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<\/a><\/p>\nTulum, Mexico. (1986) Photo by author.<\/span><\/p>\n This Contemplation comments upon and summarises a paper that considers prehistorical periods of rapid climatic transition and societal-level responses to the resulting environmental changes. I thought it interesting to review this research article given the significant concern many have regarding how humans may respond to current\/future climatic shifts and the changes that result from them.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Many variables of significant, possibly existential, importance to human existence will increasingly be impacted by a changing climate, including but not limited to: biodiversity loss, extreme weather events, disease propagation, altered geographies, and resource availability and distribution\u2013especially water and arable land. Whether our species, or any for that matter, will or can adapt to these changes in either the short-term or long-term is unknown\u2013there exist diametrically-opposed views on this, from widespread extinction of all life to a \u2018clean\u2019 and \u2018sustainable\u2019 techno-utopia in balance with nature.<\/span><\/p>\n The research article in question looks at the changes that took place during the Middle Holocene Climatic Transition (MHCT), a glacial-interglacial transition period of rapid climate change, and how human societies of the time responded to the resulting environmental shifts.<\/span><\/p>\n As the author makes clear the comparison is not perfect, primarily because of the differences in the nature of the climate shifts and the human population density and distribution dissimilarities. However, he also points out that it is somewhat analogous in that complex societies were in existence during the changes, so we can draw some parallels based upon how past societies responded to unpredictable and chaotic changes in their environment.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n What\u2019s interesting to me is that the evidence can be interpreted as hopeful for some form of successful adaptation as our world changes due to a shifting climate. While some groups were forced to disperse and others perished in the face of a rapidly changing climate, the emergence of urbanisation and complex societies as a result of adapting to environmental shifts occurred as well. There are, of course, significant caveats that suggest modern-day complex societies will not be so lucky as to adapt to changes in anything like their present form and\/or population densities.<\/span><\/p>\n There exist a number of impediments for our present-day societies and their adaptability to environmental shifts in comparison to those of the past. Below are three of these.<\/span><\/p>\n First, there is a very large segment of today\u2019s global population that is enormously reliant upon industrial technologies for maintenance of a vast array of complexities, particularly food production and distribution. These technologies, in turn, are dependent upon a finite energy resource (hydrocarbons) up and down their supply chains. Disruptions in the complex array of supports to maintain our energy-intensive technologies put many modern human populations at risk.<\/span><\/p>\n Second, there are few resource-rich regions left on the planet for human societies to expand into and exploit relative to the past. The hyper-charged population densities and distribution we currently have (thanks to the significant surplus energy of easy-to-access hydrocarbons) make the successful adaptations that past societies exhibited far less likely\u2013to say little about the increasing loss of fertility of much of our arable land due to excessive use of hydrocarbon-based chemicals upon them. There was much greater capacity for growth during shifts in the past with smaller population densities, more sparsely distributed settlements, minimal complexity, and resource abundance. The latitude available for past societies to adapt to environmental changes is gone for 8+ billion (and growing) of our species. Add to this the reality of having encountered diminishing returns on investments whereby greater and greater resources (especially energy) must be used to meet current needs, let alone growing ones.<\/span><\/p>\n Third, there exists for large swaths of our global population a general lack of skills and knowledge to survive without our energy-intensive technologies and various logistical\/organisational systems. In the past, the vast majority of people were involved in food production and could support themselves and\/or their families without complex societal systems sustaining them. That is certainly not the case today with few within our populations capable of providing anyone with the basic necessities of existence\u2013potable water, food, and\/or regional shelter needs.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Overall, things do not bode well for modern-day societies to rely upon the adaptations of the past that proved successful in the face of rapid environmental changes.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n I, personally, am as confident as I can be that \u2018collapse\u2019 of our global, industrialised complex societies is in our future\u2013many argue that it has already begun. I am unsure, however, of what arises in terms of human existence from this predicament; if anything given the degree to which we appear to be in ecological overshoot.<\/span><\/p>\n With our propensity to double down on our pursuit of technological innovation and economic growth in the face of perceived problems (rather than pursuing a simplification and contraction of our lifestyles) we are exacerbating our predicaments and creating a situation whereby the likelihood of adapting to changing conditions is being made significantly more difficult and unlikely by the day.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Only time, of course, will tell what the future holds for humanity\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n Below is a summary of the research article. The longer summary notes can be found here<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Beyond Collapse: Climate Change and Causality During the Middle Holocene Climatic Transition, 6400-5000 Years Before Present<\/b><\/p>\n Nick Brooks Our changing climate is expected to mirror the shift witnessed during glacial-interglacial transitions, only more quickly and possibly reach global average temperatures not seen for millions of years. While changes to our oceanic and atmospheric currents are not precisely known, previous transitions do suggest that the availability and distribution of key resources (especially water and arable land) will be altered and likely affect human societies.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Analogues exist from the past 10,000 years, when cyclical climate disruptions have occurred every 1000-2000 years lasting 100-300 years. These are characterised by cooling at high and middle latitudes, and increased aridity at lower ones\u2013especially in the northern hemisphere. These changes have been linked to warfare and population collapse, and the collapse of several complex societies (e.g., Arkkadian, Egyptian Old Kingdom, Neolithic cultures, and others).<\/span><\/p>\n The Middle Holocene Climatic Transition (MHCT, 6500-5000 BP) witnessed a significant environmental reorganisation due to an acceleration of cooling and increasing aridity trends. Some regions experienced sudden arid conditions, others glacial advance. Monsoons weakened with rains moving southward, and El Ni\u00f1o reappeared after a prolonged absence. The global climate system appears to have been impacted by summer solar radiation weakening outside of the tropics due to a rotational axis shift.<\/span><\/p>\n The present day is different from the MHCT in several ways: warming vs. cooling, increasing greenhouse gasses vs. a solar insolation shift, and retreat of ice and snow vs. glacial advance. The distribution of changes will be different as well and the present day may experience greater aridity, especially outside of monsoon regions.<\/span><\/p>\n The societal contexts are very different (e.g., population densities and distribution) but also similar (e.g., large urban centres and state-level societies with hierarchical structures and political institutions, as well as some small-scale agriculture and pastoralism).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n All regions studied exhibited societal shifts that coincided with rapid climate shifts. In Mesopotamia, egalitarian village-level farming communities coalesced into a hierarchical culture and agricultural settlements were abandoned with the rise of urban centres. In Egypt, many migrated to the Nile River Valley, and in some areas cattle herding increased but in a mobile sense with populations seeking appropriate pastures due to an unpredictable environment. In the Indus Valley, pastoral societies arose with cyclical migration.<\/span><\/p>\n Migration patterns, livelihoods, and settlement and occupation patterns all changed in light of increased aridity. In particular, increasing aridity led to movement towards reliable water sources and\/or arable lands, the rise of nomadic pastoralism in order to follow grazable pastures, and increasing exploitation of riparian environments (ecosystem along the edge of water bodies).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n \u201cWorsening environmental conditions may well have altered patterns of productivity, resulting in the abandonment of some areas, the agglomeration of populations in others, increased competition over resources, and widespread social disruption.\u201d (p. 98)<\/span><\/p>\n Near the end of the MHCT (5300-5000 BP) some cultures in Mesopotamia (e.g., Uruk) collapsed with nomadic pastoralism arising, while some areas witnessed dispersed populations coming together to form urban centres (e.g., Uruk-Warka). Resource competition between protostates in Egypt resulted in a larger, complex society centred on the Nile River Valley, while some regions experienced settlement abandonment and populations perishing. A shift towards greater transhumance (seasonal pastoralism) in the Indus Valley led to the emergence of urbanisation. Migration towards the Yellow River in China witnessed a shift from early complex societies to larger and more complex ones. The river valleys of coastal Peru also saw the emergence of urbanisation as people gathered in such resource-rich locations.<\/span><\/p>\n Aridification appears to have impacted migrations towards reliable water sources, where many gathered and resulted in urbanisation and complexity, including social stratification, class\/caste systems, and formal political power.<\/span><\/p>\n The archaeological evidence points to some complex societies collapsing as a result of environmental changes due to a changing climate. On the other hand, there is also evidence that some complex societies appear to have emerged as a consequence of climate change. It would appear that different contexts had different, even the opposite, outcome when climate changes occurred in the past.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n During the MHCT some regions experienced sudden arid conditions, others glacial advance. Monsoons weakened with rains moving south, El Ni\u00f1o reappeared after a prolonged absence. Summer solar radiation weakening outside the tropics due to a rotational axis shift that impacted the global climate system. The present day is different. Rather than cooling and glacial advances due to a solar insolation shift we are experiencing warming with snow and ice retreat due to greenhouse gasses.<\/span><\/p>\n The societal contexts are different in terms of population densities and distribution but similar in terms of large, urban centres and state-level societies with social hierarchies and political institutions along with some small-scale agriculture and pastoralism).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n All regions studied exhibit societal shifts that coincide with rapid climate changes. In Mesopotamia, egalitarian village-level farming communities coalesced into a hierarchical culture. Migrations to the Nile River Valley in Egypt occurred alongside a rise in nomadic pastoralism that required movement to follow suitable pastures during a time of unpredictable environments. Meanwhile, in the Indus Valley, pastoral societies emerged defined by seasonal migrations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Depending where one looks, there is strong evidence to support the interpretation that rapid environmental change led to societal-level changes. Migration patterns, livelihoods, and settlement and occupation patterns all changed in light of increasing aridity. In particular, increasing aridity led to: movement towards reliable water sources and arable lands; increasing nomadic pastoralism to follow suitable pasturelands; increasing exploitation of riparian environments; and the abandonment of settlements.<\/span><\/p>\n \u201cThe evidence from the Middle Holocene discussed here suggests that rapid climate change played a role in the emergence of complex societies, as well as their collapse, and that similar climatic stresses might result in very different outcomes in different societal contexts.\u201d (p. 100)<\/span><\/p>\n In some instances, climate change overwhelmed other drivers of societal change and adaptation was not possible. Depending upon the circumstances, however, other societies adapted.<\/span><\/p>\n If you\u2019ve made it to the end of this contemplation and have got something out of my writing, <\/span>please consider ordering the trilogy of my \u2018fictional\u2019 novel series, Olduvai (PDF files; only $9.99 Canadian)<\/b>, via my <\/span>website<\/span><\/a> or the link below \u2014 the \u2018profits\u2019 of which help me to keep my internet presence alive and first book available in print (and is available via various online retailers).<\/span><\/p>\n Attempting a new payment system as I am contemplating shutting down my site in the future (given the ever-increasing costs to keep it running).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n If you are interested in purchasing any of the 3 books individually or the trilogy, please try the link below indicating which book(s) you are purchasing.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Costs (Canadian dollars):<\/span> Feel free to throw in a \u2018tip\u2019 on top of the base cost if you wish; perhaps by paying in U.S. dollars instead of Canadian. Every few cents\/dollars helps\u2026\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n https:\/\/paypal.me\/olduvaitrilogy?country.x=CA&locale.x=en_US\u00a0<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n If you do not hear from me within 48 hours or you are having trouble with the system, please email me: <\/span>olduvaitrilogy@gmail.com<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n You can also find a variety of resources, particularly my summary notes for a handful of texts, especially Catton\u2019s Overshoot and Tainter\u2019s Collapse: see <\/span>here<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Released September 30, 2024<\/b><\/p>\n It Bears Repeating: Best Of\u2026Volume 2<\/b><\/p>\n A compilation of writers focused on the nexus of limits to growth, energy, and ecological overshoot.<\/span><\/p>\n With a Foreword by Erik Michaels and Afterword by Dr. Guy McPherson, authors include: Dr. Peter A Victor, George Tsakraklides, Charles Hugh Smith, Dr. Tony Povilitis, Jordan Perry, Matt Orsagh, Justin McAffee, Jack Lowe, The Honest Sorcerer, Fast Eddy, Will Falk, Dr. Ugo Bardi, and Steve Bull.<\/span><\/p>\n The document is not a guided narrative towards a singular or overarching message; except, perhaps, that we are in a predicament of our own making with a far more chaotic future ahead of us than most imagine\u2013and most certainly than what mainstream media\/politics would have us believe.<\/span><\/p>\n
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\n<\/span>Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography
\n<\/span>2013
\n<\/span>Vol. 112, No. 2, 93-104
\n<\/span>http:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.1080\/00167223.2012.741881\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
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\n<\/span>Book 1: $2.99<\/span>
\n<\/span>Book 2: $3.89<\/span>
\n<\/span>Book 3: $3.89<\/span>
\n<\/span>Trilogy: $9.99<\/span><\/p>\n
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