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Two Cheers for Population Decline
Two Cheers for Population Decline
Eventual gradual population decline, provided it results from free choice, should be welcomed. Indeed, the greatest demographic challenge to human welfare is not low fertility and population aging, but rather the high fertility rates and rapid population growth still seen in Pakistan, much of the Middle East, and Africa.
LONDON – Since China abolished its one-child policy on January 1, 2016, annual births, after a temporary increase to 17.86 million that year, have actually fallen, from 16.55 million in 2015 to 15.23 million in 2018. The baby boom that wasn’t should surprise no one.
No other successful East Asian economy has ever imposed a one-child policy, but all have fertility rates far below replacement level. Japan’s fertility rate is 1.48 children per woman, South Korea’s is 1.32 and Taiwan’s 1.22. China’s fertility rate will almost certainly remain well below replacement level, even if all restrictions on family size are now removed.
Population decline will inevitably follow. According to the United Nations’ medium projection, East Asia’s total population will fall from 1.64 billion today to 1.2 billion in 2100. Nor is this simply an East Asian phenomenon. Iran’s fertility rate (1.62) is now well below replacement level, and Vietnam’s 1.95 slightly so. Across most of the Americas, from Canada (1.56) to Chile (1.76), rates are already well below two, or falling fast toward it.
The clear pattern is that successful economies have lower fertility rates: Chile’s rate is much lower than Argentina’s (2.27), and wealthier Indian states, such as Maharashtra and Karnataka, already have fertility rates around 1.8. In the poorer states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, fertility rates over three are still observed.
We should always be cautious about inferring universal rules of human behavior, but, as Darrel Bricker and John Ibbitson suggest in their recent book Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline, it seems we can identify one.
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The Normalization Delusion
The Normalization Delusion
LONDON – There is a psychological bias to believe that exceptional events eventually give way to a return to “normal times.” Many economic commentators now focus on prospects for “exit” from nearly a decade of ultra-loose monetary policy, with central banks reducing their balance sheets to “normal” levels and gradually raising interest rates. But we are far from a return to pre-crisis normality.
After years of falling global growth forecasts, 2017 has witnessed a significant uptick, and there is a good case for slight interest-rate increases. But the advanced economies still face too-low inflation and only moderate growth, and recovery will continue to rely on fiscal stimulus, underpinned if necessary by debt monetization.
Since 2007, per capita GDP in the eurozone, Japan, and the United States are up just 0.3%, 4.4%, and 5%, respectively. Part of the slowdown from pre-crisis norms of 1.5-2% annual growth may reflect supply-side factors; productivity growth may face structural headwinds.
But part of the problem is deficient nominal demand. Despite central banks’ massive stimulus efforts, nominal GDP from 2007-16 grew 2.8% per year in the US, 1.5% in the eurozone, and just 0.2% in Japan, making it impossible to achieve moderate growth plus annual inflation in line with 2% targets. US inflation has now undershot the Federal Reserve’s target for five years, and has trended down over the last five months.
Faced with this abnormality, some economists search for one-off factors, such as “free” minutes for US cell phones, that are temporarily depressing US inflation measures. But mobile-phone pricing in the US cannot explain why Japan’s core inflation is stuck around zero. Common long-term factors must explain this global phenomenon.
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Western Mistakes, Remade in China
Western Mistakes, Remade in China
SHANGHAI – The Chinese economy faces an enormously challenging transition. To achieve its goal of joining the world’s high-income countries, the government has rightly urged a “decisive role for the market.” But, while market competition works well in many sectors, banking is different. Indeed, over the last seven years, China’s reliance on bank-based capital allocation has led to the same mistakes that caused the 2008 financial crisis in the advanced economies.
Rapid GDP growth requires high savings and investment, and high savings almost never result from free consumer choice. States can directly finance investment, but bank credit creation can achieve the same effect. As Friedrich Hayek put it in 1925, rapid capitalist growth depended on “the ‘forced savings’ effected by the extension of additional bank credit.”
The Contradictions of Chinese Capitalism
Introducing PS On Point.
Making sense of a world of conflict and conflicting ideas.
Japan and South Korea both used bank credit to finance high levels of investment in their periods of rapid growth. South Korea’s nationalized banks directly funded export-oriented companies. In Japan, private banks were “guided” toward the tradable sector.
But while governments dictated broad sectoral priorities, banks decided the firm-by-firm allocation and extended credit via loan contracts, which imposed financial discipline. If Japan and South Korea had instead used direct government finance, capital allocation would almost certainly have been worse.
But while Japan’s banking system helped drive stunning post-war growth, its credit-fueled real-estate boom in the 1980s and subsequent bust led to 25 years of slow growth and creeping deflation. The global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent post-crisis malaise replicated the Japanese experience in many other countries.
As economies get richer, they become more real-estate intensive. That is partly because people devote a rising share of their income to competing for property in more attractive locations, and partly because in service-intensive economies, high-value-added activities and talent cluster in dominant cities.
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A Stunning Admission From A BOE Central Banker: This Is What The Coming “Helicopter Money” Will Look Like
A Stunning Admission From A BOE Central Banker: This Is What The Coming “Helicopter Money” Will Look Like
Back in early 2009, just around the time the Fed announced it would unleash QE1, we warned that any attempt to reflate the debt (a pathway which ultimately leads to hyperinflation as monetary paradrops are the only logical outcome as a result of the deflationary failure of the intermediate steps) would fail, and instead would saddle the world with even more debt, making monetary financing, i.e., paradropping money, the inevitable outcome.
We said that instead, the right move would be to liquidate the excess debt, and start anew – a step which, however, would wipe out trillions in (underwater) equity, something which the status quo would never agree to, as that is where the bulk of its wealth is contained.
7 years later, debt is well over $200 trillion, having risen by more than $60 trillion in the interim, and we are rapidly approaching the peak of the world’s debt capacity as we noted a month ago in “The World Hits Its Credit Limit, And The Debt Market Is Starting To Realize That.”
Today, we find that none other than Adair Turner, a member of the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee and a Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, wrote a long essay in Bloomberg which admits everything we have warned about.
To wit:
Advanced economies’ public debt on average increased by 34 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2014. More important, national incomes and living standards in many countries are 10 percent or more below where they could have been, and are likely to remain there in perpetuity.
The fundamental problem is that modern financial systems inevitably create debt in excessive quantities. The debt they create doesn’t finance new capital investment but the purchase of existing assets, and above all real estate. Debt drives booms and financial busts. And it is a debt overhang from the last boom that explains why recovery from the 2007–2008 crisis has been so anemic.
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