{"id":27535,"date":"2017-11-01T19:54:50","date_gmt":"2017-11-02T00:54:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/olduvai.ca\/?p=27535"},"modified":"2017-11-01T19:54:50","modified_gmt":"2017-11-02T00:54:50","slug":"the-changing-geopolitics-of-energy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/olduvai.ca\/?p=27535","title":{"rendered":"The Changing Geopolitics of Energy"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Changing Geopolitics of Energy<\/a><\/h3>\n
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In 2008, US policymakers worried that increasing dependence on energy imports, together with rising prices, would severely constrain American geopolitical influence. Instead, the revolution in shale energy has brought about a tectonic shift in international relations, one that promises to boost US global power in the long term.<\/p>\n<\/section>\n
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TOKYO \u2013 In 2008, when the United States\u2019 National Intelligence Council (NIC) published its volume Global Trends 2025<\/a><\/em>, a key prediction was tighter energy competition. Chinese demand was growing, and non-OPEC sources like the North Sea were being depleted. After two decades of low and relatively stable prices, oil prices had soared to more than $100 per barrel in 2006. Many experts spoke of \u201cpeak oil\u201d \u2013 the idea that reserves had \u201ctopped off\u201d \u2013 and anticipated that production would become concentrated in the low-cost but unstable Middle East, where even Saudi Arabia was thought to be fully explored, with no more giant fields likely to be found.<\/p>\n