{"id":68917,"date":"2024-10-23T06:24:20","date_gmt":"2024-10-23T11:24:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/olduvai.ca\/?p=68917"},"modified":"2024-10-23T06:24:20","modified_gmt":"2024-10-23T11:24:20","slug":"todays-contemplation-collapse-cometh-clxxxvii-collapse-prolonged-period-of-diminishing-returns-significant-stress-surges-part-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/olduvai.ca\/?p=68917","title":{"rendered":"Today\u2019s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh CLXXXVII\u2013Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 3"},"content":{"rendered":"

Today\u2019s Contemplation: Collapse Cometh <\/b>CLXXXVII\u2013
\n<\/b>Collapse = Prolonged Period of Diminishing Returns + Significant Stress Surge(s), Part 3<\/b><\/p>\n

\"\"Tulum, Mexico (1986). Photo by author.<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

This Contemplation follows from Part 1 (<\/span>Website<\/b><\/a>; <\/b>Medium<\/b><\/a>; <\/b>Substack<\/b><\/a>) and 2 (<\/span>Website<\/b><\/a>;\u00a0 <\/b>Medium<\/b><\/a>; <\/b>Substack<\/b><\/a>) <\/b>that was prompted by the devastation brought to the southeastern United States by way of Hurricane Helene. This recent natural disaster (followed closely by Hurricane Milton) is but one of dozens to hit the globe during the past year.<\/span>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

As I stated in the introductory Contemplation \u201cmy own immediate reaction to the significant damage and a few articles\/conversations with others has me viewing the tragedy that is unfolding as another step in the path towards \u2018collapse\u2019 of the U.S. nation as currently constructed. Another straw, as it were, on the camel\u2019s back that supports societal complexity for this particular nation state\/empire\u2013which would have repercussions for most other societies on our planet given U.S. global hegemony (and its faltering nature).\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

In Part 1, I describe how complexity and collapse are viewed in archaeologist Joseph Tainter\u2019s thesis (see: The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge University Press, 1988. (ISBN 978-0-521-38673-9))<\/span>. Part 2 looks at diminishing returns and begins to explore what the \u2018collapse\u2019 process entails, i.e., what occurs during and what follows the loss of sociopolitical complexity. In this Contemplation, I will expand on what the past tells us about what a large, complex society experiences as it is in the process of \u2018collapse\u2019, what it looks like post \u2018collapse\u2019, and begin to touch on what our present-day complex societies may have in store as we continue along the path of increasing complexity while encountering diminishing returns.<\/span><\/p>\n

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A \u2018Collapsing\u2019 Society
\n<\/b>Let me begin by expanding on what past societies tell us about the \u2018collapse\u2019 process.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tainter\u2019s thesis posits that complex human societies of all sizes tend to be problem-solving organisations. Their primary means of solving the problems that they encounter have been technical innovations and\/or via expanding investments in complexity, particularly sociopolitical complexity. For relatively large complex societies, ever-larger amounts of resources are funneled towards increasing: its territory and\/or reach; its problem-solving institutions and associated bureaucracies; and, its variety of social roles and mechanisms to organise all of the various parts. Over time, however, this approach encounters a point of diminishing or declining returns on its investments.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Problem-solving costs are initially borne through regular operating budgets, typically raised through societal surpluses, taxes, and\/or conscripted labour. But as diminishing returns increase the costs of greater complexity, these costs are met through enlarging the drawdown of societal reserves and demanding greater inputs by the masses. Reserves, however, are finite and what can be borne by the society is limited in nature.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Eventually a point may be reached when burgeoning complexity actually results in decreased overall benefits for society as a whole, especially since because of diminishing returns problem solving becomes more difficult and more costly, and less successful\u2013it takes more and more time and resources to achieve satisfactory problem-solving results. It is at this juncture that a society becomes more susceptible to stressors that arise and the bonds that hold it together have an increasing likelihood to fray, perhaps even fall apart as increasing numbers of people find \u2018simplification\u2019 more attractive than increased complexity.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\u201cWhere marginal returns decline, the advantages to complexity become ultimately no greater (for the society as a whole) than for less costly social forms. The marginal cost of evolution to a higher level of complexity, or of remaining at the present level, is high compared with the alternative of disintegration.\u201d (p. 121)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\n

Archaeological evidence and pre\/historical records suggest that during the collapse process the following is experienced:
\n<\/span>1) Benefits to the population fall as the costs of complexity rise;
\n<\/span>2) Shortly before the collapse, costs increase substantially and burden a society already weakened by declining marginal returns;
\n<\/span>3) The demands of supporting a complex system negatively impact the well-being of people, who\u2019s population had leveled off\/declined before collapse;
\n<\/span>4) Growth affects the environment in a negative fashion.<\/span><\/p>\n

As complexity\u2019s costs rise, and especially once diminishing returns have been encountered, it appears that those that sit at the top of the society\u2019s power and wealth structures (and benefit the most from the status quo organisation and institutions) typically respond by imposing strict behavioural controls in order to try to decrease inefficiencies and sustain the arrangements that provide their revenue streams and positions of power. This is primarily achieved via greater legitimisation activities and\/or control mechanisms. Activities of legitimisation are less expensive than the more violent\/oppressive control mechanisms that have been used over time but they both are costly and result in feedback loops that exacerbate the economic decline. Eventually, over time, society\u2019s sociopolitical systems are weakened to the point where they begin to fall apart.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The three societal examples of collapse highlighted by Tainter in his text show that their simplifications can be seen as \u201cresponses to declining marginal returns on investment in complexity\u201d (p. 192) When the benefit:cost ratio reaches a point where alternatives to complexity are more attractive, members of society choose to simplify.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Rome\u2019s collapse, for example, was not due to barbarian invasions or internal weaknesses but \u201cthe excessive costs imposed on an agricultural population to maintain a far-flung empire in a hostile environment\u201d (p. 191) The Mayan collapse was not brought about by peasant revolts, invasions, or agricultural deterioration but \u201cdue to the burdens of an increasingly costly society borne by an increasingly weakened population\u201d (p. 191) The collapse of the Chacoan society was not due to environmental deterioration but because the population choose to disengage when the challenge of another drought raised the costs of participation to a level that was more than the benefits of remaining.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Keep in mind that the societal shifts being discussed take place over a number of years\/decades. While each may be perceived as a significant adjustment (i.e., collapse) in isolation and if \u2018sudden\u2019, this is not typically how they unfold, nor how they are perceived. As the \u2018boiling a frog\u2019 metaphor discussed in Part 2 suggests, they occur in small, incremental changes that are ignored\/unnoticed in the moment but accumulate over time. It is not until or unless we step back and compare the situation prior to changes, to that which exists later on, that we recognise the significant shifts that have taken place.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A related aspect of our assessment of change that needs to be considered is the timeframe that we are viewing societal \u2018collapse\u2019 from. If we are looking at only a small segment of time, say a generational period (i.e., 20-25 years), there may be evidence of very minimal shifts in society and its institutions. However, if we step back and take in a multi-generational chunk of time, say 7-8 generations, the change over such a time frame might indicate massive societal alterations in any and all indicators. A 150 year long decline\/simplification of a 500-1000\u00a0 year span towards peak complexity is collapse-like in comparison.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is akin to the Seneca Cliff\/Effect proposed by Dr. Ugo Bardi where growth is gradual but decline is much swifter in nature. This is \u2018collapse\u2019 when viewed in the context of the entire existence of societal complexity.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

\u201c<\/span>There are centuries in which nothing happens and years in which centuries pass.\u201d<\/span>
\n<\/span>Homero Aridjis, 1991
\n<\/span>Christian Science Monitor<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cCollapse happens slowly\u2026and then very suddenly.\u201d
\n<\/span>Dave Pollard, 2020<\/span>
\n<\/span>How to Save the World<\/span><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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Post Collapse
\n<\/b>The problem-solving strategies of a society lead to its growth and increased complexity. At first this approach yields positive returns and is supported by the masses for they are receiving more benefits than the costs they must endure. Over time, however, the perceived benefits are lost and these masses become dissatisfied. In such times, any sudden stress surge (such as a significant natural disaster or geopolitical engagement) can lead to a fraying and eventual breakdown of the societal institutions and bonds that keep the society intact.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This process may occur regionally and can but does not necessarily spread to all areas of a larger society immediately. Other regions will, however, eventually also succumb to diminishing returns and eventual simplification; for as Tainter reminds us, it is only a matter of time. This is particularly so if the areas \u2018unaffected\u2019 continue to pursue increased complexity in the face of diminishing returns.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In Tainter\u2019s words: \u201cThe shift to increasing complexity, undertaken initially to relieve stress or realize an opportunity, is at first a rational, productive strategy that yields a favorable marginal return. Typically, however, continued stresses, unanticipated challenges, and the costliness of sociopolitical integration combine to lower this marginal return. As the marginal return on complexity declines, complexity as a strategy yields comparatively lower benefits at higher and higher costs. A society that cannot counter this trend, such as through acquisition of an energy subsidy, becomes vulnerable to stress surges that it is too weak or impoverished to meet, and to waning support in its population. With continuation of this trend collapse becomes a matter of mathematical probability, as over time an insurmountable stress surge becomes increasingly likely. Until such a challenge occurs, there may be a period of economic stagnation, political decline, and territorial shrinkage.\u201d (p. 127)<\/span><\/p>\n

In the introduction of his book, Tainter describes what the evidence and records suggest about the collapse process and what follows. Here is a relatively long passage from it: <\/span>“the characteristics of societies after collapse may be summarized as follows. There is, first and foremost, a breakdown of authority and central control. Prior to collapse, revolts and provincial breakaways signal the weakening of the center. Revenues to the government often decline. Foreign challengers become increasingly successful. With lower revenues the military may become ineffective. The populace becomes more and more disaffected as the hierarchy seeks to mobilize resources to meet the challenge. With disintegration, central direction is no longer possible. The former political center undergoes a significant loss of prominence and power. It is often ransacked and may ultimately be abandoned. Small, petty states emerge in the formerly unified territory, of which the previous capital may be one. Quite often these contend for domination, so that a period of perpetual conflict ensues. The umbrella of law and protection erected over the populace is eliminated. Lawlessness may prevail for a time…but order will ultimately be restored. Monumental construction and publicly-supported art largely cease to exist. Literacy may be lost entirely, and otherwise declines so dramatically that a dark age follows. What population remains in urban or other political centers reuse existing architecture in a characteristic manner. There is little new construction, and that which is attempted concentrates on adapting existing buildings. Great rooms will be subdivided, flimsy fa\u00e7ades are built, and public space will be converted to private. While some attempt may be made to carry on an attenuated version of previous ceremonialism, the former monuments are allowed to fall into decay. People may reside in upper-story rooms as lower ones deteriorate. Monuments are often mined as early sources of building materials. When a building begins to collapse, the residents simply move to another. Palaces and central storage facilities may be abandoned, along with centralized redistribution of goods and foodstuffs, or market exchange. Both long distance and local trade may be markedly reduced, and craft specialization end or decline. Subsistence and material needs come to be met largely on the basis of local self-sufficiency. Declining regional interaction leads to the establishment of local styles in items such as pottery that formerly had been widely circulated. Both portable and fixed technology (e.g. hydraulic engineering systems) revert to simpler forms that can be developed and maintained at the local level, without the assistance of a bureaucracy that no longer exists. Whether as a cause or consequence, there is typically a marked, rapid reduction in population size and density. Not only do urban populations substantially decline, but so also do the support populations of the countryside. Many settlements are concurrently abandoned. The level of population and settlement may decline to that of centuries or even millennia previously.\u201d (pp. 19-20)<\/span><\/p>\n

In summary:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n