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Behind the Scenes at the Central Banks that Created our Modern Monetary System

Behind the Scenes at the Central Banks that Created our Modern Monetary System

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[From the Summer 2018 Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. A review of How Global Currencies Work: Past, Present, and Future by Barry Eichengreen, Arnaud Mehl, and Livia Chitu, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018, 250 pp.]

The present volume is an engaging and intriguing account of how global currencies, such as British sterling and the U.S. dollar, have risen to global dominance in the international monetary arena, and how currencies such as the Chinese renminbi, for example, could follow in their footsteps. Divided into twelve chapters, the work focuses primarily on the international monetary history of the 20th century, complemented by a comparatively brief account of the 19th and 21st centuries. The narrower focus of the discussion in these chapters—and most of the data supplied in each chapter’s appendices—concerns the composition of foreign reserves, i.e. the balance between holdings of pounds and dollars, and later of yen, euro, and renminbi.

From this, the authors propose to tease out a few new factual discoveries and some implications for the future of the international monetary system. More precisely, they disavow the traditional theoretical view which argues that international currency status resembles a natural monopoly that arises organically from the benefits of using the currency of the most economically (commercially and financially) powerful country in international economic transactions, i.e. a monopoly due to network returns (p. 4), and winner-takes-all and lock-in effects.

Because, argue the authors, this ‘old’ model is not supported by much of the data from the 20th century, they propose a ‘new’ view arguing that multiple currencies can be used concomitantly on an international scale, such as the pound sterling and the dollar during the 1920s. These currencies played “consequential international roles” (p. 11) demonstrating that inertia and persistence due to network effects in international transactions are not as strong as previously thought.

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Europe Struggles as the ECB Pretends to Know What It’s Doing

Europe Struggles as the ECB Pretends to Know What It’s Doing

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The European Central Bank (ECB) is rumored to be planning a halt  to its four-year quantitative easing program at the end of this week when it will stop its asset purchases while continuing to keep interest rates at current near-zero levels through 2019. The Economist laments this ‘rash’ decision, arguing that the European economy is still ‘faltering’, showing only very feeble and unstable signs of growth.

Since 2015, the ECB has bought bonds worth almost $3trn. However, core inflation has remained fairly low, exports have waxed and waned, and the Euro area has shown no clear signs of recovery after the 2008 financial collapse. Groping in the dark, The Economistblames “[p]oor weather, strikes and a bad flu season” for the shaky start of 2018, and low demand, both domestic and foreign, for the overall bleak outlook.

But in fact, the European economy is a very sick patient whose self-appointed doctor, the ECB, is treating it with the same poison that made it ill in the first place. It is also judging the health of its patient by monitoring the wrong signs, i.e. looking for some color in its cheeks rather than a strong heartbeat.

Mises (2009, 20) pointed out as early as 1934 that

[…] the inevitable and ineluctable consequence of the expansion of credit… was bound to lead eventually to a collapse. And the thing which is chiefly advocated as a remedy is nothing but another expansion of credit, such as certainly might lead to a transitory boom, but would be bound to end in a correspondingly severer crisis.

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Why Public Debt Is a Problem — And Trade Deficits Aren’t

Why Public Debt Is a Problem — And Trade Deficits Aren’t

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As the U.S. trade deficit has been widening for the fourth month running, markets and business experts appear once again bewildered by the events and unsure how to react to them. On the one hand, they had vehemently opposed the increase in trade tariffs and the trade war that has made headlines this year. But on the other hand, they now find that U.S. trade deficit reaching its largest level on record — the precise deficit tariffs purported to narrow — is very worrying. Furthermore, as they scramble to adjust their costs and production plans to the increasing uncertainty of world trade relations — including here not only U.S.’s trade disputes with China, but also UK’s planned exit from the EU and the fraught relationships at the WTO — global companies are also paying less attention to the Fed’s and other central banks’ monetary policies.

It is not hard to see why they are confused. Political turmoil is bound to make navigation of global markets much more difficult, and smooth planning almost impossible. At the same time, the fallacy that trade deficits are detrimental to a nation in and of themselves is very deeply rooted in public opinion. By comparison, government deficits and easy monetary policies — the real culprit behind eroding wealth and falling purchasing power — get a lot less bad press than they deserve.

It is thus worth reminding ourselves that trade deficits themselves are not at all problematic. As Mises (2009, 448) explained:

While an individual’s balance of payments conveys exhaustive information about his social position, a group’s balance discloses much less. It says nothing about the mutual relations between the members of the group. The greater the group is and the less homogeneous its members are, the more defective is the information vouchsafed by the balance of payments.

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Trade Tariffs Won’t Crash the World Economy, Monetary Policy Will

Trade Tariffs Won’t Crash the World Economy, Monetary Policy Will

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As the Trump administration announces 25% tariffs on over $50bn of Chinese goods, and Europe and China prepare retaliation measures, The Economist concludes that “Rising tariffs are the worst of many threats to the world economy”, because, among other things, “Tariffs temporarily push up inflation, making it harder for central banks to cushion the blow.” This statement displays a deeply entrenched confusion—if not utter misunderstanding—of some basic economic concepts. Most important, many people fail to correctly distinguish between the causes and effects of price inflation and those of monetary inflation.

Monetary inflation is the increase in the quantity of money in an economy. This inflation causes the purchasing power of money to fall, which brings about price effects—a general rise in prices of goods and services—which we can refer to as price inflation. However, this general rise in prices following monetary inflation is disproportionate and staggered: prices will rise at different times and to different extents as money reaches a lower purchasing power.

But monetary inflation also has non-price effects. One of these is the transfer of wealth between the last receivers of the new money toward the first receivers.

Another—and even more important—is the distortion of the pattern of investment and production, as the new money being created through credit expansion reaches stock markets and businesses—thus artificially reducing the interest rate. This latter effect explains the occurrence of production booms misaligned with consumer preferences, and the later, inevitable economic bust or crash. These price and non-price effects of monetary inflation are general and underline every possible economic activity.

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Keynes in 1939: The Coming War Will Solve our Unemployment Problem

Keynes in 1939: The Coming War Will Solve our Unemployment Problem 

On the eve of World War II, Keynes delivered the following chilling address on the BBC, talking about the “great experiment” of curing unemployment through war expenditure:

Two years later to the day, in a lecture delivered shortly after his arrival in the U.S., Mises described how the great experiment really looked like:

We are witnesses to the most frightful and phenomenal occurrence in human history: the decay of Western civilization. London, one of the centers of this civilization… is almost completely destroyed. The buildings of the Parliament of Westminster are in ruins; the House of Commons holds its assemblies in the catacombs. […] The theater of war is spreading, and the day seems not distant when peace will have lost its last refuge. It is a moral and material collapse without precedent.

Olduvai IV: Courage
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Olduvai II: Exodus
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