“We have, as a rationalising but not rational story-telling ape, created myths about our place in the universe and how we have contributed to it. Over the past several centuries, and certainly during the most recent one, we story-tellers have weaved narratives that it is our human ingenuity — particularly around technology — that has led to our expansion and apparent ‘successes’ (not the leveraging of a one-time cache of easily-accessible, storable, and transportable dense energy).
Along the way, we have lost sight of our place and dependence upon Nature, and how fundamentally important its complexities are to our very survival. As a result, many continue to cheerlead that which is most dangerous to our and every species existence on this planet; ignoring or rationalising away the signals being sent.”
This story-telling aspect of our species appears to be applicable to every sociocultural institution or school of thought that humans use to help them interpret, understand, and explain the universe and its workings.
As this paper that reviews the evidence surrounding the “…mainstream narrative for achieving socially just ecological sustainability” reminds:
“…humans are storytellers by nature. We socially construct complex sets of facts, beliefs, and values that guide how we operate in the world. Indeed, humans act out of their socially constructed narratives as if they were real. All political ideologies, religious doctrines, economic paradigms, cultural narratives — even scientific theories — are socially constructed ‘stories’ that may or may not accurately reflect any aspect of reality they purport to represent. Once a particular construct has taken hold, its adherents are likely to treat it more seriously than opposing evidence from an alternate conceptual framework.”
Before unpacking the psychology behind this phenomenon, let’s consider the concept of ‘energy blind spots’.
Energy Blind Spots
The term ‘blind spot’ arises from the idea that there exists a “spot within one’s range of vision but where one cannot see”. It’s initial use was physiological in nature but just as the word ‘blind’ had become used to suggest confusion or not controlled by reason, ‘blind spot’ became a reference to other more figurative aspects of life (e.g., morals, intellectual pursuits, general understanding) that one could not see, was confused about, or just simply ignored — the ‘carbon tunnel vision’ I discuss in Part 1 is an example.
In the sense of ‘energy’, it’s the inability to connect the fact that energy is the fundamental underpinning of all life and life processes but also, as Nate Hagens argues (in this video), our tendency to misattribute or ignore the ‘power’ derived from the energy sources we depend upon: “To our ancestors, the benefits from carbon energy would’ve appeared indistinguishable from magic. And instead of appreciating this giant one-time windfall, we developed stories that our newfound wealth and progress had emerged purely from human ingenuity. We had become energy blind.”
Hagens goes on to point out that everything requires energy from animal physiological functioning to human economic systems and everything in between. The ‘benefits’ that energy — particularly the one-time cache of easily-accessible/recoverable, dense, storable, and transportable hydrocarbon fuels — provides to human complex systems is, in human time scales, virtually indistinguishable from magic (see this video).
One barrel of oil, for example, can provide the equivalent of 4–5 years of human labour, but since we have been growing the supply and creating enormous surplus energy we hardly — if at all — take note of the tremendous impact and benefits of this energy source. It has been taken for granted, particularly as it pertains to our expansion of complex socioeconomic systems and technology. And this extremely unique period of our human existence (where we are drawing down a finite resource to ‘power’ our expansion well beyond the natural environmental carrying capacity of our planet) has been normalised within our social zeitgeist. It is the way things have been and will continue to be…to infinity and beyond.
Much gets discounted/ignored/misattributed by most people in their thinking (or, rather, non-thinking) about the hydrocarbon energy that goes into our existence: the millions of years necessary to create it; the complexity of accessing, extracting, refining, and distributing it; the pollution streams that arise from our extraction and use; and, all the energy that is lost in these processes — let alone the significant complexities of the socio-economic and -political aspects (from financial/monetary manipulation to resource wars).
While we appear to have more of this resource each year, we are also growing in both our population and economies resulting in less actual energy available per capita (NB: this metric has plateaued since 2018 when oil production hit its peak) and the very important surplus energy it provides to ‘fuel’ our continuing pursuit of growth (see Dr. Tim Morgan’s website for great insight into this aspect). But rather than consider these aspects of our energy windfall, we instead tend to focus upon our technology and economies (especially in terms of money) believing our current living arrangements have no limit.
In doing so, we fail to consider the drawdown of this finite resource and also the diminishing returns we are encountering as the cheap and easy-to-access reserves have mostly been extracted. To counter this (and other stressors) we have greatly expanded debt and manipulated interest rates. These financial/monetary manipulations have aided our efforts to access perhaps the last of our reserves via tight/shale oil extraction[1].
This has also helped to make it appear that our reserves are boundless — it’s simply our technology and politics holding back endless extraction — ignoring, of course, the significant fall-off in extraction experienced with these shale wells and thus the necessity to increase exponentially the drilling to maintain rates[2]. As Hagens argues, we are simply widening the straw to drawdown more quickly a finite quantity of our most important energy resource.
In addition, these shale oil reserves are drawn from the source rock that feeds other deposits; and once these are used up there are no other places to extract from except perhaps bitumen deposits — an extremely ecologically-destructive and energy-intensive process[3].
Most people’s views of energy production — be it from hydrocarbons or non-renewable, renewable energy-harvesting technology — is rather simplistic; in fact, the vast majority probably don’t even think about it at all as with most complex processes in today’s world and thus the ‘magical’ nature that arises with our technologies.
Hydrocarbon refining is rather complex and energy intensive (with intensity and complexity depending upon the source material) with the various products the result of distillation, cracking, reforming, treating, and blending. Basically, crude oil is heated in a distilling column that vapourises the various chemicals with each condensing at different temperatures as it rises in the distiller. Collection trays then siphon off each product.
As some products are in greater demand than others, ‘cracking’ (so named as it breaks up longer hydrocarbon molecules) is used to convert certain liquids. ‘Reforming’ is the process used to increase product quality and volume for some of these liquids. Natural contaminants (e.g., sulphur, nitrogen, various heavy metals) are removed by binding them with hydrogen (produced by the reforming process) and then used in other industries. Finally, ‘blending’ of various refined liquids is carried out to create the different products that get used to power our vast array of technologies.
Another brick in this energy wall that gets lost for most people is the vast array of products that get produced from hydrocarbons[4]. It’s one thing to argue that non-renewable, renewable energy-harvesting technologies will replace our hydrocarbons, it’s quite another to then look at the products — some of them quite important to our modern complexities, others quite superfluous — and imagine how these will be produced without oil and gas.
There are compelling stories, especially from economic schools of thought, that virtually everything is ‘replaceable’ if there is the demand — ignoring/denying, of course, the biogeophysical limits that exist upon a finite planet (to say little of the Laws of Thermodynamics).
Perhaps among the most important hydrocarbon inputs (and ones that are most people are blind to) include those into our modern, industrial agricultural and transportation systems (especially those involved in our long-distance supply chains). While there exist competing narratives about whether these inputs can be replaced by non-hydrocarbon ones, the scale and economy of such a transition are often glossed over or completely ignored — I find this particularly true for those advocating for the immediate cessation of hydrocarbon energy extraction and use — and with no real plan in place for the consequences of this approach.
The ‘Green’ or ‘Third Agricultural Revolution’, for example, has been made almost entirely possible because of the Haber-Bosch Process. This industrial-scale process for the creation of agricultural fertilisers, herbicides, and pesticides (as well as other non-agricultural products) converts atmospheric nitrogen to ammonia by a reaction with hydrogen that is produced using natural gas as the feedstock but also requiring significant oil and coal inputs.
And while some have argued that the non-renewable hydrocarbon inputs for this undertaking can be replaced by ammonia production via concentrated solar energy (ignoring the same complexities and ecological destructiveness that accompanies the production, distribution, maintenance, and disposal/reclamation of these non-renewable, renewable energy-harvesting technologies), all such bargaining does is attempt to sustain a population well above the natural carrying capacity — a predicament created by our leveraging of hydrocarbons.
As Vaclav Smil highlights in this essay on our population explosion:
“What is the most important invention of the twentieth century? Aeroplanes, nuclear energy, space flight, television and computers will be the most common answers. Yet none of these can match the synthesis of ammonia from its elements…the world’s population could not have grown from 1.6 billion in 1900 to today’s six billion [over eight today] without the Haber–Bosch process.”
Removing the hydrocarbon inputs into our global food supplies would be catastrophic without a well-planned and in-place substitute readily available — and probably one that could not support current population levels, let alone be created in a short period of time. And, because of how the world works, such a withdrawal of these inputs would be felt most horrifically by the disadvantaged members of our species.
Blindness to the importance of hydrocarbon energy to almost all of our complex systems is leading us to offer narratives that most assuredly are making our predicament of ecological overshoot worse. They mostly depend upon tales that highlight human ingenuity, especially with respect to technology, and offer ‘solutions’ to maintain for the most part our status quo systems and complexities.
Perhaps the most mainstream stories are that that rally around alternative energy production and technologies but that continue to depend upon ecologically-destructive industrial processes.
Why do we do this? Why do we construct stories that, depending upon one’s perspective, could be considered suicidal in nature? This I will explore in Part 3.
NB: Note that I did not go into detail about our ‘resource- and ecological-blindness’ but remained focussed upon our energy blindness in this essay. My discussion was already getting longer than originally planned so I decided to leave those aspects since the principles are virtually identical.
In our attempts to simplify our perspective on complexities, we create stories to aid our understanding and then view the world through the lens of our socially-constructed narratives that tend to ignore/deny/rationalise away aspects that don’t fit into our preconceived paradigm/worldview/schema. This is as true for material resources and the ecological impacts of our extractive enterprises as it is for the energy aspect.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CXLIX–Carbon Tunnel Vision and Resource/Energy & Ecological Blindness, Part 1
September 7, 2023 (original posting date)
Mexico (1988). Photo by author.
In my attempt to ‘market’ the article compilation that was recently published, I joined a couple of Facebook Groups in order to post about the document. I subsequently posted my last Contemplation (that shares my thoughts on the extreme difficulties, if not impossibility, of a ‘managed’ contraction by our species) and received some ‘interesting’ comments within one climate-change group, many of which I attempted to respond to (I’ve included some of these conversations at the end of this post).
Most comments were perhaps only marginally connected to my post. They tended to extoll the virtues of technological ‘solutions’ to climate change (not that I discussed climate change).
In reflecting on the ‘pushback’ to my post and my responses to comments, it would appear that the thinking behind the comments were mostly due to what could be viewed as resource/energy and ecological blindness, as well as carbon tunnel vision. These cognitive ‘blinders’, along with much in the way of rampant ‘marketing’ for technological ‘solutions’, have resulted in many viewing the world along the lines of: ‘human ingenuity and technology’ can, will, and is, saving us from ourselves. And, most certainly, the ‘gate-keepers’ for this particular group.
And the following is not to denigrate the perspectives that pushed back against mine (even if some of them wandered into ad hominem territory). We all believe what we believe based on the ‘best’ (and favoured) information available to us, and then we go to significant lengths to rationalise and ‘protect’ our beliefs. All of us.
As this has become a much longer Contemplation than the ‘ideal’ short ones I aim for, it will be at least in two parts (it may be longer as I’ve only jotted down a few brief notes for Part 2).
Carbon Tunnel Vision
There is an evolutionary-advantageous tendency for humans to view our universe through rather narrow keyholes. It’s quite normal and ubiquitous. It is the way we attempt to perceive, in relatively simple terms, the exceedingly complex world that we exist within.
In our attempts to understand the world, we rely upon experience, deductions, and external sources of information (e.g., social milieu). We make relatively quick assessments of the significantly complex world about us and make choices (e.g., should I flee or fight?) or form beliefs using a variety of heuristics (mental shortcuts). This leads to us focussing upon a narrow array of information out of all that is available — usually that which supports our ‘needs’ at the time — and ignoring for the most part superfluous inputs.
Once we’ve gravitated towards a decision or particular interpretation of our environment, we continue to view the world through this lens. We justify/rationalise our decision and/or cling to our beliefs, particularly if it has served us well or it is held by the majority of people. We tend to disregard that information/evidence that challenges our decision/beliefs, creating a bias that serves to reinforce our interpretation of things and maintain the image of ourselves as rational, perceptive, and ‘objective’ individuals.
As Wikipedia states: “Tunnel vision metaphorically denotes a collection of common heuristics and logical fallacies that lead individuals to focus on cues that are consistent with their opinion and filter out cues that are inconsistent with their viewpoint.”
The ‘bias’ that many people (not all) seem to have, including those that have concerns about the impacts of a changing climate and/or atmospheric sink overloading, is what appears to be a hyper-focus upon carbon emissions. To oversimplify, there appear to be two main viewpoints on the issue. There exist many who hold that carbon emissions are not a problem at all because not only have they been higher in the past but they are what our planet’s vegetation requires as food. In stark opposition are those who argue that our fossil fuel burning is leading to excessive emissions that are causing both extreme weather events and long-term global climate anomalies, especially global warming.
As the following graphic demonstrates (with respect to particular aspects of the issue of ‘sustainability’) this tendency to narrow our perspective can prevent the acknowledgement of so many other aspects of our world — and the graphic only includes some of the many others that could be considered, such as land-system change and biogeochemical flows. Perhaps most relevant is that this tunnel vision keeps many from recognising that humans exist within a world of complex systems that are intertwined and connected in nonlinear ways that the human brain cannot fathom easily, if at all.
My own bias leads me to the belief that this hyper-focus on carbon emissions is leading many well-intentioned people to overlook the argument that atmospheric overloading is but one symptom predicament of our overarching predicament of ecological overshoot. As a result, they miss all the other symptom predicaments (e.g., biodiversity loss, resource depletion, soil degradation, geopolitical conflicts, etc.) of this overshoot and consequently advocate for ‘solutions’ that are, in fact, exacerbating our situation.
This rather narrowed perspective tends to be along the lines that if we can curtail/eliminate carbon emissions — usually through a shift in our technology to supposed ‘carbon-free’ ones — then we can avoid the negative repercussions that accompany the extraction and burning of fossil fuels, most prominently climate change. For many this is the only (or, at least, the most prominent) issue that needs to be addressed to ensure our species’ transition to a ‘sustainable’ way of living.
So, let’s try for a moment to open up this rather narrow keyhole and take in a wider perspective. Let’s look at how some of the other significant planetary boundaries are being broached.
When one opens the keyhole wider, the concern with carbon emissions/climate change may be seen as an outsized one in comparison to boundaries that appear to have been more significantly broached, such as: novel entities, biosphere integrity, land-system change, biogeochemical flows, and fresh water change.
This is not to say that the boundary of climate change is not important, it’s to try to better understand why a hyper-focus on carbon emissions is problematic: it’s one of several tipping points that need our attention, and not even the worst. The most pressing areas that we appear to have overshot beyond climate change include:
· Biogeochemical flows: agriculture and industry have increased significantly the flow of phosphorous and nitrogen into ecological systems and overloaded natural sinks (e.g., atmosphere and oceans)
· Novel entities: geologically-novel (i.e., human-made) substances that can have large-scale impacts upon Earth system processes (e.g., chemicals, plastics, etc.) have grown exponentially, even to the point of some existing in all global water supplies
· Biosphere integrity: human demand for food, water, and natural resources are decimating ecosystems (clearing land for mining and agriculture, for example, may have the worst impacts)
· Freshwater change: global groundwater levels in particular have been significantly altered by human activity and expansion (especially our drawdown of aquifers that exceed significantly their replenishment)
· Land-system change: human conversion of land systems (e.g., solar farms, agriculture, etc.) has impacts upon several of the other boundaries (i.e., biosphere integrity, biogeochemical flows, freshwater change) and the significantly important hydrological cycle
Azote for Stockholm Resilience Centre, based on analysis in Wang-Erlandsson et al 2022.
Carbon tunnel vision tends to help minimise, or at worst, ignore these other predicaments of our ecological overshoot. In fact, what I sense and what some of my conversations did suggest is that the issue of ecological overshoot itself is completely off the radar for these commenters. One, in fact, admitted he had never read Catton’s book on the subject but in ‘skimming over’ the summary notes I sent a link for he simply saw “a bunch of vague assertions…didn’t learn anything…probably heading towards a hard wall…”. He then added for effect: “I don’t see any solutions from you. I do see almost entirely your focus on smearing renewables with the exact same material the Deniers and carbon pollution people do. Exactly the same.”
Again, my own bias suggests to me that the reason for this hyper-focus (perhaps the most significant one) has been manufactured by a ruling caste and others that have created a means of monetising carbon emissions, mostly through carbon taxes and cheerleading greater industrial production via a narrative around ‘green/clean’ energy technologies. For, if we were to address those boundaries that have been more severely broached and that require curtailing of the causes contributing to this overshoot (which is human growth — economic and population), we would need to curtail industrialisation and its associated revenue streams significantly; something that would undermine greatly the power and wealth structures that benefit a large but very privileged minority class of humans.
And the marketers of this particular point of view know full well the psychological mechanisms that are effective in ‘persuading’ the masses to hold it and support it — especially the human tendency to defer to expertise/authority and engage in groupthink (see my 6-part series on Cognition and Belief Systems). It should be no surprise, given these tendencies, that the profit-/revenue-seekers amongst us have leveraged them to market the narrative, and associated industrial products, extolling the virtues of them while downplaying/denying/obfuscating the ecologically-destructive nature of what they are marketing.
Even those aware of this issue can fail to see the connection to industrial technology, cheerleading ‘sustainable’ development/practices and ‘clean/green’ (and supposedly) non-fossil fuel-based technologies[1].
As the Energy Blind animated presentation on Nate Hagen’s The Great Simplification website suggests: “…To our ancestors, the benefits from carbon energy would have appeared indistinguishable from magic and instead of appreciating this one-time windfall we developed stories that our newfound wealth and progress had emerged purely from human ingenuity. We had become energy blind.”
This energy blindness (along with ecological blindness) is what I will discuss in Part 2.
We have, as a rationalising but not rational story-telling ape, created myths about our place in the universe and how we have contributed to it. Over the past several centuries, and certainly during the most recent one, we story-tellers have weaved narratives that it is our human ingenuity — particularly around technology — that has led to our expansion and apparent ‘successes’ (not the leveraging of a one-time cache of easily-accessible, storable, and transportable dense energy).
Along the way, we have lost sight of our place and dependence upon Nature, and how fundamentally important its complexities are to our very survival. As a result, many continue to cheerlead that which is most dangerous to our and every species existence on this planet; ignoring or rationalising away the signals being sent.
As I stated to another in a subsequent discussion about another post within the same FB Group that was, again, extolling the virtues of ‘green/clean’ technology:
“We’re going to have to agree to disagree over this. Ideally we would not be debating which industrial-produced transport vehicles or energy sources are ‘better’; they are all horrible. We can’t even get a handle on the growth that is killing our planet so this debate, in that context, is meaningless — especially in a world where the dominant species is in Overshoot. Degrowth, especially in our technologies and industries is where our focus should be. Relocalising everything but especially food production, potable water procurement, and regional shelter needs. All else is superfluous at this point.”
Some examples of comments that suggest ‘narrow keyhole’ perspectives:
Electric Vehicles
KFT: DS what really annoys me is the belief that someone’s time is far too precious to spend it charging an ev. Clearly way more precious than the quality of life of their children. You are correct, people refuse to use their agency.
Me: EVs are no help to ecological overshoot; in fact, they are as bad as ICE vehicles.
KFT: nonsense. Evs cancel out their manufacturing carbon in the first year of driving. ICE vehicles add carbon for their lifetime. By the way evs are likely to last much longer than ICE vehicles further reducing their manufacturing footprint. Ev batteries are 95% recyclable, gasoline is 0% recyclable unless they perfect carbon capture. I don’t anticipate that. By the way people who won’t charge an ev sure as hell won’t ride a bicycle. Just FYI I was bike commuting while you were very likely still in diapers so I know a bit about it.
DS: that’s def not true unless you cherry pick emissions and ignore externalities. in fact, it’s literally impossible for an car to “cancel out” their emissions, that’s literally not scientifically possible and a gross misunderstanding.
and even then, lithium mining still causes drought and leaches brine into natural habitat. mining still chops down rainforests and kills animals. electric vehicles are even more deadly than gas vehicles, even very large animals can’t survive a 7,000lb truck at 45 MPH or higher
Me: It would appear that you don’t understand that overshoot is a predicament without a solution. The best we might hope for is to mitigate some of the inevitable consequences.
DS: I don’t agree with that, you may not like the solutions but they are available. apathy is the biggest problem we face in society now
Me: DS I don’t agree that there is a ‘solution’ to overshoot except what Nature is going to provide. Most of the ‘solutions’ proposed by homo sapiens make our predicament worse, particularly if they involve more complex technologies/industrial production. In an ‘ideal’ world we could degrow our species and its impacts; unfortunately, we don’t live in an ideal world and most of the ‘decision-makers’ are steering us in an unsustainable and destructive trajectory because there are power and wealth structures that provide their revenue streams and must be maintained regardless of costs (especially environmental). Given that the ruling castes of large, complex societies have been doing this for the 10,000+ years, I see no chance we will do anything different. Of course, only time will tell…
DS: the world currently produces enough food for 16 billion humans
you think reducing food production to 8 billion peoples will make the predicament worse?
DS: I have no idea why you think that
earth’s agricultural capacity is …..insane…. the Netherlands is the second largest exporter of food in the world next to the USA.
Me: Look into fossil fuel inputs into agricultural. Pesticides. Fertilizer. Herbicides. Diesel machinery. The list goes on. Here’s a paper just on inputs in the UK: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2935130/
DS: I can literally do this for ever
indoor agricultural reduces herbicides and pesticides by 95–100%
Technology
DS: you literally said there is no solution to prevent overshoot, I have to assume you’re a techno-solutionist, basically you’re in the same group as elon musk who believes the future of humanity is on mars
Me: No, technology is what has put us in Overshoot. More of it only exacerbates the predicament.
DS: technology is the only way to survive overshoot, I think overshoot should be avoided. you said we can’t stop overshoot
DS: I’m sorry but this is bullshit
“This new series is critical of the Just Stop Oil Movement, specifically for how the movement makes no real sense to anyone who understands the predicament we are actually part of. Just stop oil means stopping the energy that civilization rests and depends upon — do this and civilization also stops, meaning that 7 billion people and countless millions of other animal species die in rather short order.”
“Just Stop Oil is a British environmental activist group. Using civil resistance, direct action, vandalism and traffic obstruction, the group aims for the British government to commit to ending new fossil fuel licensing and production” Steve Bull let me repeat that to make sure
“THE GROUP AIMS FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO COMMIT TO ENDING NEW FOSSIL FUEL LICENSING AND PRODUCTION”
I really don’t think it’s worth my effort to debunk this gish gallop, I specifically used my self agency to live in a 15 minute city and it’s possible if people choose it
you should honestly stop reading this bullshit blog
Me: Your 15 minute city is based and depends upon fossil fuels. It cannot survive without it.
DS: that’s also bullshit, buses can run on biofuel, buses can literally run on garbage. my neighbor Mesa Arizona literally fuels their garbage trucks with garbage, they make a fuel from gases.
Me: And the production of said buses and garbage trucks?
DS: most of the production can be done with materials like hemp and because hemp is efficient at phytoremediation it creates a completely closed carbon cycle.
by the way, carbon neutrality does not require eliminating 100% of fossil fuels, we can create strict environmental standards and reduce production by 90% -100%
KP: Advanced technologies helping humankind reduce our footprint is what Ecomodernism is about.
Without killing billions we can reduce the population footprint and travel to the stars. This preserves wild spaces and restores natural biodiversity.
And to top it all off:
Space: The Final Frontier
JN: You said, “technology is what has put us in Overshoot. More of it only exacerbates the predicament”
Yes, because and as long as we are trapped on this ‘closed system’ planet we call Earth. But if we can escape the gravity trap we will have unlimited resources in Space.
Interesting statement:
“‘Opting out’ in today’s world is more difficult as there are no more ‘New Worlds’ to exploit for their resources”
Comment: Collapse Cometh? Yes, unless we do something! But why in 148 years? Not sure if this is saying that opting out is ‘giving up’ or a ‘solution’? Yes, we need a new frontier to explore — and we don’t have any territory left on Earth to do that. The areas still remaining ‘unexploited’ must be preserved to save the biosphere and cannot be used for ‘exploitation’.
And why using the term ‘opting out’? Why not word it as part of a solution instead?
There are new worlds to exploit in Space. 148 years is plenty of time to set that up — as long as we have an economic system that will allow it! We need a space colonization and mining program as a solution to the human dilemma — which is lack of territory on Earth to ‘exploit’ and to ‘blow the fuse’…
Our species needs to become a space faring species, with future colonization in space and with mining of minerals on the Moon, Mars, and the Asteroids.
‘Why the human race must become a multiplanetary species’
(https://www.weforum.org/…/humans-multiplanetary-species/)
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars):
Book 1: $2.99
Book 2: $3.89
Book 3: $3.89
Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
I’ve been very, very slowly reading a paper by archaeologist Joseph Tainter (Problem Solving: Complexity, History, SustainabilityPopulation and Environment, Sep., 2000, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 3-41) that I will comment upon and summarise in a few weeks. In the meantime, I thought I would share a fresh experience.
A recent issue within a Facebook Group (Peak Oil: Twilight of the Oil Age) I am a member of has prompted me to throw together some thoughts, once again, regarding the push by many well-meaning individuals/groups to increase massively the production and distribution of non-renewable, renewable energy-harvesting technologies (aka ‘renewables’) and associated industrial products (e.g, electric vehicles, ‘renewables’-powered manufacturing).
The primary reason given this time is perhaps the most common used to rationalise/justify this push and move quickly towards a ‘clean/green’ energy transition: reduce significantly our extraction/use of hydrocarbons, thereby eliminating the greenhouse gases that are released in the process, and put a halt to rising global temperatures.
While all well and good, this calling for trying to reduce our species’ impact upon the planet, I continue to fear we are doing the exact opposite via a massive expansion of complex industrial products to provide electrical power to our ubiquitous energy-intensive technologies.
These technologies are contributing not only to our increased extraction and burning of hydrocarbons (they are, after all, a highly energy-intensive industrial product requiring massive amounts of hydrocarbons to produce, distribute, maintain, and dispose of/recycle), but to the overshoot of the various planetary boundaries that have been found to be significant to the stability and resilience of the Earth system (i.e., land system changes, novel entity distribution, climate change, biosphere integrity, freshwater change–see here).
Among a handful of arguments by ‘renewables’ advocates are some of the following:
their production is replacing/supplanting hydrocarbon extraction/production/use;
they have become less expensive than hydrocarbons;
they reduce greenhouse gases;
they are capable of replacing hydrocarbons.
Evidence, however, brings all of these assertions (or ‘hopes’) into question.
I’ve posted quite a number of Contemplations upon ‘renewables’ and attempted to demonstrate that they are not the ‘saviour’ for sustaining our society’s complexities as they are, for the most part, being marketed as.
See some of my more recent Contemplation on ‘renewables’:
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXX-She Blinded Me With Science, and More On The ‘Clean’ Energy Debate…. June 2, 2024. BlogMediumSubstack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXVIII-Magic Permeates Our Thinking About ‘Solutions’. February 27, 2024. BlogMediumSubstack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXVI–Confessions Of A Fossil Fuel Shill. February 11, 2024. BlogMediumSubstack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXI–A ‘Solution’ to Our Predicaments: More Mass-Produced, Industrial Technologies. December 21, 2023.BlogMediumSubstack
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXX–To EV Or Not To EV? One Of Many Questions Regarding Our ‘Clean/Green’ Utopian Future, Part 1. December 18, 2023. BlogMediumSubstack Part 2. January 14, 2024. BlogMediumSubstack
Rather than repeat some of the arguments I have made previously, I thought it would be instructive to provide the recent thoughts of two others: Chris Smaje and Dr. Tom Murphy.
Below you will find summations of two recent posts by these two.
Basically, they both challenge the common/mainstream assertions about ‘renewables’ and the associated ‘clean/green’ energy transition. Two additional voices to consider…
-Chris has argued for some years that he believes “…the future is likely to devolve into low energy-input local societies based around widespread agrarianism…”
-the movement to this may occur in an unmanaged form (societal collapse from pursuing a business-as-usual path) or managed one (purposeful degrowth)
-critics have raised a third option: maintain current high-energy societies via rollout of ‘renewables’
-Chris admits that “A renewables-based transition to a lower-energy, more equitable, local and agrarian economy could be a wonderful thing.”
-his skepticism towards this third pathway, however, is primarily towards the notion that we can quickly transition to from high-carbon to low-carbon energy sources that can sustain our high-energy, growth-oriented global economy
-this perspective, labelled ecomodernism, focuses upon technological innovations and products to address environmental issues
Energy transition–the current state of play
-while the transition literature makes it appear that hydrocarbon use is quickly diminishing and ‘renewables’ is taking its place, the data shows this is not occurring
-the percentage of primary energy used has dipped slightly, but the quantity of hydrocarbon use has continued to increase without much if any of a pause
-looking at electricity generation, ‘renewable’ production has increased significantly from a very low point; but hydrocarbons still account for generating about 60% and in absolute terms has increased more than any other source
2024 Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy
-in other words, there is no ‘transition’ out of hydrocarbons despite the rapid growth of ‘renewables’; if there were, we’d be using less of them, not more
{NOTE: keep in mind, also, that the vast majority of ‘renewables’ are manufactured in China, where the primary energy source is coal and which has reached record extraction/use rates]
-despite these data, many continue to argue (based upon questionable assumptions, see next point) that hydrocarbon use will peak soon and then begin its inevitable decline, being replaced by ‘renewables’
-the International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests in a recent report (New Zero By 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector) that not only must electricity generation increase significantly, but that to reach Net Zero, hundreds of gas/coal plants (particularly in emerging and developing countries) need to be equipped with unproven technologies (carbon capture and storage), and electrical networks everywhere need to be expanded greatly
S-curves
-data, naturally, reflects the past and ‘renewables’ advocates often proffer their arguments with dependence upon impending exponential growth and technological breakthroughs
-appealling to future innovations creates a situation that can neither be proven nor unproven
-and Smaje admits ‘renewables’ are environmentally preferable [NOTE: I do not agree here mostly because there exist many aspects of ‘renewables’ production/distribution/maintenance/disposal/reclamation that are discounted in such a perspective; particularly the hydrocarbon inputs and ecological systems destructiveness of mining for needed components, both the ‘renewables’ and necessary storage products]
The real cost of renewables
-the electricity supply chain consists of several unbundled aspects (generation, transportation, buy/sell wholesalers, and consumers) and price decreases in one do not generally filter down to consumers
-while much has been made of the falling price of the material components of ‘renewables’, other costs have risen (e.g., land, integration of ‘renewables’-produced electricity, price of capital); the ‘levelised cost of energy’ (LCOE) metric often cited as proof of ‘renewables’ inexpensiveness, often excludes these other costs
-the intermittency of ‘renewables’ impacts the price received for electricity (since it varies depending upon supply and demand) making the LCOE low in theory but high in reality
-the IEA report cited above notes that to achieve Net Zero, electrical grids need to more than double in size and scope given the bottleneck it currently is for ‘renewable’-generated power; Chris notes that this will require massive fossil fuel-powered extraction
-adding the grid costs and additional facilities increases the actual cost of ‘renewables’ past that of hydrocarbons
-the financial institutions that provide the capital for ‘renewables’ projects have little interest given the low profitability and debt-servicing issues common in the sector
-while there is some efficiency in ‘renewables’ over hydrocarbons given the amount of energy lost to heat in the latter, hydrocarbons have a distinct advantage in also providing chemical feedstocks important in various other sectors
-in addition, electricity only supplies a fraction of industrial energy use (about 10-20%), with industries that cannot easily (or not at all) electrify
-as it stands, the globe is nowhere close to achieving Net Zero
-even if one accepts the argument that recycling and/or a circular economy can help to address these issues, there exist limits and our current trajectory is taking us nowhere near the ideal
Make Government Great Again?
-could the economic impediments be overcome if governments nationalised their electricity sectors?
-while China, in their quick adoption and rollout of ‘renewables’ suggests this may be possible, there remain difficult if not impossible realities to overcome [NOTE: it’s true that China has adopted a lot of ‘renewables’, and produces the vast majority; but China also is seeing record amounts of coal use in their power generation and use]
-regardless of who is in charge, there remains: industries that are difficult/impossible to electrify; intermittency of generation; high material costs; difficulty matching supply and demand
-nationalisation is no ‘easy’ feat and requires political, bureaucratic, and technical aspects; to say little about the lack of interest in such a move by many in government, industry, and the public–neoliberalism dominates almost everywhere
-instead, governments tend to offer incentives/subsidies; this approach, however, often results in boom/bust situations
-“..neoliberal globalization needs to end–but that’s not going to bring the Keynesian happy place back. There’s too much debt, and too little real growth.”
Batteries to the rescue?
-hydrocarbons are advantageous in that they can be turned on/off as needed; ‘renewables, however, require energy storage systems
-while there are constant cheers for potentially inexpensive and efficient systems to do this, none exist at the moment [current systems require hydrocarbon-based industrial and ecologically-destructive processes to produce] and the costs of decommissioning/reclaiming/disposing current systems must be considered–to say little about scaling such systems up
Minerals
-the mineral requirements for this ‘transition’ are critical and a number of analysts/researchers doubt the ability of our planet to provide what is being called for
-there exist limits/bottlenecks/diminishing returns for finite minerals/other resources (especially hydrocarbons), and concerns over the ecological impacts of the massive mining required
-here, many ‘renewables’ advocates point to the ecological destructiveness of hydrocarbons but “..if you set the bar as low as ‘not as bad as fossil fuels’ then a lot of things can jump over it.”
Energy cliffs, energy traps and economic slips
-while the concept of energy-return-on-energy-invested (EROEI; also known as net energy) is important to the global economic systems geared to growth, its real-life application to this issue is controversial
-despite the EROEI falling for hydrocarbons, it tends to remain higher than that for ‘renewables’
-energy cliff refers to the idea that as the EROEI of an energy source declines, the energy available to an economy declines more quickly; this is especially a problem for ‘renewables’ given their energy investment mostly occurs upfront creating less economic incentive to switch and resulting in a negative feedback (or energy trap)
-a transition may be more feasible for an economy not dependent upon growth, but we do not live in that world [and given the Ponzi-like structure of our economic systems it’s unlikely we could shift to such a system]
Geopolitics
-it appears that many countries (especially those not self-sufficient in hydrocarbons) are building out ‘renewables’ for energy security purposes, not for ‘decarbonisation’, given that world politics has become more volatile as the US’s hegemony wanes
-there is no fossil fuel-replacement occurring, however; what we are witnessing is an energy diversification and “…the pursuit of economic growth, energy security and geostrategic power is likely to drive increases–or at least retrenchment–in all forms of energy, including fossil fuels.”
-in fact, we may witness an increase in hydrocarbon use (especially coal), including the intensive-energy military sector–and particularly from the US is unlikely to “…give up its fossil-fuelled control of its oceanic trade empire without a fight…”
-domestically, governments opt for hydrocarbons over renewables to ensure grid stability during peak demand times and due to them being a less expensive option; this, however, can lead to grid failures when fuel shortages occur
-with global temperatures increasing, we can imagine a positive feedback loop where higher demand (air conditioning) leads to more hydrocarbon use, resulting in higher global temperatures and so on
-it’s also possible grids will be overwhelmed by demand and/or richer nations pushing up prices beyond the reach of poorer ones and impacting supply chains so that ‘renewables’ production is impacted negatively
-many/most poorer nations depend upon relatively cheaper hydrocarbons (especially coal); Africa, for example, produces 74% of its electricity from hydrocarbons and only 11% from ‘renewables’
-for any kind of global ‘transition’ to occur, it’s going to require a massive transfer of wealth from richer nations to poorer ones
On-grid
-‘renewables’ skeptics are often criticised as playing into the pursuits of Big Oil, but Chris counters that it is those who advocate for the transition that have interests that are more in line with Big Oil/Capital
-these interests are dominated by profit-making and many Big Oil companies have invested heavily in ‘renewables’ (deinvesting when profits are waning) [I would add that part of their support for ‘renewables’ is likely because the industrial processes required to produce/distribute/maintain/reclaim them are heavily dependent upon hydrocarbons]
Off-grid
-while techno-fix narratives sound serious, whether they actually offer ‘solutions’ to our meta-crisis times is questionable
-one often used approach is to market ‘renewables’ as beneficial to the ‘poor’ and ’emerging’ economies but what mostly occurs is a loss of autonomy, increased assimilation, disruption of traditional living, etc.
-ecomodern, techno-fix narratives brush aside these concerns
-Chris concludes his thoughts by stating that “I don’t think renewables transitions are a serious likelihood for most people worldwide, but I don’t expect to be taken seriously by those who think otherwise…the more we can get off-grid, use soft-energy paths and agroecology, and build local communities, the more we can avoid getting wrecked by the siren call of banoffees (business as nearly ordinary feasibly-fast (and) future-proofed energy-transition enthusiasts)…[and] off-grid doesn’t have to mean isolation or survivalism. There’s a world o localism to be won.”
-Tom presents “various reasons why renewable energy and recycling are not our way out of the predicament modernity has set out for us. It’s just a doubling-down that can’t really work anyway.”
A Past Enthusiast
-having lived an off-grid lifestyle and experimented with a number of off-grid configurations, Tom has an intimate relationship with the concept and products
-he originally believed ‘renewables’ were part of the answer to our issues of climate change and peak oil but has reached the conclusion that such narrow solutions tend to work only for narrowly-defined problems
Cost of Climate Change Dominance
-a narrow view of our ecological predicament where CO2 emissions can be eliminated via ‘renewables’ and all is well is attractive but overlooks the complexities
-the belief that climate change is the main issue and this can be corrected with technology denies the larger picture/complexities
-‘renewables’ fail to get us out of the mess we’ve created
Materials Demand
-‘renewable’ technologies require massive amounts of finite resources
-‘renewables’ require significantly more materials per unit of electrical energy delivered than that of hydrocarbon combustion; it is not a build-once-and-done game
-‘renewables’ are thus not actually ‘renewable’ as they depend upon finite materials in perpetuity
The Genius of Life
-Nature is remarkable in that it has figured out how to accomplish all it does with the small set of elements found upon our planet (e.g., 96% of human mass is composed of oxygen (65%), carbon (18%), hydrogen (10%), and nitrogen (3%)–all derived from air and water)
-natural recycling is essentially 100% efficient and can continue indefinitely
-modern human inventions, however, rely upon the wrong things (e.g., rare earth minerals), don’t last (some not even a human generation and rarely a lifetime), and leave often harmful waste streams (e.g., radioactive waste)
Recycling Limitations
-the common rebuttal to the significant material needs of ‘renewables’ is the idea of recycling or circular economy
-first, the massive initial build-out should not be discounted and you cannot recycle what’s not present
-and it’s worth considering that even the substantial speed of ‘renewables’ production over the past couple of decades has not been able to meet human energy needs with hydrocarbon-use increases being necessary
-the massive outlay required to even meet growing needs would result in significant ecological systems destructive
-second, even the most efficient recycling is imperfect with fantasy-level 90% recovery resulting in a 50% loss of material after just 7 cycles and 90% loss after 22–it is not indefinite
-wind turbines and solar panels last a couple of decades prior to requiring replacement, so at best recycling can push ‘renewables’ out for a handful of centuries (that’s if everything goes ‘just right’)
What Do We DO with Energy?
-at the heart of our predicament is what we do with energy
-much is used to cause ecological systems damage (e.g., clear forests, industrial agriculture, mine, manufacture products, etc.)
-regardless of the energy source or technology, we are destroying planet health
Intent Matters
-with technology in hand, we appear intent on harming Nature
-it matters not if the technology is hydrocarbon-based or ‘renewable-based’
-Tom suspects, however, that it won’t be long before “…the deteriorating web of life will create cascading failures that end up making humans victims, too, and pulling the power cord to the destructive machine.”
Obligatory Titanic Metaphor
-powering modernity with different technology does not change the outcome, just as lithium batteries instead of a coal-fired engine would not have altered the Titanic’s tragedy
Cease What, Exactly
-none of our destructive activities are likely to cease if we alter our energy source
-eliminating CO2 might be great but it doesn’t change our ecological predicament in the least if everything else remains the same
-“…doing so keeps our boot on the throat of the community of life so it can’t breathe. Doing so keeps the sixth mass extinction basically on track, uninterrupted—though perhaps not as quickly or warmly.”
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
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If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
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You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Introducing The Bulletin, a collation of recent articles focusing upon those predicaments flowing from the ongoing collapse of our global, industrialised complex society.
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXIII–Complexity and Sustainability
I believe that in many ways the past is a prologue to our future. Every experiment our species has attempted in the development of complex societies (from small to large ones) has eventually ‘failed’ to sustain the systems that make them complex and simplification/decline/collapse has followed.
Regardless of this pre/history and the lessons inherent in it, our species seems to make the same unsustainable choices with each and every iteration of complex societies. An argument can be made that such repetitive behaviour is unavoidable as our ‘successes’ cannot help but lead to our ‘failures’. It is our ‘nature’ (as it is perhaps for virtually every species) to grow in numbers and, if the circumstances ‘permit’ (i.e., fundamental resources are present), to exceed the natural carrying capacity of its habitat and proceed into ecological overshoot (see William Catton Jr.’s Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change)
Our longest lasting and perhaps most ‘sustainable’ living arrangements were when our species followed a somewhat nomadic, hunting and gathering existence that relied upon living within the restraints imposed by local natural resources. When population pressures arose due to human reproductive success, groups could split up with some moving to adjacent, unexploited lands. Eventually, however, this process bumped up against limits to such expansion and it was through technological ‘innovations’ that population pressures were addressed.
While there are many theories regarding the reason for a society’s ‘collapse/simplification’, it would appear that part of the answer is that the organisational structures (i.e., sociopolitical and/or socioeconomic) that share important information and goods to maintain themselves, experience declining returns on the investments necessary to keep them active–particularly if an unexpected crisis erupts after a prolonged period of diminishing returns.
Eventually, when the ‘costs’ outweigh the ‘benefits’, support from the masses is withdrawn resulting in a much more simplified world where small, local groups develop that are primarily dependent upon the immediate environment’s carrying capacity and significantly less so on widespread energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade, especially long-distance forms) and the complex organisational structures necessary to sustain these systems.
In general, the article (Complexity and Sustainability: Perspectives From the Ancient Maya and the Modern Balinese) summarised below–comparing a ‘technotasking’ approach to a ‘labourtasking’ one–concludes that it is our technological innovations that have served to sustain our species growth but that these same innovations lead invariably to the ‘collapse’ of a complex society that employs them. This is due to technologies expediting the drawdown of finite resources (leading to diminishing returns on investments in resource extraction and thus complexity) and the overloading of various compensatory sinks. The authors emphasise that social stresses are increased by the implementation of new technologies but that because such innovations disproportionately benefit those at the top of societal political and economic structures (primarily via the control of key resources), they are employed regardless of the negative impacts that arise–social and/or environmental.
While reading through the article, I had a variety of thoughts relating to my understanding of the ‘collapse’ process and our modern trend towards that somewhat inevitable outcome.
First, it is a net surplus of resources (especially energy) that is perhaps the key result of human adaptations (see Dr. Tim Morgan’s Surplus Energy Economics for more on this). This surplus allows for expansion. No surplus means no expansion and/or use of ‘savings’ to sustain society, leading to a more vulnerable situation when/if crisis erupts as per archaeologist Joseph Tainter’s thesis regarding how and why complex societies ‘collapse’ (see The Collapse of Complex Societies). It would seem that ‘stability’ appears when new energy is NOT harnessed and growth/expansion curtailed. This possibility now appears unachievable (without a severe disruption to current complexities) because of the creation of a world predicated upon such growth and increasingly ‘necessary’ due to its dependence upon the extraordinary expansion of debt-/credit-based fiat currency that has allowed us to pull growth from the future–but that requires payback of both principal and interest.
Second, technological innovations (what the authors refer to as ‘technotasking’) appear to create jumps in complexity and are limited by immediately available resources. If resource demands cannot be met, collapse or simplification is the most likely outcome. A ‘labourtasking’ path (one that depends primarily upon manual labour), however, displays only small, incremental increases in complexity and costs. This alternative pathway is far more ‘sustainable’ than one that employs technologies; it can still result, eventually, in collapse/simplification just taking much longer to get to that endgame.
Third, today’s energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade) is a global, complex industrial product-reliant enterprise fundamentally based upon hydrocarbon extraction and refinement. The fragility and complexity of such a system has led to enormous reliance upon finite resources (especially hydrocarbons, and most located far away) and led to a significant loss of skill/knowledge in self-sufficiency for most of our species. The need for resources to maintain our societies’ complexities and the movement of them has led to massive militaries and ongoing geopolitical brinkmanship.
Fourth, our modern societies are similarly following the collapse trajectory of the Maya as we accept a top-down strategy and employ a technotasking approach in offsetting production deficiencies and countering population pressures. In fact, we have accelerated this approach in a number of ways, including the use of technology to make more technology and are now contemplating using technology (artificial intelligence) to guide our decision-making far more than practised to date. (see Erik Michaels’ Problems, Predicaments, and Technology for more on the issues surrounding technology use and the predicament it has led our species into)
Fifth, we can see in the Maya a faltering of technological innovations and their maintenance as a result of organisational communications breaking down. This eventually led to a degradation of important complexities, especially pertaining to food production. This occurred as the elite consolidated resources for themselves to offset the limits society was encountering. Elite self interest resulted in more and more resources being directed towards this ruling minority and less towards the systems necessary to support the societal complexities needed for everyone.
Sixth, despite assurances in modern times by the priesthood of economic ‘science’ that resource limits are meaningless in a world of ‘free’ market economies where human ingenuity and technology can counter deficiencies in resource supplies, hard biogeophysical limits to infinite growth exist. These real limits lead to massive issues for the technotasking pathway but it is almost always chosen to be pursued because it can accommodate rapid growth and the consolidation of social/economic power for the ruling elite to whom most of the benefits accrue. This occurs without much thought or concern, if any, about sustainability.
Finally, it may only be with the fall of nation states and other forms of large, complex societies (and the caste of elite that accompany such social organisations) that more sustainable forms of human existence can be pursued. This depends on a number of important factors not least of which are: the number of our species that survive the fall of the current industrial-based, globalised complex society; the state of the planet’s ecological systems once all mass, extractive enterprises are curtailed; the survivability of our planet due to our overshooting of various planetary boundaries; the availability of certain, important natural resources (especially potable water, food sources, and regional shelter needs); and the ability of any remaining human populations to live within the capacity of their local natural resources/environment.
A handful of previous Contemplations looking at how the past informs the possible future…
Complexity and Sustainability: Perspectives From the Ancient Maya and the Modern Balinese
V.L. Scarborough and W.R. Burnside
American Antiquity, April 2010. Vol. 75 No. 2, pp. 327-363
Scarborough and Burnside argue that there exists several different pathways for societal complexity to emerge in human populations (where complexity is defined “as the nonlinear escalation of costs and emergent infrastructure with rising energy use and concentrated power as societies develop.” (p. 327)) Using examples drawn from the ancient Maya and modern Balinese, two of the pathways are compared highlighting “their relative costs, benefits, and potential for long-term sustainability.” (p. 327)
After a brief discussion of how best to conceptualise societal complexity for the purposes of their research, the authors concentrate upon socioenvironmental relationships, especially around water management for their compare/contrast analysis with the complexity resulting from increasing ‘throughput’.
Human groups self-organise within their biophysical environment with their culture altering the environment. New cultural systems can be highly adaptable but they are also more fragile and can lead to relatively quick ‘collapse’. Social modifications usually lead to stressed living conditions with increased costs and three possible futures if harmful conditions cannot be absorbed by the biophysical and/or sociocultural systems: “(1) the cultural system cuts its exaggerated and mounting social costs by lessening its intensity of resource use resulting in a partial reversion to an earlier lifeway of reduced costs and relative simplicity; (2) the system suffers from relatively abrupt social collapse; or (3) the system cultivates and focuses its energy and social capital on greater “complexity” associated with an evolved set of institutional structures–an emergent organizer of information and resources.” (pp. 329-330)
Research suggests that societies follow a labourtasking or technotasking path (or combination) to incorporate new resources or reset old ones.
Technotasking offsets production deficiencies by investing in ‘technological innovation’ that can help establish surpluses. In an early/primary state, ‘canalisation’ (i.e., riverine drainage system) was a commonly employed innovation as it could be adopted relatively quickly. The resource concentration such adaptations resulted in led to the emergent phenomenon of urbanisation and organisational structures, with those in ‘control’ of these economic/political structures benefitting disproportionately–“…those profiting most from the newly invented technologies accrued greater quantities, concentrations, and control of key resources.” (p. 332).
Deployment of a new technology is costly in terms of society and its environment but even after costs ‘level-out’ time and entropy can begin to increase costs. These increased costs can lead to a slowing of growth, collapse, or, with a new technology, a restart of the process. Transitions to greater complexity seem to be triggered by these rapid reorganisations. Successful and long-term shifts are limited by immediately available resources. Such change creates vulnerability if the new structural complexity cannot adjust to resource use/demand “If the new structure and the necessary resources are not synchronized and compatible, then the social system will collapse or at least slip back to an earlier, less complex social order.” (p. 335)
Labourtasking relies upon trained labour pools to help modify the landscape rather than a technological ‘breakthrough’. Here, the resulting change is incremental, long lasting, monitored, promoted generationally, and refined according to local conditions. Complexity and its social costs increase over time but in a smooth, uninterrupted manner. There are no abrupt transitions preceded by breakthrough technologies. Complexity costs increase but at a smaller ratio than in technotasking societies.
The ancient Maya and modern Balinese both have tended to employ labourtasking to aid in their adaptation to their somewhat similar semitropical settings whereby heavy seasonal rains were followed by prolonged dry periods. Both developed microwatershed adaptations but via different ‘technologies’.
The Maya would take advantage of natural drainage catchments and enhance them via landscape modifications (channel systems and reservoir) with household and monumental architecture mound volume equivalent to drainage volume. “[T]he system was likely a communitywide effort monitored by a collective interested in sustaining the entire group.” (p. 338) Although labourtasking was their primary economic means for some time, the Maya shifted into and out of technotasking as needs required. Innovations, however, would hasten resource drawdown and quicken negative impacts (e.g., erosion and sediment accumulation).
It appears that the Mayan success led to its eventual demise. Turmoil within large centres disrupted community communication beginning in the west. Information exchange faltered and the elite succumbed to immediate self-interest and became less responsive to other needs investing fewer resources in the many and more to the few; a scramble for hegemonic control between the large centres ensued. Written records suggest a governing council was implemented at Chichen Itza as depopulation hit its southern contemporaries but rather than adjust social networks (i.e.., economic and political) the elite chose to seek greater control. During the Terminal Classic demise phase there is evidence that the cost-complicated landscapes suffered the most from this, In particular, was the impact upon irrigation channels and reservoirs that show massive sediment/silt buildup; impacts that can still be seen today.
Mayan ‘collapse’ appears to have ensued once the environment and its natural resources could no longer support societal complexities. While several major centres and their hinterlands experienced ‘collapse’ (especially acute depopulation and the overshoot of local resources), some smaller communities were resilient and avoided the fate of the large ones–mostly by specialising in local resources and establishing trade with nearby populations. Those populations that shifted towards labourtasking-based adaptations were able to sustain themselves for a period of time beyond those that depended upon technotasking. “Generally speaking, the more long-term time and energy invested in the system, the greater the degree of collapse if the fields or related surfaces are neglected or abandoned for even a short period.” (p. 349)
The modern Balinese, in comparison, have oriented towards a labourtasking pathway after having their initial attempts (circa 11-12th century) to recreate their Javanese roots fail due to significant geographical differences. Its highly-dissected, steep-sided valleys with little in the way of natural resources required more decentralised structures. Indigenous farming populations managed their own affairs avoiding centralised bureaucracies and their demands. Groups self organised within their unique ecological circumstances. This approach proved productive and shaped the social system. “Balinese social institutions remain responsive to the complex adaptive system they have spawned, providing the flexibility to accommodate and locally manage accretional landscape change.” (p. 353)
The Balinese, with their labourtasking approach that focuses upon decentralisation (as opposed to the hypercentralisaiton characterised by the Late Classic Maya), have so far avoided collapse and suggests a path forward for sustainability. Resilience and long-lived stability would appear to be the result of small, incremental adjustments in a labourtasking approach as opposed to the frequent and rapid shifts that result from a technotasking one. However, near the end of an extended run, labourtasking systems may still result in extreme social ‘collapse’.
“A key difference between the two systems is the expectations for grand collapse…Because of the ever-changing, nonlinear interdependencies within and between groups and their environments, labortasking leads to a set of ‘phase transitions’ that produce adaptive forms of social organization and built environments. This process is long-lasting, resilient, and generally well-adjusted to resource limitations, making it relatively sustainable. However, acute vulnerability or collapse can occur if drastic external and/or social structural change is unleashed.” (pp. 355-356)
Technological innovations that tend to buffer humans from the environment but negatively impact it are often chosen because they accommodate rapid growth and the consolidation of social/economic power without much thought or concern about sustainability. While improvements in human health and welfare can be attributed to technotasking these need to be evaluated in terms of the costs, especially upon the environment whose ‘health’ human societies depend on.
The longer summary notes of the article can be found here.
If you’ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars): Book 1: $2.99 Book 2: $3.89 Book 3: $3.89 Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
Attempting a new format (that I will probably fiddle with for a week or so) for sharing articles of interest. Below you will find a number of links to those articles. Note that I may add a few before the day ends so check back. Hope this works for everyone…
Today’s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXIX–Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse
It’s been a few months since I last posted a Contemplation. There are a variety of reasons for this.
I’ve been ‘distracted’ by the preparations in my gardens for the upcoming growing season. The unseasonably warm weather here north of Toronto allowed me to get outside quite a bit earlier than previous years and I’ve put that time to use performing all those preparatory tasks I need to do: post-winter clean-up, setting up my rain barrel system (that gets ‘dismantled’ in the fall given the snow and cold our region receives in the winter), preparing the ever-increasing number of garden beds, getting seed potatoes and a variety of other seeds in (i.e., pea, bean, carrot, and kale), mixing up new soil (compost + ‘used’ soil + peat moss + vermiculite), spreading mulch over many of the beds, and finishing up some stairs and a work area in behind my greenhouses that I began last year. These things are on top of the hydroponic seed-growing system I established in the past couple of years and some weeks ago began several dozen seeds (tomato, squash, eggplant) and required periodic attention and, finally, transplanting into pots/grow bags/raised beds.
As most of this prepping is now complete my activities have already shifted towards maintenance of crops (especially the perpetual trimming/training of vines/canes) and working on the next ‘big’ project (dismantling an older experiment with composting and replacing the wooden retaining walls with brick/stone).
On top of this, I made a pledge to myself to reduce significantly my screen time. So that’s also reduced my reading and writing time. While not helping to minimise my cathartic needs that writing brings, less screen time does focus my energies on actionable, physical endeavours that in the end I believe are far more immediately relevant; and which require a bit more time with each passing year–apparently, I’m not getting any younger as my back and various joints periodically remind me; and ‘suffering’ through a torn rotator cuff due to a fall playing pick-up hockey (who knew it’s hard to stay upright when you step on another player’s stick?) that has slowed me even more than my ever-increasing age–although I’m ‘fortunate’ that it’s only certain arm motions that have been restricted and I’ve still been able to haul heavy objects around and do the majority of physical chores that need doing.
In addition, I occasionally think of that line from the Talking Heads song, Psycho Killer: “Say something once, why say it again”. And as I think about many of my Contemplations, the repetition of some themes/topics cannot help but be obvious; and the repeating of them increasingly seems pointless since we all believe what we wish to believe (especially that which addresses our confirmation biases)–the choir that I preach to will accept my stories while those who do not will in all likelihood never, regardless of ‘evidence’ or persuasiveness–we are a rationalising species, not a rational one.
And, this writing ‘hobby’ (despite the long-ago initial motivation: marketing my ‘fictional’ novel trilogy) is a money-losing prospect where the income from my novel sales is significantly less than the ‘channel fees’ I pay to my self-publisher for keeping the print version of my first book available; to say nothing of the fees for maintaining a website presence. Being on a pension for the past 10+ years makes one just a tad more concerned about ‘superfluous’ expenditures such as personal hobbies.
I’ve also been spending a lot of time attempting to both update my website (still more to do) and post all my Contemplations on Substack (now complete). So, if you’re relatively new to my writing and find yourself looking for more to confirm or challenge your beliefs, please peruse my website, Substack, or Medium page.
Finally, perhaps most importantly, I am attempting to spend more time with my wife. We try to get our dog out for a 30-45 minute forest walk every morning, and have been enjoying other time together as we reconnect after many years of giving our time and energy to ‘raising a family’ and careers in education (and other people’s children). And as I experience my adult children’s periodic struggles with our increasingly complex (dare I say, ‘collapsing’) world, I am also attempting to be present and supportive for them more than I have in the past.
Realising that one is closer to the end of this roller-coaster ride of life than the beginning puts things in perspective and pulling back on the amount of time I engage in a somewhat self-indulgent ‘hobby’ seems apropos. Reading and writing have taken a distant backseat to my attempts to ‘live in the moment’, that is sometimes ‘difficult’ when one filters a lot of what’s going on in our world through an ‘overshoot-collapse’ lens.
Or, maybe all the above is a personal rationalisation/justification for just being ‘collapse weary’ and realising how fubar our species is and my ‘pontificating’ over it is accomplishing little. Actions over words is where my mind is settling, and those actions are oriented towards personal, familial, and community resiliency and sufficiency in a ‘collapsing’ world.
In summary, my time spent sitting in front of my computer or even just with a book/article is being reduced significantly as a result. What time I have had in the early mornings as I’m enjoying a couple of mugs of coffee, is oriented towards perusing some articles and doing some other personal chores. I am even going to be scaling back the ‘current events/articles’ I share via my website–perhaps just performing this periodically.
And as I continue to reflect upon and contemplate our predicament and how to perhaps ‘insulate’ my family/community from the changes to come, I am shifting towards an attempt to understand more fully what past complex societies did in response to societal decline/collapse/simplification. There are clues in these responses as to how we can better adapt to the societal transition that is upon us.
Given the above, then, I am thinking of changing tack with my writing. I am going to begin reading, summarising, and commenting upon academic/research articles that pertain to the two most common themes of my writing: societal collapse and human ecological overshoot. Combined with the aspects I outlined above, this will necessarily slow down significantly my screen time and writing; academic work can oftentimes be more ‘dense’ and time-consuming to process (especially if one is not repeatedly immersed in the field of study and the style of writing)–at least, this is true for me. I am going to aim for posting a new Contemplation at a rate of about once every 4-8 weeks; maybe more, maybe less–we’ll see.
The first such article I wish to share and comment upon is one from archaeologist Joseph Tainter that looks at the archaeological evidence that suggest examples of ecological overshoot and societal collapse. My thoughts regarding it follow…
Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse
Joseph A. Tainter Annual Review of Anthropology, 2006, Vol. 35, pp. 59-74.
After suggesting that the concept of overshoot traces its roots to Malthus’s argument that population (which grows exponentially) would overshoot food supply (which grows linearly), Tainter argues that population numbers, consumption of resources, and waste production are the main concerns surrounding human ecological overshoot. He also suggests that the concept of collapse has been poorly defined by researchers but commonly is assumed to be a loss of both population numbers and societal complexity.
He reviews the pre/historic record for evidence of societal collapse brought on by ecological overshoot and proposes that overshoot goes beyond simply population and consumption, and may include political aspects, economic costs to society (especially its ability to pay for ever-growing complexities), and technological capabilities (particularly with regard to transportation and communication).
The studies Tainter reviews include collapse for the Maya lowlands (whose collapse has been blamed upon ecological factors, a growth system, and sociopolitical and socioeconomic policies), and Mesopotamia (Ur dynasties, that experienced diminishing returns on its resource base, and overreach via excessive socioeconomic policies).
Chew’s (2001) studies of ecological degradation over the past 5000 years using World Systems Theory concluded that excess consumption led to environmental degradation and eventual collapse for societies of the past. Basically, “… over-exploitation of resources due to capital accumulation, urbanization, intense land use, and population growth led to constraints on continued expansion and ‘a downscaling of material and cultural lifestyles’”.
Diamond’s (2005) overshoot model similarly argues that the foundational cause of collapse for a society is degradation of the environment, however it also includes the variables of local ecology, hostile neighbours, social responses, climate, and trade partners. While disagreeing with most of Diamond’s examples (mostly because of rare, adverse conditions that prevented adaptation), Tainter suggests the best case for overshoot, resource degradation, and collapse presented is that for Easter Island.
Tainter appears to agree fully with the assessment that Easter Island’s complex society ‘collapsed’ in the sense of a loss of organisational capacity. Several researchers suggest deforestation kicked off a cascading set of events: decline in fishing and farming, increase in warfare and insecurity, settlement pattern shifts, population decline, and, finally, sociopolitical collapse.
Tainter reviews a number of theories regarding overshoot and collapse, using the archaeological record as a measuring stick to gauge their viability, including: Meggar’s (1954) environmental limitation theory, Cooke’s (1931) and Sanders’s (1962) research regarding the consequences of low-production swiddening leading to overshoot and collapse, and Culbert’s (1988) elite-driven agricultural intensification resulting in resource degradation and eventual overshoot.
He suggests that Ur’s Third Dynasty and the Abbasid Caliphate may be the best candidates for assessing population overshoot, resource degradation, and sociopolitical collapse, but then argues the evidence indicates that neither show Malthusian overshoot, nor one brought on by excess production (today’s primary concern).
Further, he concludes that Chew’s (2001) analyses of Bronze Age societies are not supported by the empirical evidence.
Diamond’s (2005) analyses demonstrate a misunderstanding of ‘collapse’ (Norse Greenland and Pitcairn and Henderson Island) and confuse Malthusian overshoot with overshoot due to extreme climatic conditions (Maya and Southwest U.S.). And even Easter Island is not likely to qualify as a case of overshoot and collapse since the loss of giant palms (the identified tipping point leading to collapse by many) was likely more due to the rats brought by the original settlers than to human population overshoot.
Tainter concludes that the archaeological literature contains few cases that suggest population and/or mass consumption overshoot followed by environmental degradation and sociopolitical collapse. He further suggests that most of the interpretations that argue for overshoot are not credible; those that are lead to the conclusion that overshoot only occurs during extreme conditions [this aligns with his thesis in The Collapse of Complex Societies in that collapse is brought about by a society’s inability to respond to crises due to reserves being depleted via their use to sustain status quo systems as a consequence of diminishing returns having been encountered on investments in problem-solving].
Rather than cases of overshoot, we see examples of elite mismanagement and lack of proper feedback to governing institutions to correct misguided policies and actions. The human ability to adapt, especially in terms of agricultural intensification, is often denied by those seeking examples of overshoot. Greater resource production always appears possible via capital and technology application, labour, knowledge intensification, and/or energy subsidies.
The argument can be made that increasing mechanisation, irrigation, fertilisation, and/or labour have all resulted in increased production–proving Wallace, Erlich, Jevons, and Malthus wrong. In addition, societies may choose to simplify to a less costly organisation and/or reduce consumption; this is what the Byzantine Empire chose in the 7th-century AD when it lost its wealthiest provinces (Tainter notes this “may be history’s only example of a large complex society systematically simplifying” (p. 72)).
Despite the above, Tainter wonders whether our modern world can continue to intensify production indefinitely escaping a Malthusian fate. Neoclassical economists argue markets will always uncover new resources so overpopulation and/or overconsumption is not ever a concern.
“The contrary view is well known. We must reduce our ecological footprint or eventually collapse. The neoclassical argument is based on faith that markets will always work and denial of diminishing returns on innovation. Should we base our future on faith and denial, or on rational planning?” (p. 72).
The lack of agreement over what constitutes overshoot and/or collapse is not unimportant. One of the ‘insights’ I gained over my decade of post-secondary education and subsequent observations of human perceptions of our universe is that the exact same observable phenomena are oftentimes (if not always) interpreted in different ways–sometimes even diametrically opposed to one another. I would argue that this is especially true when one is dealing with broad concepts such as ‘collapse’ and ‘overshoot’. Ask archaeologists what ‘collapse’ is and you’re likely to get many different answers; in fact, you’re likely to also get some that argue the term is inappropriate for what is observed via the artifactual remains of human complex societies (i.e., societies don’t ‘collapse’, they ‘adapt’).
Differences in what societal ‘collapse’ and/or ‘overshoot’ are and how they present themselves in the archaeological record can lead to quite disparate explanations about the process and responses. Despite the ideal of science being a dispassionate and objective enterprise, it is performed by humans with all the subjectivities, foibles, and predilections that we possess. We often if not always see what we want to see and interpret the world to support our beliefs. Scientists are no different and can become enmeshed in particular paradigms and echo chambers. Where one sees clear evidence of societal ‘collapse’, another sees examples of innovative adaptation.
The ability of humans to adapt to changing conditions, particularly around resource production, is predicated upon our capacity to shift behaviour and/or leverage resources–especially energy. One must wonder, as Tainter does, whether this is possible for our modern globalised and industrialised world. It would seem this is especially so where the all-important energy subsidy for hydrocarbons may not exist; certainly not at the scale necessary to support modern, industrial society’s complexities and its finite resource requirements–no matter how ingenious our species perceives itself to be.
This appears to be where the rubber hits the road. The archaeological evidence may indicate no previous examples of societal collapse due to overshooting of the natural carrying capacity, but past societies were vastly different in the sense that most of the population were skilled and knowledgeable in food production with few ‘elite’ being supported by the labour of the masses, and vast regions of land that had yet to be overexploited by humans existed relatively close by.
The ability of our species to intensify resource production in order to support our numbers and complexities seems in the present severely handcuffed by the lack of an energy subsidy that is capable of meeting the ability of hydrocarbons to do this. Despite narratives that a suitable energy ‘transition’ is not only feasible but in the works, every energy system continues to depend upon finite resources, cannot equal the density nor transportability of hydrocarbons, and serves more to support/sustain growth (in that they are additive to our energy use rather than supplanting any) than adapt to a simplifying world with much, much less energy–particularly net energy–to support our expansion and complexities, let alone continue to sustain the status quo.
The combination of increasing ecological systems destruction/degradation–because of our massive expansion in both numbers and corollary resource consumption and waste production–and very significant dependency upon a single energy resource (that is finite in nature and has encountered significant diminishing returns) has painted us into a corner.
While it has been said that history never repeats itself precisely but tends to rhyme with the past, the archaeological record has shown that virtually every iteration of human societal complexity has eventually reached a zenith and then simplified/collapsed. Our story, then, is likely to be quite similar but with idiosyncratic twists and turns not experienced in the past. Predicting exactly what will happen, or when, is complete guesswork.
From my perspective, our pre/historical record can provide signals as to what we might expect (bearing in mind that differences in the interpretation of artifactual remains and their import alters the story told). Whether humanity can avoid and/or mitigate the trials ahead of us is yet to be seen–especially in a fractured world where the worst of us seem to be steering the policies and actions to be taken as we bump up against the limits of what is and is not possible.
The current lack of skills/knowledge to be self-reliant/-sufficient (at a scale far, far beyond past societal simplifications where skilled families/communities could extricate themselves from the sociopolitical/-economic complexities and their disintegration via migration and/or self-sufficiency) combined with widespread ecological systems destruction due to humanity’s expansive reach and extractive proclivities, as well as significant diminishing returns on resource extraction and energy-averaging systems (i.e., trade to subsidise the lack of local resources) indicates exceedingly chaotic times ahead for homo sapiens 8 billion individuals and their complex societies.
The tales that will be told by we story-telling apes as the species collectively stumbles into this chaotic future and argue incessantly over how to ‘solve’ our insoluble predicaments will be something to behold. I can’t help but wonder what myths about our peak global society will emerge on the other side of this stupendous clusterfuck we have created. My ‘hope’ is that humanity can meet these ‘challenging’ times with grace and dignity; my prediction, however, is that we will not.
Best of luck to all in the journey ahead.
Snapshot of articles I’ll be reading/summarising over the next year or more:
The Origins of Agriculture. Kent Flannery, 1973.
Archaeological Contributions to Climate Change Research: The Archaeological Record as a Paleoclimatic and Paleoenvironmental Archive. Daniel H Sandweiss and Alice R. Kelley, 2012.
Archaeology, Ecological History, and Conservation. Frances M. Hayashida, 2005.
What Cultural Primatology Can Tell Anthropologists about the Evolution of Culture. Susan E. Perry , 2006.
Social Stratification. Frank Cancian, 1976.
The Archaeology of Equality and Inequality. Robert Paynter, 1989.
The Evolution of Complexity in the Valley of Oaxaca. Stephen A. Kowalewski, 1990.
Institutional Failure in Resource Management. James M. Acheson, 2006.
Population Control and Politics. Jack Parsons. 1991.
Population Growth Through History and the Escape From the Malthusian Trap: A Homeostatic Simulation Model. Marc Artzrouni and John Komlos. 1985.
Population Viability Analyses with Demographically and Spatially Structured Models. H. Reşit Akçakaya. 2000.
Optimum Human Population Size. Gretchen C. Daily, Anne H. Ehrlich and Paul R. Ehrlich. 1993.
Is Human Culture Carcinogenic for Uncontrolled Population Growth and Ecological Destruction? Warren M. Hern. 1993.
A handful of ‘recent’ articles of interest (you can view many more on my website):
If you’ve made it to the end of this Contemplation and have got something out of my writing, please consider ordering the trilogy of my ‘fictional’ novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian), via my website or the link below — the ‘profits’ of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).
Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).
If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.
Costs (Canadian dollars): Book 1: $2.99 Book 2: $3.89 Book 3: $3.89 Trilogy: $9.99
Feel free to throw in a ‘tip’ on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents/dollars helps…
If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com.
You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton’s Overshoot and Tainter’s Collapse: see here.
It Bears Repeating: Best Of…Volume 1
A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.
With a Foreword and Afterword by Michael Dowd, authors include: Max Wilbert; Tim Watkins; Mike Stasse; Dr. Bill Rees; Dr. Tim Morgan; Rob Mielcarski; Dr. Simon Michaux; Erik Michaels; Just Collapse’s Tristan Sykes & Dr. Kate Booth; Kevin Hester; Alice Friedemann; David Casey; and, Steve Bull.
The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine–and most certainly than what mainstream media/politics would have us believe.
Click here to access the document as a PDF file, free to download.
What follows is a story involving a movie watched by animals. The pacing of the movie to be described might seem like a very odd choice, but it simply mirrors the pacing of human life on the planet. A vivid visual imagination on your part will help to bring the story to life. So, put on your creative cap and let’s dive in!
Picture a small-town movie theater on a street so quiet and unimposing that the surrounding prairie and forest sidle right up to the back of the theater. The marquee advertises a feature film called The Human Saga.
As the afternoon shadows lengthen, a trickle of woodland creatures start to emerge from the forest, mosey up to the theater, pay for tickets, and go in. You notice rabbits, a fox, a group of turkeys, a band of raccoons, some stoats, newts, a skunk (who will be lucky enough to sit next to it?), a hoppy group of frogs, some chittering squirrels, a family of porcupines, a pair of doves, an ancient looking tortoise, a doe and her two fawns, and even a mama bear with cubs. They and many others have all come to absorb a tale of what these humans are all about. It’s a long movie: almost three hours chronicling the almost 3 million years of humans on Earth. But it’s fine: no one is in a big hurry.
The animals amicably settle into their seats, enjoying candy, popcorn, and a hot dog here and there. They’re relaxed, but wide-eyed with excitement for this special treat.
Opening Scene
The curtains rise, and the opening scene dazzles the crowd, bathing them in orange light as a bright sunrise radiates from the screen…
…click on the above link to read the rest of the article…
Today’s very short contemplation was in response to a post I was asked to comment upon that calls for sociopolitical ‘leadership’ to ‘tackle’ natural disasters that have been linked to the climate crisis.
I believe that most still don’t understand that the existential predicaments we are experiencing are but symptoms of the over-arching predicament of ecological overshoot[1]. Until and unless we acknowledge our overshoot we seem to be chasing maladaptive strategies in attempts to deal with its catastrophic symptoms and, in my opinion, asking the wrong people to address the situation.
For example, most people, in their well-intentioned desire to confront the effects of climate change, believe that if we abandon fossil fuel use and transition to some alternative (that has been mislabeled ‘green/clean’ and ‘sustainable’), we can maintain our energy-intensive complexities. Understanding that energy-harvesting technologies (e.g., solar, wind, wave, nuclear) not only depend upon the fossil fuel platform but upon finite resources that require a continuation of environmentally-/ecologically-destructive processes to retrieve and refine radically alters how one should perceive our path forward.
We need to be pursuing radical degrowth in all its iterations, from population to economics. Modern living standards of advanced economies (even of ‘emerging’ economies) are not in any way shape or form sustainable on a finite planet. If we cannot accept this and acknowledge that this needs to guide our responses and actions, then we are in all likelihood destined (some argue it is all but guaranteed) to experience the collapse that always accompanies overshoot. And such collapse will only increase in severity when it eventually occurs if we continue to chase misguided ‘solutions’ that further reduce the natural carrying capacity of the planet.
Given that our sociopolitical systems are built on power/wealth structures that for some time now have come to rely almost exclusively upon chasing the perpetual growth chalice, it seems to me that looking to them to correct our path is completely misplaced and increasingly more destructive in the end. Their tendency is to talk a good talk about addressing issues but when push comes to shove they almost always leverage such crises to their own advantage in one way or another to expand upon and prolong the Ponzi schemes they preside over[2].
As I argued in a recent article[3], people: “are encouraged to focus on relocalising the basic aspects of living (i.e., potable water procurement, food production, and regional shelter needs) as much as possible and reconnect with community members who will be your primary supports as things go increasingly sideways. Do not put your faith in our so-called political ‘leaders’. Despite their propaganda, they do not have your best interests at the top of their agendas; if such an incentive even makes the agenda except perhaps around election time when the marketing of more, more, more really blossoms. Because, you know, more is in your best interest…only it’s not.”
Yes, we need to shut down our fossil fuel industry but we also need to realise there is no ‘replacement’ for the significant energy it supplies society. The post-carbon world will be radically, and I mean radically, different than today. The illusion of a modern utopia with electric vehicles and all the accoutrements painted by the techno-cornucopian snake oil salesmen (that are little more than grifters lining their pockets) must be abandoned if we are to have any hope of getting through the bottleneck we have created for our species and most others on this planet.
Please consider visiting my website and helping to support its continuation through the purchase of my ‘fictional’ collapse trilogy: Olduvai.
[1] If you have yet to read William Catton Jr.’s Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change, I highly recommend it. It is fundamental to understanding overshoot. You can find my personal summary notes here.
[2] I use the term Ponzi scheme intentionally given the fact that such contrivances require continual growth to keep from collapsing and that they are, for all intents and purposes, rackets that benefit a few at the expense of the many participants.
Yes, the grieving process must be travelled through to the end to reach ‘acceptance’ of our human ecological overshoot predicament. Some are just beginning this process and as such display the very typical denial and bargaining stages, thinking quite adamantly that human ingenuity and our technological prowess will triumph over any and everything that Nature has in store for us story-telling apes. In fact, it’s not unlikely that the vast, vast majority of people are not even remotely aware of the human ecological dilemma and attribute growing signs of ‘collapse’ to socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors solely.
For myself, it took a number of years to move through these grief stages and I still get bogged down in some ‘hopefulness’ periodically that we can avoid what is for all intents and purposes inevitable (I think mostly because I have children whom I’d like to think can ‘dodge’ the ramifications of the coming storm).
Aside from this psychological journey of grieving, I wrote a series of Contemplations (starting here) about a number of other cognitive aspects that impact our belief systems and thinking about this, concluding that:
“The collapse that always accompanies overshoot seems baked in at this point with little if anything we can do about it.
Personally, I’d like to see our dwindling fossil fuels dedicated to decommissioning safely those significantly dangerous complexities we’ve created (e.g., nuclear power plants, biosafety labs, chemical storage, etc.) and relocalising as much potable water procurement, food production, and regional shelter needs as possible rather than attempting to sustain what is ultimately unsustainable given the fossil fuel inputs necessary. Perhaps, just perhaps. by doing these things a few pockets of humanity (and many other species) can come out the other side of the bottleneck we’ve created for ourselves.”
Your call for focusing on a ‘graceful landing’ immediately had me think about Dr. Kate Booth and Tristan Sykes ‘Just Collapse’ initiative. They describe it as “an activist platform dedicated to socio-ecological justice in face of inevitable and irreversible global collapse…[that] advocates for a Just Collapse and Planned Collapse to avert the worst outcomes that will follow an otherwise unplanned, reactive collapse…[and] advocates for localised insurgent planning and mutual aid.” And this avenue may be the best path to follow at this point, particularly since it appears that most of our reactionary attempts to stave off the symptom predicaments of our overshoot are serving to exacerbate our issues.
Exponential Growth, Natural Carrying Capacity, and Ecological Overshoot
The following very short contemplation was in response to some comments on an Andrew Nikiforuk article in The Tyee.
As an Apex predator, humans were on a path from the outset to likely overshoot the natural carrying capacity of their environment. As the late Dr. Albert Bartlett opines in a must-watch presentation on our inability to understand the exponential function: “…here we can see the human dilemma — everything we regard as good makes the population problem worse, everything we regard as bad helps solve the problem. There is a dilemma if ever there was one.”
As William Catton argues in Overshoot, we humans have had two approaches to overcoming carrying capacity limits and continuing our exponential population explosion and global reach/impact: the takeover and drawdown methods.
For millennia we relied upon taking over unexploited regions by migrating. The biggest boost came about with the European ‘discovery’ of a second hemisphere.
Then, a couple of centuries ago, we began exploiting the drawdown method that relies upon extraction of fossil energy to inflate the human carrying capacity.
Given that the drawdown method relies upon a finite resource, that avenue of extending the limits to our expansion could only ever be temporary. And, it would appear, we encountered diminishing returns on the drawdown method some decades ago but are only now really beginning to experience the limits imposed upon us by a finite planet.
Population biology shows us what happens to a species that comes to rely upon finite resources (or renewables ones that are over-harvested faster than can be replenished): population collapse.
We have this knowledge and awareness but for many reasons we tend to refuse to accept it. Instead we craft comforting narratives in our denial or bargaining to avoid thinking too deeply about it.
There is no solving this via our technology or ‘ingenuity’ (in fact, there’s a good argument to be made that our attempts to do this are actually expediting and adding to our overshoot by increasing our drawdown of finite resources, further overloading our planetary sinks, and further reducing our carrying capacity). Our refusal (for whatever reason) to degrow/downsize/power-down/etc. ensures we lose our chance to mitigate the consequences of our overshoot.
After posting this comment, Alice Friedemann (see her Energy Skeptic website) posted the following on Facebook. I encourage everyone to read this and consider signing it.
Energy-Averaging Systems and Complexity: A Recipe For Collapse
Supply chain disruptions and the product shortages that result have become a growing concern over the past couple of years and the reasons for these are as varied as the people providing the ‘analysis’. Production delays. Covid-19 pandemic. Pent-up consumer demand. Central bank monetary policy. Government economic stimulus. Consumer hoarding. Supply versus demand basics. Labour woes. Vaccination mandates. Union strikes. The number and variety of competing narratives is almost endless.
I have been once again reminded of the vagaries of our supply chains, the disruptions that can result, and our increasing dependence upon them with the unprecedented torrential rain and flood damage across many parts of British Columbia, Canada; and, of course, similar disruptions have occurred across the planet.
Instead of a recognition that perhaps a rethinking is needed of the complexities of our current systems and the dependencies that result from them, particularly in light of this increasingly problematic supply situation, we have politicians (and many in the media) doubling-down on the very systems that have helped to put us in the various predicaments we are encountering.
Our growing reliance on intensive-energy and other resource systems is not viewed as any type of dependency that places us in the crosshairs of ecological overshoot and unforeseen circumstances, but as a supply and demand conundrum that can be best addressed via our ingenuity and technology. Once again the primacy of a political and/or economic worldview, as opposed to an ecological one, shines through in our interpretation of world events; and of course the subsequent ‘solutions’ proposed.
Our dependence upon complex and thus fragile long-distance supply chains (over which we may have little control whatsoever) is not perceived as a consequence of resource constraints manifesting themselves on a finite planet with a growing population and concomitant resource requirements but as a result of ‘organisational’ weaknesses that can be overcome with the right political and/or economic ‘solutions’. Greater centralisation. More money ‘printing’. Increased taxes. Significant investment in ‘green’ energy. Massive wealth ‘redistribution’. Expansive infrastructure construction. Higher wages. Rationing. Forced vaccinations. The proposed ‘solutions’ are almost endless in nature and scope.
All of these ‘solutions’ have one thing in common: they attempt to ‘tweak’ our current economic/political systems. They fail to recognise that perhaps the weakness or ‘problem’ is with the system itself. A system that has built-in constraints that pre/history, and population biology, would suggest result in eventual failure.
Archaeologist Joseph Tainter discusses the benefits and vulnerabilities of ‘energy averaging systems’ (i.e., trade) that contributed to the collapse of the Chacoan society in his seminal text The Collapse of Complex Societies.
He argued that the energy averaging system employed early on took advantage of the Chacoan Basin’s diversity, distributing environmental vagaries of food production in a mutually-supportive network that increased subsistence security and accommodated population growth. At the beginning, this system was improved by adding more participants and increasing diversity but as time passed duplication of resource bases increased and less productive areas were added causing the buffering effect to decline.
This fits entirely with Tainter’s basic thesis that as problem-solving organisations, complex societies gravitate towards the easiest-to-implement and most beneficial ‘solutions’ to begin with. As time passes, the ‘solutions’ become more costly to society in terms of ‘investments’ (e.g., time, energy, resources, etc.) and the beneficial returns accrued diminish. This is the law of marginal utility, or diminishing returns, in action.
As return on investment dropped for those in the Chacoan Basin that were involved in the agricultural trade system, communities began to withdraw their participation in it. The collapse of the Chacoan society was not due primarily to environmental deterioration (although that did influence behaviour) but because the population choose to disengage when the challenge of another drought raised the costs of participation to a level that was more than the benefits of remaining. In other words, the benefits amassed by participation in the system declined over time and environmental inconsistencies finally pushed regions to remove themselves from a system that no longer provided them security of supplies; participants either moved out of the area or relocalised their economies. The return to a more simplified and local dependence emerged as supply chains could no longer provide security.
Having just completed rereading William Catton Jr.’s Overshoot, I can’t help but take a slightly different perspective than the mainstream ones that are being offered through our various media; what Catton terms an ecological perspective. And one that is influenced by Tainter’s thesis: our supply chain disruptions are increasingly coming under strain from our being in overshoot and encountering diminishing returns on our investments in them (and this is particularly true for one of the most fundamental resources that underpin our global industrial societies: fossil fuels).
What should we do? It’s one of the things I’ve stressed for some years in my local community (not that it seems to be having much impact, if any): we need to use what dwindling resources remain to relocalise as much as possible but particularly food production, procurement of potable water, and supplies of shelter needs for the regional climate so that supply disruptions do not result in a massive ‘collapse’ (an additional priority should also be to ‘decommission’ some of our more ‘dangerous’ creations such as nuclear power plants and biosafety labs).
Pre/history shows that relocalisation is going to happen eventually anyways, and in order to avert a sudden loss of important supplies that would have devastating consequences (especially food, water, and shelter), we should prepare ourselves now while we have the opportunity and resources to do so.
Instead, what I’ve observed is a doubling-down as it were of the processes that have created our predicament: pursuit of perpetual growth on a finite planet, using political/economic mechanisms along with hopes of future technologies to rationalise/justify this approach. While such a path may help to reduce the stress of growing cognitive dissonance, it does nothing to help mitigate the coming ‘storms’ that will increasingly disrupt supply chains.
The inability of our ‘leaders’ to view the world through anything but a political/economic paradigm and its built-in short-term focus has blinded them to the reality that we do not stand above and outside of nature or its biological principles and systems. We are as prone to overshoot and the consequences that come with it as any other species. And because of their blindness (and most people’s uncritical acceptance of their narratives) we are rushing towards a cliff that is directly ahead. In fact, perhaps we’ve already left solid ground but just haven’t realised it yet because, after all, denial is an extremely powerful drug.
Today’s Contemplation is my brief comment on an article posted on Facebook by Tristan Sykes of Just Collapse.
The article in question (short and concise) is an update of the World3 model used in creating the various scenarios in the 1972 The Limits to Growth study using the most recent empirical data.
While the authors make clear the uncertainty involved in a data’s trendline after it reaches its ‘tipping point’ (although one could argue there exists great uncertainty in any such modelling beyond the present; complex systems with their nonlinear feedback loops and emergent phenomena are impossible to map out with ‘perfect’ accuracy), the interesting — but not surprising — thing to note is that virtually all of these projections exhibit not just shifts of their peaks into the future but ‘higher highs’ followed by temporally-contracted declines (i.e., a quicker ‘collapse’) resulting in ‘lower lows’.
‘Deniers’ will argue this highlights the fallibility of ‘doom-based’ narratives’ and ‘bargainers’ will likely suggest this buys humanity more time to ‘mitigate/manage’ our predicament. But, perhaps, this merely points out how non-linear system-feedback loops behave.
As Donella Meadows argued in Thinking in Systems: A Primer: “…Delays that are too long cause damped, sustained or exploding oscillations, depending on how much too long. Overlong delays in a system with a threshold, a danger point, a range past which irreversible damage can occur, cause overshoot and collapse.”
The delays in these peaks that are projected are looking to allow us to go further into overshoot — providing fodder for those rationalising away our predicament — and most likely result in a ‘correction’ that will most certainly ‘dampen’ adaptive responses as the time to do so will be shorter. Such a situation may also possibly feed into further negative feedback loops as attempted adaptations could be quite maladaptive (as many (most? all?) have been the past few decades given the influence and direction of our societies’ wealth-extractors who are leveraging our predicament at every turn).
While it is indeed difficult to make predictions, especially if they’re about the future, overshoot and collapse remains the predicted ‘conclusion’ of this business-as-usual scenario, despite the uncertainty painted by the authors.
As the saying goes, the future ain’t what it used to be; it seems to be getting worse by the day…
