responsibility for them. The Federal Reserve, in particular, had long been against any linkage between monetarism and asset bubbles, believing instead that they were fully contained under “market” irregularities (that has evolved, somewhat, under the relatively new Yellen Doctrine). I’m not sure the PBOC ever went so far as to completely delink its own activities from asset bubbles, but it at one point was clearly embracing of them even if reluctantly part of a greater government mandate.

 

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

BIS Slams The Fed: The Solution To Bubbles Is Not More Bubbles, It Is Avoiding Bubbles In The First Place

BIS Slams The Fed: The Solution To Bubbles Is Not More Bubbles, It Is Avoiding Bubbles In The First Place

On one hand there are hard-core Keynesians who will wave the flag of inflation as the only cure to a world drowning in debt, even after the mushroom cloud results of their policies going off around the globe “assure” GDP hits +? once every window in the world is shattered and has to be replaced…

… on the other, you have the BIS which with every passing day is becoming the citadel of Austrian thought, the latest example thanks to the BIS’ most recent quarterly review in which we read that not only is deflation not the “monster” the Bank of Japan and other Keynesian acolytes would like to make it appear…

The evidence from our long historical data set sheds new light on the costs of deflations.It raises questions about the prevailing view that goods and services price deflations, even if persistent, are always pernicious. It suggests that asset price deflations, and particularly house price deflations in the postwar era, have been more damaging. And it cautions against presuming that the interaction between debt and goods and services price deflation, as opposed to debt’s interaction with property price deflations, has played a significant role in past episodes of economic weakness.

… but more importantly and as Zero Hedge has said from day one, the BIS now says the solution to an asset bubble is not some incomprehensible jibberish of “macroprudential regulation” or a “bubble-busting” SWAT team at the Fednot another asset bubble (especially not one which leads to house price deflation, the same that is slamming the Chinese economy at this moment), which by now has become clear to all is the only “tool” in a central banker’s aresnal, and the remedy to debt isnot even more debt.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

 

Van Hoisington And The Fed’s Bubble: “Overtrading” And “Discredit” Always End In “Revulsion” | Zero Hedge

Van Hoisington And The Fed’s Bubble: “Overtrading” And “Discredit” Always End In “Revulsion” | Zero Hedge.

Excerpted from Hoisington Investment Management’s Quarterly Outlook,

via Van Hoisington and Lacy Hunt:

The U.S. economy continues to lose momentum despite the Federal Reserve’s use of conventional techniques and numerous experimental measures to spur growth. In the first half of the year, real GDP grew at only a 1.2% annual rate while real per capita GDP increased by a minimal 0.3% annual rate. Such increases are insufficient to raise the standard of living, which, as measured by real median household income, stands at the same level as it did seventeen years ago.

Asset Bubbles

Historically, in our judgment, the most important authority on the subject of asset bubbles was the late MIT professor Charles Kindleberger, author of 20 books including the one of the greatest books on capital markets Manias, Panics and Crashes (1978). He found that asset price bubbles depend on the growth of credit. Atif Mian (Princeton) and Amir Sufi (University of Chicago) provided confirmation for Kindleberger’s pioneering work and expanded on it in their 2014 book House of Debt. Chapter 8, entitled “Debt and Bubbles,” contains the heart of their insights. Mian and Sufi demonstrate that increasing the flow of credit is extremely counterproductive when the fundamental problem is too much debt, and excessive debt can fuel asset bubbles.

…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…

Fuzzy Numbers – Crash Course Chapter 18 | Peak Prosperity

Fuzzy Numbers – Crash Course Chapter 18 | Peak Prosperity.

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Fuzzy Numbers – Crash Course Chapter 18

How we’re deluding ourselves with bad data
Friday, October 17, 2014, 9:58 PM

Chapter 18 of the Crash Course is now publicly available and ready for watching below.

What if it turned out that our individual, corporate and government decision-making was based on misleading, if not provably false, data?

As we detail in this latest chapter of the Crash Course series, that’s exactly the case today with the key indicators (inflation, GDP, employment, deficits, etc) our central planners are using to guide the future of the global economy.

The cumulative effect of all this statistical sleight of hand serves only to make things seem rosier than they actually are. If this is not lying to ourselves, then “deluding ourselves” is the next best term.

Keep this self-deception in mind when you next read about how “our robust economy is still expanding”.

We are now in the midst of a worldwide debt orgy, dangerous asset bubbles, the beginning waves of boomer retirements  – and solid, credible information is what we need as a beacon to find our way out.

…click on the link above for the rest of the article…

 

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